This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

3 3433 08162460 7




MICROFILMED

A

REPLY

TO

THE CALUMNIES

OF

THE EDINBURGH REVIEW

AGAINST

OXFORD.

1. Edinburgh Review.
2. Oxford Chronicle.
3. Classical education - [illegible]

A

REPLY

TO

THE CALUMNIES

OF

THE EDINBURGH REVIEW

AGAINST

OXFORD.

CONTAINING

AN ACCOUNT OF STUDIES

PURSUED IN THAT UNIVERSITY.

[Copleston, Edward.]

Χαλεπὸν τὸ μετρίως εἰπεῖν, ἐν ᾧ μόλις καὶ ἡ δόκησις τῆς ἀληθείας βεβαιοῦται.

SECOND EDITION.

OXFORD,

Printed for the Author; and sold by J. Cooke, and J. Parker; and J. Mackinlay, London.

1810.

THE NEW YORK
PUBLIC LIBRARY
502385 A
ASTOR, LENOX AND
TILDEN FOUNDATIONS
R 1930 L

NEW YORK
PUBLIC
LIBRARY

Collingwood and Co. Printers, Oxford.

ADVERTISEMENT.

IT will detract very much from the authority of theſe pages, but to prevent all poſſible miſrepreſentation it is right, to ſtate, that a ſingle individual is reſponſible for every fact, opinion, ſentiment, and criticiſm, advanced in them. The undertaking was ſuggeſted by his own feelings, without communication or advice, and finiſhed entirely by his own hand. Many things perhaps are contained in it, which would not be ſanctioned by the general voice of this place. For the correctneſs of the ſtatements, however, the Author has no fears: and for this he will not refuſe to account in perſon, if it ſhould ever be called in queſtion by any reſpectable name. In the mean time he will defend himſelf againſt the variety of judgments that will probably be paſſed on his work, by a ſentiment which is explanatory

tory of the motto he has aſſumed, and which the wiſeſt hiſtorian has placed in the mouth of the greateſt ſtateſman of Greece.

Ὁ τε γὰρ ξυνειδὼς καὶ εὔνους ἀκροατὴς τάχ' ἄν τι ἐνδεέστερος πρὸς ἃ βέλεταί τε καὶ ἐπίσταται νομίσειε δηλοῦσθαι· ὅ τε ἄπειρος, ἔστιν ἃ καὶ πλεονάζεσθαι, διὰ φθόνον, ἅτι ὑπὲρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἀκούει. Thuc. ii. 35.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION. *General Strictures on the Conduct of the Edinburgh Review.*

CHAP. I.

Of the Study of Ariſtotle, and neglect of the Mathematics. p. 14.

CHAP. II.

Examination of a Criticiſm, in the 28th Number of the Edinburgh Review, on Falconer's Edition of Strabo. p. 31.

CHAP. III.

CLASSICAL EDUCATION. *Remarks on an Article in the 29th Number of the Edinburgh Review, upon Edgeworth's Profeſſional Education.* p. 104.

CHAP. IV.

Courſe of Studies purſued at Oxford. p. 136.

CHAP. V.

Of PLANS OF EDUCATION *in general, and particularly*

cularly of Engliſh Education.—Abuſe of the term UTILITY.—*Remarks on the Study of Political Economy and Moral Philoſophy—Of ſome vulgar errors reſpecting Oxford—Concluſion.* p. 156.

INTRODUCTION.

IN a late endeavour which I made to hold up to general contempt a work profeſſedly deſigned for the Students of this Univerſity, a work teeming with faults, and preſenting a view of its ſubject totally miſtaken and confuſed, my only ſcruple then was, and my only ſource of regret now is, leſt it ſhould lead any to imagine that criticiſm of that ſort is a thing which I admire for its own ſake, or would myſelf willingly engage in. If no ſhare of the diſgrace, which ſuch a publication muſt incur, had belonged to us, if no practical evil were likely to ariſe from it, evil of a kind which it is our eſpecial duty to cure and to ſuppreſs, the work, however deceitful its name and its compoſition, might perhaps have been allowed to paſs along unnoticed. But what might be conceded to the common practitioners in this faculty of authorſhip, cannot be claimed by him who boaſts of his offices and employments in a ſeat of learning, in order to give weight and currency to his opinions—by him who had already ſpurned the rod which *gently* corrected him, and had

given full proof, that none but the moſt rigorous and unrelenting diſcipline could have any avail. In ſuch a caſe, it was well known, that no tender feelings would be haraſſed and tormented: and the ordinary ſmart, which literary diſgrace brings with it, cannot by any manly reaſoner be oppoſed to the exerciſe of an important public duty. When the author, not content with weaving his tiſſue of cobweb errors in obſcurity, preſumes to hang them on one of the proudeſt columns of our national temple, who is the ſickly *ſentimentaliſt* that would ſtay the arm of criticiſm, or feel a pang at ſeeing the whole unſightly cluſter ſwept away[a]? Swept away, I truſt, they now are, and added to that heap of uſeleſs rubbiſh which is for ever accumulating from the offal of the preſs: and I ſhall be well content if the criticiſm itſelf, as well as the folly which provoked it, be doomed to the ſame end. If there be any bits of finer temper and harder ſubſtance found in it, they may be ſorted

[a] It is ſaid that the author laughs at this criticiſm, as feeble and inefficient. If it fails of effecting its purpoſe, he may be ſure another attempt of the ſame kind will be made. Of the province of taſte, wit, fancy, and female education, I leave him in undiſturbed poſſeſſion. But if he again comes forward in the capacity of inſtructor to the Students of this Univerſity, or commits the credit of the Univerſity in any way upon his works, the ſolidity of his pretenſions will be examined with the ſame freedom as heretofore.

from

from the maſs, and worked up hereafter into ſome goodlier and more enduring form: but the reſt, if it have done the ſervice for which it was intended, may go with my free pleaſure, where the haſty effuſions of the hour naturally go, and be forgotten.

If, however, I ſhall have acquired the character of one who looks with a keen and malicious eye into the doings of his neighbour, or who is rather prone to diſcover what is amiſs, than to praiſe and to be thankful for what is truly valuable, I ſhall have made a greater ſacrifice than my wiſh or meaning was, to what I eſteemed a public ſervice. On this ſubject my opinions and my feelings will have been utterly miſtaken. The diſguſt indeed, which I have felt at witneſſing the miſapplication of literary torture, far exceeds the ſatisfaction I have ever derived from the moſt juſt and ſalutary employment of it. And the preſent age has ſurely furniſhed abundant proof, how a cruel and unjuſt judge may defeat the purpoſe for which he was inveſted with his brief authority; and make us heſitate whether it be not better to live without laws and without magiſtrates, than to ſuffer the prejudices and paſſions of an individual to acquire an almoſt reſiſtleſs ſway, from the ſanction of a regular and apparently conſtitutional tribunal.

The tribunal of which I ſpeak every one will

underſtand. It is one of the ableſt of our literary journals; and, with the power of doing much good, ſeems to delight (ſhall I ſay it?) in doing evil. It glories in abuſing the privilege which public admiration at one time, and public fear ſince, has conferred upon it. But it is time to raiſe the voice of injured freedom and inſulted honour. It is time to convince the world, that bitter invective and loud reproach do not always flow from the abhorrence of what is wrong, but often from the diſlike only of what is different, or the envy of what is proſperous. If we had formerly to complain of mean and mercenary judges, we may perhaps have gained little by changing them for thoſe that are capricious, prejudiced, or vindictive. The indulgence of malignant paſſion, if not ſo contemptible as the love of gain, is certainly more odious—and the ſtain of ſelfiſhneſs is as deeply ingrained in him, who, for the ſake of ſerving his own partial intereſts and contracted relations in the community, undermines the reputation of his neighbour, or who laughs in ſecret at the miſchief which his dark ſlander propagates, as in him who hoards the wages of his ſervility, and broods in ſilence at home over his ill-gotten treaſures.

The vice indeed which firſt ſprouted forth from this green oligarchy, and whoſe rank growth firſt required pruning and correction, was one which

which is the natural offspring of unreſiſted power. After having inſtalled themſelves with a little harmleſs pageantry, in a court degraded by the corruption of its former magiſtrates, and having diſplayed to the gaping multitude, with ſome decent ceremony, though with ſome vanity, their new robes of office, they ſoon began to make them feel the full rigour of their juriſdiction. It was a rigour however which fell indiſcriminately on flagrant and on venial offences, on young and timid culprits, as well as on the moſt practiſed and incorrigible offenders: till at length the exerciſe of ſeverity ſeemed to have blunted, and in ſome inſtances brutalized, the feelings of the judges. They reſpected not the ſmothered but yet unextinguiſhed ſpark of virtue which ſhame indicates; and, for one act of temerity or indiſcretion, dealt out the full meaſure of puniſhment without mercy: thus leaving to the generous mind, once ſtung by the conſciouſneſs of diſgrace, no hope of retrieving its honour, and confirming the habitual delinquent in his bad courſes, by making no difference between him and leſſer criminals. The puniſhments themſelves were accompanied by new and exquiſite tortures, deſerved indeed in ſome caſes, but frequently employed only becauſe the ſubject was likely to feel more tenderly, not becauſe his crime was greater, or his audacity more offenſive. And over too many of ſpotleſs life

life and character, they wielded, in wanton defiance of all our feelings, the ſceptre of tyranny, inſtead of the ſword of juſtice.

But what are the fruits of this harſh diſcipline, even ſuppoſing it to be impartial? Among the moſt induſtrious huſbandmen in that vineyard are thoſe who are not impelled by want or the lure of high wages, but who *love their work*, and who think they cannot better or more honeſtly employ the time which God has given them, than in this taſk. Theſe men, if treated with plain and homely fare, are well ſatisfied; but they turn with diſguſt and ſhrink back with fear from a ſervice which expoſes them to the headſtrong and boiſterous humours of ſome inſolent taſkmaſter: and, rather than endure his railings and impertinence, they will eat their bread in private, and ſhun all communion, except with their neareſt neighbours.

Why then ſhould we permit a few forward and loud talkers to confound and ſilence ſuch men as theſe? men, who though not fitted to guide the converſation in the great ſociety of the world, are yet well qualified to ſuſtain their part in it, to enliven, to diverſify, and occaſionally to enrich it? Why ſhould we ſcare from the face of day that uſeful and laborious mediocrity, which is not ambitious of fame, although it may be tender of its reputation; which intrudes not into our uppermoſt ſeats, but demands only a civil and not unfriendly

unfriendly reception? This ſurely is neither conſiſtent with juſtice, nor humanity, nor ſound policy. It is dangerous to check the current of free commerce. By ſo doing we either in time divert it wholly from ourſelves, or idly pond back the wealth which ought to circulate through a thouſand ducts and channels, for the public good.

Literature, as well as Science, if it does not go forward, is apt to periſh where it ſtands, or even to loſe ground rapidly. But let us not imagine that he who ſits aloft guiding the car, or that the fiery ſteeds which bear it along, are alone entitled to our admiration. How many unſeen hands are at this moment employed in ſhaping the various and complicated parts of that divine machinery! How many in drawing together the fit materials for its ſtructure, ſcattered as they are over the whole ſurface of the univerſe! How many in exploring diſtant regions, for thoſe gems and brilliant dyes, which glitter in the ſunſhine of peace, and captivate for a time our roving fancy! How many faithful and diligent pioneers are now clearing thickets, fencing out precipices, and removing the obſtructions with which time and neglect and prejudice and ignorance have contributed to impede our progreſs! How many ſkilful engineers are planning new lines of direction for our road, ſmoothing aſcents, cutting off angles and uſeleſs windings, uniting the yawning

ſides

ſides of valleys, round which we formerly toiled in tedious circuit, and providing acroſs the hitherto untrodden gulph a firm and ſafe paſſage! How many of livelier imagination, and more buoyant ſpirits, are adorning the road-ſide with flowers, dreſſing out the country, right and left, in all the fair varieties of nature, opening the landſcape to our view, and giving us at intervals a proſpect of thoſe happy fabled regions, lit up by the gleams of hope and of memory, which pleaſe even at a diſtance, and charm away the tedium of human life!

We are all engaged in one ſervice, although our powers may be unequal, and our departments various. And whoever heartily and honeſtly lends himſelf to any of theſe duties, deſerves not our contempt and deriſion, but our favour and encouragement. Let him even fail of ſatisfying the expectation he has raiſed, ſtill if his labours have not been wholly barren, the moſt moderate ſervices may be allowed to ſave him from the keen edge of ſcorn and ridicule and ſtrong invective. Dulneſs muſt indeed be made to underſtand its proper level; arrogance muſt be humbled, forward ignorance abaſhed, error reprimanded, and prejudice condemned. But that powerful enginery ſhould be reſerved for offences of deeper guilt and more ſerious miſchief, for the grovelling reptiles of quackery and obſcenity, for the foul deformed monſters of malice

malice, ſedition, and impiety. Againſt theſe let the indignant Spirit of criticiſm bare his red right arm, and hurl his thunders; againſt theſe let him ſend forth the fierce miniſters of his vengeance, with their viper hair and ſounding laſh.

And to the immortal honour of the Editor of that Journal be it ſpoken, he *has* employed *his own* unrivalled talents, if rumour ſays true, moſt frequently in that ſervice[b]. And by theſe manly efforts in the cauſe of virtue, he has raiſed to himſelf a monument, that will outlive the memory of thoſe occaſions which awakened them, and will continue to command our admiration long after the clamours of his enemies have been huſhed, and even the well-grounded complaints of injured men have been forgotten. The boundleſs extent, however, of his wealth appears to me to have betrayed him into ſome waſteful and ſome injurious expenditure. There is a reſpect due to Genius even in its failings. When the predominant character is bright and pure, while blemiſhes here and there tarniſh its luſtre, I do not ſay theſe

[b] It is commonly reported that, among many other maſterly Eſſays, the following have proceeded from his pen. On Ritſon's Abſtinence from Animal Food, No. 3. Moore's Poems, No. 16. Willan on Vaccination, No. 17. Cobbett's Political Regiſter, No. 20.

blemiſhes ſhould be palliated or unnoticed, but the tone of animadverſion ought certainly to be lowered. Who is not offended at ſeeing THE FIRST POET OF THE AGE chaſtiſed, even when he errs, like a truant Schoolboy?

This ſeverity, however, although a prominent vice in the conduct of that Review, is not the grievance which has called forth the preſent complaint. A remedy, indeed, for that evil in ſome meaſure adequate, may be found in the juſtice and candour of other critics, who poſſeſs the confidence of the public. But when the examination of works in almoſt every branch of ſcience and literature is made the vehicle for covert inſinuation and open railing againſt the Engliſh Univerſities, and eſpecially againſt Oxford; when ſarcaſtic ſneers and alluſions in one number are followed up by keen reproaches and bold accuſations in the next; when the public are taught with unwearied and malicious induſtry to look upon us either as gloomy bigots, or lazy monks, or ignorant pretenders to learning and ſcience; although the falſehood and malevolence of ſuch charges may be viſible to many, yet it muſt happen that ſuch continual droppings will in time make an impreſſion on the public mind, and, if not ſeaſonably counteracted, will probably alienate that reſpect and confidence which we have heretofore

en-

enjoyed, and which it is the nation's intereſt, as well as our own, that we ſhould never loſe.

With perſons accuſtomed to the preſs ſuch attacks loſe much of their force, or rather are altogether harmleſs. The malevolence is ſo evident, that they poſſeſs no weight or authority in themſelves: and when the grounds upon which they reſt are examined, it is uſually found that they ariſe not from any poſitive miſdemeanors, which are alledged againſt us, and which admit of diſtinct evidence and diſcuſſion; but that they are looſe charges tacked on to ſome indictment, preferred againſt an individual perhaps, with whom we are quite unconnected, and glancing obliquely only at the Univerſity. It is not that we joſtle them, or ſtop up the way; but they ſtep aſide, and leave their own buſineſs on purpoſe to inſult and pick a quarrel with us. Nothing can more clearly mark a ſettled purpoſe and deſign than this practice. Hardly a book is noticed, (for I will not call their ordinary method *reviewing*,) which does not furniſh an opportunity for this ſort of calumny. And latterly the rankling humour has burſt out in ſuch exorbitant quantity, and with ſuch a malignant aſpect, as to call for immediate and ſtrong remedy.

Of the Editor himſelf I do not think ſo meanly as to impute the wilful falſehoods and miſrepreſentations, with which his journal abounds, to his own

choice. Moſt probably he thinks the charges well-founded. For I believe many of them proceed from the vile ſerpent-brood which have been hatched in our own boſom—that hireling tribe of turncoats, who, diſappointed of honours or rewards here adequate to their own fancied merits, have carried over to the enemy, as the moſt acceptable paſſport, ſome local information, and have courted the favour of their new employers, by mean detraction and extravagant abuſe of their former friends. If any ſuch there be, they will feel the juſtice of this rebuke without any more particular deſignation of their perſons; and I wiſh them no ſeverer puniſhment than that infamy, which, when their work is done, is the common lot of traitors with all parties.

In the mean time, one cannot forbear to reprobate the low ſpirit of jealouſy, with which the Review has been long conducted; and which muſt have been well known to exiſt before thoſe ſervile devotees preſented their rank offerings. Long before theſe loathſome maſſes were introduced, a ſprinkling of the ſame ill-flavoured ſubſtance had been a regular ingredient; and the palate of the public, thus gradually vitiated, was thought perhaps now duly prepared for that groſs meal, which has ſickened or poiſoned all whoſe natural taſte was not previouſly corrupted. My preſent purpoſe, however, is not to notice particularly

larly theſe petty cavils, but to haſten to the conſideration of more ſolid and direct charges, having firſt diſpoſed of one, which, as it proceeds from a writer of profound ſcience and great ability, is the more deſerving of our attention.

CHAP.

CHAP. I.

Of the Study of Ariſtotle, and neglect of the Mathematics.

IN the 22d Number of the Edinburgh Review is a maſterly analyſis of La Place's Traité de Méchanique Céleſte; which no one, I will venture to ſay, has read without feeling reſpect and admiration for the writer of the article, and gratitude for the diſtinctneſs with which he has brought home to his mind reaſonings of the moſt abſtract nature, upon the grandeſt and moſt ſublime of all ſubjects. It is impoſſible to praiſe it too highly. But, in proportion to the homage we feel diſpoſed to pay to uncommon talents, is our vexation at finding a powerful and enlightened mind, equally with the reſt of his brethren, debaſed by a mean and unmanly prejudice. To no other cauſe can I attribute the following paſſage, which is preceded by reflections on the inferiority of the later Mathematicians of this country to thoſe of the Continent.

"We believe, however, that it is chiefly in the pub-
"lic inſtitutions of England, that we are to ſeek for
"the

"the cauſe of the deficiency here referred to, and par-
"ticularly in the two great centres, from which
"knowledge is ſuppoſed to radiate over all the reſt
"of the iſland. In one of theſe, *where the dictates of*
"*Ariſtotle are ſtill liſtened to as infallible decrees, and*
"*where the infancy of ſcience is miſtaken for its ma-*
"*turity*, the mathematical ſciences have never flou-
"riſhed; and the ſcholar has *no means of advancing*
"*beyond the mere elements of Geometry*[a]."

The far-ſpread fame of Cambridge for Mathematical ſtudies fixes this deſcription to Oxford: and if the charge were true in the only ſenſe in which the words can be underſtood, there is no ridicule or invective ſo keen, which that Univerſity would not deſerve. The only parts of Ariſtotle's writings, which can interfere with the Student's progreſs in natural philoſophy, are his Phyſics; the doctrines of which, it is well known, were formerly made the baſis of inſtruction in that department of ſcience through all the Univerſities of Europe. Early in the 17th century they received their rudeſt ſhock from the writings of Bacon. Before the end of that century, the new method had ſucceeded in diſlodging the Ariſtotelian philoſophy from its ſtrong holds; and, as uſually happens in revolutions of that magnitude, after a ſhort interval of confuſion among contending fac-

[a] Page 283.

tions,

tions, of which the Carteſian was for a time predominant, the old dynaſty was by univerſal conſent ſuperſeded, and the Newtonian quietly eſtabliſhed on the throne. Under this comprehenſive title I include, for the ſake of convenience, the whole modern ſyſtem of Natural Philoſophy, which grew up, as it were, in the ſchool of Bacon.

Oxford, although the place where this new fledged philoſophy tried her earlieſt[b] flights, and firſt plumed her feathers, was, I believe, one of the laſt fortreſſes, of which ſhe took a formal poſſeſſion. For the Ariſtotelian Phyſics were interwoven with the whole courſe of our ſtudies and exerciſes; and it was not eaſy to reconcile the abandonment of them with the language of the Statutes, which public officers were bound to inforce. And thus, as in courts of Judicature, and other bodies of ancient ſtanding, many forms and practices continued to ſubſiſt, which had loſt their original force and meaning. Even after the new doctrines were received and taught, formal exerciſes continued to be performed according to the ancient regimen. How long this anomalous ſtate of things laſted, I cannot exactly ſay; but it may ſafely be aſſerted, that, *for more than a century*, the Phyſics of Ariſtotle have been ſet aſide,

[b] See the Hiſtory of the Royal Society, which began at Oxford.

and,

and, except for the ſake of ſatisfying liberal curioſity, and of tracing the progreſs of ſcience, they are never even conſulted.

What then muſt we think of the author of this calumny? Did he know that he was advancing a falſehood? This I will by no means affirm; and I am unwilling to ſuſpect it. But he has at leaſt ſhewn more eagerneſs to indulge a prejudice common, I am afraid, among his countrymen, than to acquaint himſelf with the truth of the caſe, as in juſtice he ought to have done, before he became a gratuitous accuſer. The motive which dictated this accuſation is too obvious to be miſtaken. The ſordid inner coating appears too plainly through the ſpecious garb of candour and zeal for ſcience, which is thrown about it: and when that is once diſcovered, no credit, it is hoped, will be given to opinions and inſinuations, which reſt more on the *authority* of the writer than the evidence of facts. On this account I think it needleſs to ſay much here upon the impudent, unſupported declaration, that, in Oxford, "the infancy of Science is miſtaken for its "maturity." If it relate merely to the charge of teaching the Phyſics of the Peripatetic School, in preference to modern ſyſtems, it has been refuted already. If it regard the reſt of our ſtudies, it can at preſent only receive a flat contradiction; and, as I may be thought an intereſted party, my opi-

nions will carry but little weight. I truſt, however, ſoon to convince the reader, by a plain unadorned expoſition of the courſe of ſtudies here purſued, that no calumny was ever more unfounded. And although I cannot claim any deference to my opinions unſupported by proof, yet I may ſurely expect, that the opinions of him will be diſregarded, who is proved to be groſsly ignorant of the circumſtances about which he is ſpeaking.

The latter part indeed of the accuſation is expreſſed in a more diſtinct and tangible form, relating to a matter of fact.

"The Scholar has no means of advancing beyond "the mere elements of Geometry."

What are the mere elements of Geometry? Are Plane and Spherical Trigonometry, are the properties of Conic Sections, of Conchoids, Cycloids, the Quadratrix, Spirals, &c. &c. the mere elements of Geometry? Is the doctrine of Fluxions included under the ſame appellation? On all theſe ſubjects, lectures both public and private are given, Natural Philoſophy in all its branches, and Aſtronomy, are taught, perhaps by one of thoſe *two perſons* whom the Reviewer[c] modeſtly allows to

[c] See Edinburgh Review, Number 22, p. 81. He complains, that even in the Cambridge method the ſpirit of diſcovery, the δυναμις ευρητικη, as he calls it, is not awakened. A *genuine* Edinburgh Reviewer ought to be careful how he meddle

Oxford, as equally capable with himſelf of underſtanding La Place. And that the Scholar *has* the means of advancing to Newton's Principia, is tolerably proved by the public examination of Candidates for the Degree of B. A. twice every year, in that work.

Here again I beg the writer will not think I am impeaching his veracity. In all probability he thought he was ſpeaking truth. But his aſſertion is groſsly falſe. There is ſome difference perhaps between aſſerting what one knows to be falſe, and aſſerting as a thing known what one really knows not: I willingly leave the Reviewer this loop-hole for his conſcience and his character; only aſſuring him, that, notwithſtanding our ſcholaſtic jargon, ſuch ſubtleties have been long ago exploded at Oxford from our doctrine, and few things would be more deſpiſed and condemned amongſt us in our practice.

Throughout this examination I have taken it for granted, that the Phyſics of Ariſtotle were the *infallible decrees* intended by the Reviewer.

dles with Greek. If he quotes two words, one of them in all likelihood is wrong. I ſay a *genuine* Edinburgh Reviewer, becauſe the Greek criticiſms in that Journal, ſome of which are learned and ingenious, have, I believe, been *all* furniſhed from Engliſh Univerſities. In *many inſtances* I know they have. Such phraſes as δυναμις ευρητικη, and *tribrach periods*, for ſentences of three members, [vid. Number 18, p. 398.] betray their Northern origin.

Both the ſubject on which he is writing, and the whole tenor of his argument, require that interpretation. It was not neceſſary therefore in this part to defend the ſtudy of other treatiſes by the ſame Philoſopher, which have no connexion with theſe purſuits. Some account will be given of theſe under the head of Studies purſued in this Univerſity. Let me be permitted however to ſay a few words in this place of the venerable Sage, whoſe revilers have perhaps exceeded in ignorance the bigotry and folly of his moſt devoted admirers.

It has been a current charge againſt Ariſtotle, that he meditated the ſame thraldom over the minds of men, which his pupil Alexander endeavoured to effect over their bodies and fortunes. A charge which, from its flippancy, one might ſuſpect to be of a very different growth, but which had its origin with no leſs a name than Bacon. Now if ever a writer laboured more than another, in an age of ſophiſtry and dogmatiſm, to eſtabliſh the empire of Common Senſe and Reaſon, it was Ariſtotle. He was thoroughly verſed in all the doctrines of the Schools of Greece. He ſubſcribed implicitly to none. He even incurred the obloquy of deſerting and undermining his maſter Plato, becauſe he rejected the viſionary ſpeculations of that philoſopher, however faſcinating to the fancy, as deluſive and irreconcileable with reaſon.

reaſon. He is moſt generally known as the author of the Syllogiſtic form of Reaſoning, in which his aim has been commonly miſunderſtood, and miſrepreſented even by thoſe who ſhould have pointed out and corrected the vulgar error. This is one of the leaſt of his works: but it is a noble ſpecimen of that inflexible unwearied perſeverance, which the love of truth only, mixed perhaps with the honeſt love of fame, is able to ſuſtain. His chief characteriſtic is a reſolute endeavour to get to the bottom of his ſubject, whatever it may be. In this reſolution his firmneſs and intrepidity are beyond example. It reſembles that unextinguiſhable ardour, that inſatiable deſire of finiſhing their enterprize, attributed to the heroes of romance. He never reſts ſatisfied with partial glimpſes and imperfect demonſtration, where the ſubject ſeems capable of cloſer handling. And however thorny and deſert the tracts through which he purſues his prey, however far he may be led from the cultivated and elegant walks of life, the fear of loſing admiration, or of diſheartening his companions, never bends him from his purpoſe.

Theſe virtues, conſpicuous as they are in all his writings, are moſt obſervable in what is now called the Organon; becauſe, from the dry and repulſive nature of the ſubject, it poſſeſſes hardly any other attraction. Much of this work is at preſent

ſent uſeleſs, as being applicable merely to the Greek language, and to errors and practices now ſeldom obſervable. Much of it has been judiciouſly compreſſed and *re-caſt*, with increaſed perſpicuity and no loſs of matter: and ſome of the modern compendiums, more eſpecially that of Aldrich, contain the ſubſtance of the original, relieved of its tedious explanations and ſubtleties, and totally free from the barbarous jargon with which the later Schoolmen had overloaded and corrupted it. It is in this reformed ſhape that his ſyſtem is now ſtudied in the Univerſity. And beſides the incidental benefit derived from the rigorous accuracy, with which every argument is analyſed, much good is ſuppoſed to ariſe from enabling a young Student to ſtate his reaſoning, *whenever it may be neceſſary*, in its moſt bare and elementary form, and to examine any ſuſpected reaſoning of another by the ſame rule.

Theſe were the leading objects, which the Author of the Organon himſelf had in view when he unfolded the ſyſtem. He has been abſurdly ſuppoſed to have forged this weapon for the purpoſe of endleſs wrangling. Nothing is more oppoſite to the truth. Its principal uſe and advantage is to *cut ſhort* wrangling, by marking out preciſely the real object of diſpute, and by confining the diſputant to correct reaſoning. Before the method of the Syllogiſm was invented, an ingenious

Sophiſt

Sophiſt could ſet at defiance the ſoundeſt and the moſt acute reaſoner: but the laws of the Syllogiſm, if well enforced, cannot by any art be long evaded, and if the contending parties be of equal power, (which is the only way of trying the utility of any method,) *truth muſt prevail.* The practice of wrangling, [ἐριστικὴ, as it was anciently called,] or ſupporting an argument for the ſake of victory, is adopted merely as an exerciſe to try the powers and dexterity of the diſputant, to give him the free uſe of his limbs, and the command of his weapons: juſt like the practice of a fencing ſchool[d], or the drill of a light horſeman. And as this was one of the favourite exerciſes in the leiſurely ſchools of Athens, it is no wonder that its author ſhould have pointed out the aſſiſtance, which might be derived to it from his own ſyſtem. But never, no never, does he by his advice, his ſentiments, or his example, encourage that perverſion of the nobleſt faculty of man, in ſerious diſcuſſion; on the contrary, he always ſpeaks of it with contempt: and he has done what he could,

[d] It is related as a ſhrewd ſaying of a Nobleman, who, upon being ſhewn the College of the Sorbonne at Paris, and being told that regular diſputations had been held in their hall for ſix centuries, aſked, what they had *ſettled* in all that time. To me the wit appears no better, than if a man ſhould aſk in a fencing-ſchool, how many quarrels had been ended, or how many men ſlain there.

by

by expoſing all the trick and myſtery of falſe reaſoning, to ſuppreſs and defeat the impoſture. In all his writings he ſpurns the uſe of ſuch artifice: he never evades the difficulties of his ſubject: he never ſeeks to diſguiſe or gloſs over the imperfections of his reaſonings; maintaining, that it is better to get near to truth, even if we cannot reach her, than always to ſtand contentedly at a diſtance.

Some allowance will, I hope, be made for the length of theſe remarks. It ariſes from a conviction, that the world are greatly miſled, on this ſubject, by writers of high authority, and from an earneſt deſire to vindicate an illuſtrious name from the unjuſt aſperſions, with which ignorance and frivolity delight to inſult it.

Even the candid and ſagacious Locke is not proof againſt the blind propenſity mankind feel to mark their diſguſt of the abuſe of a thing by denying its uſe. How elſe can we account for his continual reflections on the folly and uſeleſſneſs of Logic, when in his Thoughts on Education he recommends that his friend's ſon ſhould be made to read Chillingworth? Read Chillingworth! Not a page of Chillingworth is intelligible without Logic. All the diſtinctions of Logic, the maxims, the rules, the technical names and phraſes, are employed in the courſe of his controverſy, not only without ſcruple, but in a way which

which would now be called pedantry and oftentation. The ſame advice is repeated by Dr. Reid, in his Analyſis of the Organon, inſerted in Lord Kaimes's Sketches of the Hiſtory of Man, joined with many juſt reflections on the utility of Logic; and yet he manifeſtly under-rates the ſyſtem of Ariſtotle; and one may collect from ſome of his remarks, that he has no value for it whatever, and thinks the ſtudy of it a waſte of time.

In reading through that Analyſis, I confeſs I have been ſtruck with the inconſiſtency of Dr. Reid, as well as with the erroneous poſitions and interpretations he now and then advances. It is difficult to reconcile the tone of levity and diſreſpect ſometimes aſſumed, with the acknowledged acuteneſs, accuracy, and ingenuity, of the ſyſtem he is examining. That Ariſtotle has purpoſely darkened his demonſtrations, by uſing A, B, C, inſtead of words, is ſo futile a charge, that one wonders how it ever appeared there[e]. The contempt expreſſed for the *Dictum de Omni et Nullo*, and the remark at the end of Sect. 5. on the frivolity of the whole ſyſtem which is reſolvable into this principle, argue either an inadequate view, or a forgetfulneſs, of its true nature and deſign[f]. The ſame thing may be ſaid of the

[e] Chap. iii. ſect. 3.

[f] It is the very beauty of ſcience, to reſolve the moſt intricate theorems into ſome ſimple elementary truth; and that

enquiry how far the Syllogiſm is an engine of Science. As an engine of Science it is not, and never was, propoſed.

Lord Kaimes's own remark[s], that "Ariſtotle "himſelf never attempts to apply his ſyllogiſtic "mode of reaſoning to any ſubject handled by "him"—that "on Ethics, on Rhetoric, and on "Poetry, he argues like a rational being, without "once putting in practice any of his own rules," is, like many other remarks of the ſame writer, flippant and falſe: the treatiſes he mentions are the moſt copious ſource of examples in every part of Logic, and the reſolution of argumentative paſſages in thoſe works, into their ſyllogiſtic elements, is a common and eaſy exerciſe for young ſtudents.

It is unfortunate for the fame of Ariſtotle, that he ſhould be known chiefly as the Author of the Logical Treatiſes. The Treatiſe on Rhetoric is a magazine of intellectual riches. Under an arrangement the moſt accurate perhaps and the moſt luminous ever marked out, the diverſified elements of thought, of feeling, and of taſte, are preſented in due order to the reader's mind. Nothing is arbitrary, nothing gratuitous. Long ex-

which provokes Dr. Reid's contemptuous exclamation is really the great and well-grounded boaſt of Logic.

[s] Page 166. 4to. edit.

perience

perience with mankind, attentive obſervation of human nature in public and in private life, the political hiſtory of paſt times, and the occurrences of his own age, furniſhed him with the materials of this great work. In the courſe of the enquiry, nothing is left untouched, on which Rhetoric, in all its branches, has any bearing. His principles are the reſult of extenſive original induction. He ſought them, if ever man did ſeek them, in the living pattern of the human heart. All the receſſes and windings of that hidden region he has explored: all its caprices and affections, whatever tends to excite, to ruffle, to amuſe, to gratify, or to offend it, have been carefully examined. The reaſon of theſe phænomena is demonſtrated, the method of creating them is explained. The third Book contains a body of rules for good writing, traced to thoſe natural principles, out of which they all grow, and illuſtrated by examples, which his own intimate acquaintance with the beſt poets and orators of Greece readily ſupplied. The whole is a text-book of human feeling; a ſtore-houſe of taſte; an exemplar of condenſed and accurate, but uniformly clear and candid, reaſoning.

It would lead me too far, if I were to do juſtice to my own feelings on this ſubject. Theſe works will perhaps be mentioned again, when I come to treat particularly of our plan of Study. In the

mean time let it be obſerved, that the writings of this great Philoſopher on Logic, Rhetoric, Poetry, Ethics, and Politics, were not merely diſſertations and eſſays, ſuch as procure fame to the writers, if they contain but ſome valuable hints and opinions diffuſely argued: they are not merely critical *diatribes* and ingenious detached arguments, improvements upon former theories. But they are, what is the higheſt and moſt laborious effort of human intellect, entire *ſyſtems* moulded into a full and perfect ſhape; they are buildings planned and raiſed from their foundation by the ſame hand, and carefully finiſhed in all their parts. Nothing ſeems to have been too vaſt for his comprehenſive mind; nothing too minute or intricate for his ſagacity.

He is accuſed indeed of ſevere judgment of thoſe who went before him, of a dictatorial ſpirit, of jealouſy againſt his contemporaries, of pride and arrogance. As theſe charges are unſupported by proof, it is enough to ſay that I have met with no proof of them in his writings. And they may in general be refuted by that ſentiment of his own, that noble characteriſtic, which often raiſes the clamours of little minds, an uniform zeal in the cauſe of truth—a ſettled devotion which ſuffers no other paſſion to interfere with it. A ſentiment, which I cannot but recommend to the attention of this Reviewer,

viewer, if ever he ſhould feel himſelf wavering between his prejudice and his conſcience.

Ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν, ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

Let me diſmiſs this ſection then with a tranſlation of that honeſt and manly concluſion to his Organon, in which he aſſerts his claim to originality, with fearleſſneſs indeed and freedom, but without arrogance. The ſubſtance of the paſſage has been well given by Dr. Reid[h], although he has miſtaken the meaning of the text in two or three places, eſpecially in the laſt ſentence. I ſhall follow his method in rendering it, correcting him only where he is evidently wrong.

"Of thoſe things which may be called inven-
" tions, ſome have been begun only in a former
" age, and have grown up to perfection by means
" of ſucceſſive improvements; ſome are the work
" of the firſt inventer, but remain in a rude ſtate
" till enlarged and improved by other hands.
" The chief merit however belongs to the be-
" ginner." For the beginning, though ſmall, is
" the moſt difficult; to add to it by degrees, and
" complete it, is comparatively eaſy.

" Now with regard to the Dialectic art, there
" was not ſomething done, and ſomething re-
" maining to be done: there was abſolutely no-
" thing done. For thoſe who profeſſed the art of

[h] Page 227, Lord Kaimes.

" diſ-

" diſputation reſembled the Rhetoricians of Gor-
" gias's ſchool. As theſe compoſed orations, ſo
" the other framed arguments, which might ſuit,
" as they imagined, moſt occaſions. Theſe their
" ſcholars ſoon learned. But they were in this
" manner only furniſhed with the materials pro-
" duced by the art: the art itſelf they did not
" learn. It was juſt as if a man, profeſſing to teach
" you how to protect the feet from injury, ſhould
" bring you ſhoes of all ſorts and ſizes. He does
" perhaps by ſo doing anſwer your preſent pur-
" poſe; but he does not, as he profeſſes to do,
" teach you the art of providing for yourſelf.

" Upon Rhetoric indeed much has been al-
" ready written; but on the art of reaſoning, no-
" thing: the whole of what I have compoſed on
" that ſubject is from myſelf; and it has coſt me
" much pains. And ſhould you find upon ex-
" amination that my ſyſtem, though deriving no
" benefit from former labours, is yet not unwor-
" thy of compariſon with others, which have by
" ſlow degrees been brought to perfection, I have
" only to expreſs my hope, that you will forgive
" what may be left undone[1], and that what
" has been done will meet with a favourable ac-
" ceptance."

[1] It ſhould be obſerved, that the Hypothetical Syllogiſm, of which he promiſes, in the firſt book of the Firſt Analytics, to treat more fully afterwards, is altogether omitted.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Examination of a Criticism, in the 28th Number of the Edinburgh Review, on Falconer's Edition of Strabo.

BEFORE I proceed to examine the juſtice of the Reviewer's criticiſms, and the truth of his aſſertions, it may be as well to correct what was perhaps only a miſtaken opinion, concerning the reſponſibility of the Univerſity for works printed with the approbation and aſſiſtance of the Delegates of the Preſs.

The Clarendon Preſs has been liberally endowed, and the management of its concerns is entruſted by the Univerſity to a board of Eleven Members, called Delegates of the Preſs, who derive no emolument from their office. They have the entire diſpoſal of its funds: they direct what books ſhall be printed; and to what extent the Authors or the Editors ſhall be favoured with their aid. A conſtant and regular ſupply iſſues from this preſs of Bibles, Common Prayer Books, and reprinted editions of the moſt uſeful works. Perſons who project improved editions often ſubmit their propoſals to the Board, which are always attentively

attentively conſidered, and encouraged in proportion to the opinion entertained of the competency of the perſon, and the general merits of his plan. If the plan be adopted, the money for carrying it on is ſupplied, and the whole riſk is thrown upon the public fund. It is alſo common for undertakings of this kind to originate with the Delegates themſelves; and in that caſe individuals are ſought out, who are thought well qualified for conducting them, and who have given, either in public or private, ſome proof of their fitneſs.

In none of theſe proceedings do the Delegates take on them that kind of reſponſibility which belongs to the Editor of a work, except as far as the printing is concerned. For the general plan, and the general competency of the perſon employed, they *are* reſponſible, but not for the detail of the execution. Miſtakes both in matter and in language may be made, for which an Editor may be blamed: but the diſgrace attached to theſe miſtakes cannot in any fairneſs be imputed to the Delegates; eſpecially if the work contain valuable materials procured by their means, and openly communicated to the world.

With theſe general remarks premiſed, let us proceed to examine the charge brought againſt the Univerſity by this Reviewer. The introductory reflections I leave untouched: they are intended only to heighten the effect of what follows: and

if

if I can ſhew that what follows is *falſe*, *unjuſt*, and *ignorant*, the efficacy of this rhetorical flouriſh will not be great.

The writer clearly does not pretend to be a Logician; or to underſtand when two propoſitions are oppoſed to each other. For inſtance, he ſays, "the moſt confident hopes are excited, that "*every new impreſſion* of a claſſic volume from "the Clarendon Preſs will exhibit it with every "*remaining obſcurity or ambiguity* explained." But this hope, he adds, is conſtantly diſappointed: and why? "becauſe, although this learned body "have occaſionally availed themſelves of the ſa-"gacity and erudition of Ruhnken, Wyttenbach, "Heyné, and other *foreign* profeſſors, they have, "of late, added nothing of their own." Where inſult and abuſe are uppermoſt in a writer's mind, it is no wonder that he forgets his reaſon. The abſurdity of ſaying that editions iſſuing from the Oxford Preſs are inferior to expectation, *becauſe* they incorporate the labours of foreign critics of the firſt eminence, inſtead of Britiſh, is too groſs to require a comment.

The reader is next reminded of an "unhappy "attempt at an improved edition of Apollonius "Rhodius," by which the critic ſuppoſes "the "*Graduates* of Oxford were ſatisfied that *degrees* "neither implied nor *conferred ſcience*, but that "a man might become a *Maſter of Arts* without

" poſſeſſing any knowledge or ſkill whatſoever in " that particular art which he profeſſed, and " which he was choſen and appointed to practiſe " for the benefit of the community."

If the edition be a bad one, where is the need of exaggeration? At any rate it has no buſineſs here. I do not call it a good edition: but it is a uſeful one; and, notwithſtanding the wrong readings which it has, I will undertake to match the latinity of the Editor againſt that of this Critic, if ever he ſhould favour the world with a ſimilar attempt.

The quotation above is ſomewhat abridged. The following I give entire.

" Certain it is, that no ſuch attempt has been made " ſince, except in the ſingle and minute, but very " ſucceſsful inſtance of Ariſtotle's Poetics; which was " produced by an *auxiliary volunteer*, reſiding in the " metropolis, *engaged in buſineſs*, and never ſecluded " from the avocations of ſociety. *By not enjoying the " leiſure*, perhaps, he never contracted the indolence " or apathy of a Monk; but preſerved the activity, " even by the diſtraction of his faculties. His name " ſtands in the title-page plain Thomas Tyrwhitt— " without any decorative adjunct or title of degree,— " though it would have done honour to the proudeſt " which the moſt exalted ſeat of learning could be- " ſtow."

Leſt it ſhould be imagined that there is any truth

truth in what the Reviewer intimates, that Tyrwhitt *took no degree at Oxford*, and *was not even a member of the Univerſity*, I will add a very brief ſummary of facts and dates concerning that illuſtrious critic.

He was born in 1730; came from Eton to Queen's College, Oxford, 1747; took the Degree of B. A. in 1750; was elected Fellow of Merton in 1755; took the Degree of M. A. in 1756; and remained Fellow of that College ſeven years; i. e. till 1762; when he was made Clerk of the Houſe of Commons, and reſigned his Fellowſhip. *He quitted all public employment in* 1768; from which time till his death in 1786, he occupied himſelf chiefly in critical and other literary ſtudies, to which the greater part of his former life had been devoted. His Poetics is a poſthumous publication from unfiniſhed notes, and the title page was of courſe arranged by another hand.

The next preliminary charge relates to the edition commonly called the Grenville Homer.

"The editors, he ſays, have *religiouſly retained all* "*the errors of Clarke's edition*, even thoſe intro- "duced on the authority of mere conjecture, and in "inſtances where the true reading had been twice be- "fore publiſhed on the authority of the Venetian Ma- "nuſcript. One of theſe *ſo appalled us*, in the 20th "line of the firſt Iliad, as to deter us from all further

 "critical

" critical examination: for, when a groſs violation of " idiom in the uſe of the moods and voices, *introduced* " *arbitrarily* to ſupply a defect in the metre, neither " excited ſuſpicion, nor ſuggeſted inquiry, no one who " values his time can think it worth while to go far- " ther[a]."

To this I anſwer, that the Editors *have not religiouſly retained all the errors of Clarke's edition*—that although Clarke's text was the baſis, many readings were corrected during its progreſs through the preſs, on the authority of MSS. collations in the editions of Erneſti and Villoiſon, and of a MS. in New College Library. Of theſe new readings there are *twenty-five* in the two firſt books of the Iliad, and *near three hundred* in the whole Poem. In the Odyſſey there are *above one hundred and fifty*; and the collations of the Harleian MS. by Porſon, ſome of which are incorporated with the text, are given entire at the end of the volume.

Now, with regard to the 20th line of the firſt Iliad, which ſo appalled the Reviewer, it may be proper firſt to ſtate, that the *plan* of the edition was ſimply to give the text. No critical remarks or diſcuſſions were to be introduced. No reading therefore was to be received which required diſcuſſion to ſupport it.

[a] Page 431.

The

The 20th line in Clarke runs thus,

Παῖδα δέ μοι λύσαιτε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθε.

In the editions of Wolfius [b] and Heyné it is,

Παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ ΛΥΣΑΙ ΤΕ φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα ΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ.

Clarke has a note of ſome length, giving reaſons for rejecting λύσατε, which had been a common reading, and λύσασθε, which Barnes had adopted, and ending with a conjecture that λύσοιτε is the true reading: but as λύσαιτε *had the authority of the Vatican and Florentine MSS.* he prefers it. δ' ἐμοὶ he himſelf prefers to δέ μοι, as being more emphatic, but he does not alter the text. He objects to the reading,

Παῖδα δέ μοι ΛΥΣΑΙ τε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα ΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ;

as not agreeing in conſtruction with what follows, Ἀζόμενοι. To this objection Erneſti has ſince replied, by pointing out ſimilar caſes of conſtruction; but he expreſſes no diſapprobation of λύσαιτε, and no preference of the other. The reading is alſo confirmed by the Venice and other MSS. which have δέχεσθαι, although with λύσαιτε inſtead of λῦσαί τε. Bentley conjectured λύσαντε, which would certainly accord with the ſenſe and conſtruction; but it is not neceſſary to have recourſe to that remedy.

[b] Wolfius indeed reads, without aſſigning his authority, τὰ Τ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι.

After

After this view of the caſe, I will leave it to the reader to determine whether he ever met with a more deſpicable inſtance of conceited pedantry, than the exclamation of the Reviewer, that he *was appalled* at this reading, and could go no farther; a reading which Clarke preferred to that ſince adopted by Heyné and others: and whether an edition which took Clarke's text as a baſis could have made the propoſed alteration, againſt Clarke's deliberate judgment, without aſſigning a reaſon; to do which was not compatible with the plan laid down. Thus too there are, beſides that already noticed, two other poſitive untruths in this ſingle ſentence of the Review. For λύσαιτε *is not* a reading introduced arbitrarily: and λῦσαί τε *has not* the authority of the Venetian MS. which, as publiſhed by Villoiſon, reads λυσαιτε.

All this however is by way of prelude to the main attack. He goes on to ſay, with admirable conſiſtency, that having obſerved this degeneracy and ignorance in Oxford Editions, he now "*confidently expected*" a moſt complete edition of Strabo: and adds,

"We therefore learned, with much ſatisfaction, that "no pains nor expenſe had been ſpared in obtaining "collations of manuſcripts from the libraries on the "Continent, as well as from thoſe at home: *but* that "the materials would be *worthy of the artiſts*, and the "ſolidity

"ſolidity of the *ſubſtructions* correſpond with the "weight and extent of the edifice."

In the ſame page, after alledging that the ſtudent has a right to claim the Editor's judgment of preference among the various readings, he proceeds;

"This claim becomes ſtronger when the *office of* "*editor is undertaken by a learned body*, whoſe buſi- "neſs is public inſtruction, or *is delegated by them to* "*ſuch of their members* as are deemed moſt competent "to expreſs the judgment, and exerciſe the authority "of the whole ..... from ſuch a *ſynod of critics*, "the republic of letters have a right to expect a *work*— "not merely the raw materials of one, &c."

To this the beſt anſwer will be a reference to the ſtatement already given reſpecting the Delegates of the Preſs. The paſſage admits of no other, and deſerves no other, at leaſt no other of a literary kind. The clauſe, "is *delegated by* "*them to ſuch of their members &c.*" will be conſidered immediately.

For the ſake of convenience, then, it may be better firſt to diſpatch ſome aſſertions of an extraordinary kind, although they do not lie in exact order, and then to examine more at large the philological criticiſms. Theſe aſſertions, as they are not commonly met with in good ſociety, it is difficult to deſcribe by any proper title. In-

* Page 432.

deed,

deed, ſo numerous are they, that I am perſuaded, if the writer had only reſided a fortnight among the Houyhnhnms, he would have compelled that nation to enrich their language. The firſt of them is, when criticiſing a note of the Editor's, he calls it,

"A paſſage from the Univerſity preſs, and the pen "of a *diſtinguiſhed Graduate, ſelected from the whole* "*body, at an advanced period of life,* to conduct the "greateſt work that it had undertaken for more than "a century preceding[d]." *Splendidè mendax*[e]*!*

The *truth* is, the Editor *never was a Graduate,* he *was not a member of the Univerſity,* when he undertook this work: *he was not then at an advanced period of life:* he reſided here a little more than a twelvemonth during the progreſs of it, chiefly that he might enjoy the ſociety of literary men, and the uſe of the libraries: he *was not* "*ſe-* "*lected therefore from the whole body,*" nor indeed was *he ſelected* by the Univerſity at all. All this, however, the Reviewer aſſerts, that he may have an opportunity of calling the Latin, Oxonian Latin; a phraſe which he repeats with a degree of aſſurance, not undeſerving of a coarſer epithet.

[d] Page 437.

[e] *Splendidè,* of the firſt magnitude. If the reader is not familiar with Horace, he will find a learned commentary on this expreſſion, in Congreve; Love for Love, Act II. Sc. 5.

Pindar

Pindar gave good advice to a Prince, which may not be unſuitable to a Reviewer.

ΑΨΕΤΔΕΙ δὲ ϖρὸς ἄκμονι ΧΑΛ-
ΚΕΤΕ γλῶσσαν.
Εἴ τι καὶ φλαῦρον παραθύ-
σει, μέγα τοι φέρεται
Παρ σέθεν· πολλῶν ταμίας
Ἐσσί.

Χάλκευε brings up a familiar image, by which a certain moral quality is ſometimes indicated, not of the moſt amiable kind. If the Reviewer meant to comply with this precept when he wrote, he ſhould have taken care to follow it throughout: but he has been as unhappy in the choice of an anvil, as any gentleman of his profeſſion ever was. Let us now examine ſome more work from the ſame forge.

"We have nevertheleſs *peruſed the whole attentively*, "and can again aſſert, that the printers have done their "duty in rendering very accurately that which was "put before them. The accuracy is, however, that of "the Chineſe tailor, who, in making a new coat from "an old one, copied all the darns, patches and blemiſhes, "which he found in the pattern. In the ſame manner "here, *every error of the preſs*, and uſual inaccuracy of "ſpelling that had crept into the Amſterdam text, *is* "*religiouſly retained*[f]."

Again:

[f] Page 440.

"The text, which has been so servilely copied, is "merely a repetition of Casaubon's; who does not "appear to have superintended the printing, or to have "corrected it at all himself; whence errors have ac- "cumulated on errors: *which are all carefully embalm- "ed and preserved in the splendid edition before us.*" Ibid.

The best answer that can be given to these charges has already appeared in the Gentleman's Magazine for September 1809. A long list of readings in the Oxford edition, together with those of the Amsterdam edition of which they are corrections, is there inserted. It is needless to repeat the particulars here: but I cannot do better than copy the remarks with which the writer of that article follows up his list.

"You have here, Mr. Editor, more than *Fifty Cor- "rections* of the Amsterdam edition, within the compass "of *fewer than one hundred successive pages* of the Ox- "ford edition. This list does not include any which "are merely accentual; and it is confined to the text, "though the version and notes would have supplied a "still larger number. I have also examined more than "300 of the subsequent pages, and they bear the same "testimony to the *attentive perusal* of which the Re- "viewer boasts, and afford the same ground for an un- "qualified reliance on his candour, and his scrupulous "love of truth[8]."

[8] Gent. Mag. Sept. 1809, page 351.

Equally

Equally undeſerving of reſpect with his aſſertions are the doctrines and opinions of this unhappy critic. In the firſt diſplay indeed of theſe, may be obſerved the ſame diſingenuous ſpirit as in the former part. He treats the Preface and the Notes, as if they proceeded from the ſame pen; whereas the writer of the Preface informs him in the firſt paragraph, that the Editor was his Uncle, and that (he having been dead many years) regard for his memory was one motive which impelled him to this undertaking. The Preface goes on to ſay, that the Editor never deſigned a reviſal of the Text of Strabo; and that *he was ſupplied with the new Collations, procured at great expence, by the liberality of the Univerſity of Oxford.* This Preface is dated *Bathoniæ*, which too being prefixed to a Book on Geography, one would hardly have expected to ſee interpreted as it is by this Gentleman, "written "in the Univerſity of Oxford[h]."

Aſſuming that this ſtain belongs to it, he proceeds to handle it very roughly; but, not content with noticing errors, he ventures upon ſome critical diſſertation. The paſſage of the Preface on which he remarks is this.

Cæterum agam uti potero, et, ſi nihil aliud afferam, ſaltem ea recenſebo, quæ rationem operis te edoceant,

[h] Page 433, l. 22.

quibus ſubſidiis inſtructa eſt haec Strabonis editio, vel quae aliqua ex parte incrementa eam ſumpſiſſe contigerit.

The phraſe, "*edoceant quibus inſtructa eſt,*" he ſays, would not be admitted in any place, "where ignorance is not privileged by degrees "of ſcience;" and that to make it Latin we muſt either write *ſubſidia quibus* or *ſit*, inſtead of *eſt*.

I do not defend the phraſe; but the fault is common: and this critic has not pointed out what principle it violates: he only ſays generally, that although the proper and diſcriminative uſe of the Indicative and Subjunctive moods be often a point of extreme nicety, yet in this caſe the error is groſs and obvious—a remark, which is of no benefit to the reader. Indeed, he calls it, when referring to the ſame paſſage[i], the uſe of the Indicative *with the relative pronoun*, ſubordinate to another verb. Before many pages are read, it will probably be made evident, that this remark proceeded from entire ignorance of the true nature of *quibus*: and the point is one of ſuch frequent occurrence in Latin, that I hope to be excuſed for treating it at ſome length.

The difficulty then of determining the proper mood in ſuch caſes ariſes chiefly from the ambiguity of the Latin oblique caſes *cujus, cui, quem,*

[i] Page 436, l. 16.

&c.

&c. in the ſingular number, and all the caſes *qui*, *quibus*, *quæ*, &c. in the plural: and this ambiguity is cauſed, by their belonging to different nominatives, Quis and Qui. Theſe words are derived, as Perizonius has well ſhewn [k], from the different Greek roots, Τίς and Κός, and in the old Latin preſerved a diſtinction in their oblique caſes, till in proceſs of time the Relative *Qui* in moſt of thoſe caſes became ſubſtituted for the interrogative τίς [l]. In ſome inſtances, indeed, the caſes peculiar to *Quis* were incorporated with the declenſion of *Qui*; as *Quem*, *Quid*, *Quî* and *Quibus*, for which the original caſes of *Qui* were *Quum*, *Quod*, *Quo*, and *Queis*. *Cujus* and *Cui* were common perhaps to both from the firſt: ſtill the main fact is clear, that the diſtinction in every caſe but the Nominative was loſt, and ſometimes even there, as Plaut. Curcul. I. 2. 51.

Now it is a common rule, that where the ſubject of a ſentence is known and definite [m], the *indicative* mood is to be uſed: where it is un-

[k] Not. ad Sanct. lib. iii. c. 14.

[l] Ceterum in obliquis caſibus, etiam ad interrogationem, adhibuerunt illa, quæ ab Relativo *Qui* deſcendunt. Nam in obliquis hic rurſus in unam voculam confuderunt Latini ſimul *relationis* et *interrogationis* vim. Not. ad Sanct. iii. 14.

[m] Unleſs the ſentence be conditional or dependent, or imply ſome contingency; of which caſes we ſhall ſoon ſpeak more particularly.

known

known and indefinite, the *ſubjunctive*. This, however, does not hold with *pure Interrogatives*: in them the ſame mood is uſed as in the caſe of aſſertion; and the reaſon perhaps is, that the tone of voice, the direct application to another perſon, ſufficiently proves that we are not aſſerting any thing. But wherever any doubt or indefinite deſcription is intended, which character is denoted by *the pronouns and nouns called indefinite*, the ſubjunctive is employed. This Indefinite, however, if attentively conſidered, will be found to correſpond very cloſely with the Interrogative. It is in fact the ſame word. Τις in Greek, and *Quis* in Latin, have both ſenſes. And the reaſon is manifeſt: for there is the ſame ſtate of mind, the *ſame uncertainty* in each caſe.

Quid *exiſtimas* de hac quæſtione?

indicates the ſame ſtate of mind as,

Quid *exiſtimet* de hac quæſtione, incertum eſt.

And in all caſes where a queſtion is aſked by *Quis*, the ſame thing might be expreſſed with *Quis* and the *ſubjunctive mood*, in the form of a propoſition about which we are doubting. The ſame holds of *Cur*, which in the interrogative form requires an Indicative; in the form of a ſentence denoting uncertainty, a Subjunctive. And thus the Reviewer's objection to the ſentence in note pag. 48, is valid: "*Cur omiſit* Strabo expe-

"ditionem

"ditionem maritimam regnante Necho factam, "nescio." If it were a *question*, ending at *factam*, *omisit* would be right: but being an assertion with *nescio*, it required *omiserit*; just as in the example above given, where *Quid existimas* is resolved into *Quid existimet, incertum est.* But though he is right in his objection, he is plainly ignorant of every principle on which it rests; as will further appear presently.

It is then by confounding the Indefinite with the Relative, that mistakes are continually made in the use of moods. The Relative, as a Relative, requires no particular mood after it. It refers to some antecedent; and if that antecedent be certain and definite, or if the Relative introduce a fact or independent assertion, it will naturally have the Indicative mood: Thus,

Nihil faciam insolenter, neque te tali vel scientia vel natura præditum hortabor, ut ad eas te referas artes, *quibus* a primis temporibus ætatis studium tuum *dedisti*; tantum dicam, quod te spero approbaturum, me, posteaquam illi arti, *cui studueram*, nihil esse loci, neque in curia, neque in foro viderem, omnem meam curam atque operam ad Philosophiam contulisse [n].

Ex quo ego veni ad ea, *quæ fueramus* ego et tu inter nos de sorore in Tusculano locuti [o].

[n] Cic. Ep. Fam. iv. 3.

[o] Ep. ad Att. v. 1.

Hortemur

Hortemur liberos noſtros, cæteroſque *quorum* gloria nobis et dignitas chara *eſt*, ut animo rei magnitudinem complectantur, neque iis aut præceptis, aut magiſtris, aut exercitationibus, *quibus utuntur* omnes, ſed aliis quibuſdam, ſe id, *quod expetunt*, conſequi poſſe confidant P.

When the Antecedent is leſs certain and definite, or when the aſſertion is vague and diffident, the indicative is not uſed.

Hic *quæ agantur*, quæque *acta ſint*, ea te et literis multorum et nuntiis cognoſcere arbitror: quæ autem *poſita ſunt* in conjectura, *quæque* mihi *videntur* fore, ea puto tibi a me ſcribi oportere Q.

Here, although the latter things are called *conjectural* and *probable*, yet the aſſertion that they are ſo is *abſolute*; which aſſertion the writer intending to convey, naturally uſes the Indicative mood.

The moſt frequent caſes of error however are where, as in the paſſage quoted from the Preface, the Relative is ſuppoſed to be uſed, although it is in fact the Indefinite, and an Indicative is made to follow it. In Greek the writer is not liable to this error, becauſe the relative and indefinite are expreſſed by different words; and perhaps the beſt *practical* rule for a ſtudent acquainted

P De Orat. i. §. 19. See alſo other examples, ibid. §. 23. 49. 53.

Q Ep. Fam. i. 5.

with

with both languages, is to conſider what word would be employed in Greek. If τὶς, ποῖος, οἷος, ὅς‹ις, ὅσπερ, would have preſented themſelves, inſtead of the pure relative ὃς, moſt probably he will decide at once for the Subjunctive. In the Preface, ποίοις perhaps, rather than τισὶ, would have been uſed where *quibus* ſtands; certainly not οἷς. Thus:

Cujus mihi videbar et fidelitatem erga te perſpexiſſe, et nôſſe locum *quem* apud te is teneret[r].

Ἥντινα would have been uſed in Greek (not ἣν) *after*, or perhaps τινὰ, or οἵαν, *before* τάξιν.

The full doctrine is of ſuch extent, that I muſt be cautious how I venture upon it here[s].

[r] Cic. Ep. Fam. iii. 6.

[s] There is indeed no queſtion in grammar more ſubtle and intricate than the doctrine of the Subjunctive Mood. It would require a much longer diſcuſſion than theſe pages will admit to ſift it thoroughly: but as it is a kind of *moot point* among grammarians, a few hints from one who has often conſidered the ſubject may not be unacceptable. I am far from propoſing this as a complete theory, or as one which is very ſatisfactory even to myſelf: and I am aware that the principles do not reſt upon a ſufficiently broad baſis of Induction.

To me then it has appeared, that the uſe of the Subjunctive Mood may be referred to *three general heads*, which I cannot preciſely deſcribe without the aid of Logical terms.

1ſt. *When the* SUBJECT *of the ſentence is uncertain, vague, or indefinite.*

2dly. *When the* PREDICATE *is of that kind.*

3dly. *When the* PREDICATION *or Sentence itſelf is not direct, but dependent upon ſomething elſe.*

There are numerous principles of a ſubordinate kind, with exceptions to all of them, and many

Of the firſt kind, are all thoſe ſentences where the verb is connected with *Quis,* or any of its caſes, which are more numerous than are commonly imagined; or where the *relative* is reſolvable into *Quinam, Qualis, Quicunque*; or where, after the relative *Qui,* we can ſuppoſe a parentheſis of this ſort, "*whoſoever he may be.*" E. g.

Quæ de me populi *ſit* opinio, neſcio. Clar. Orat. c. 51.

Neque is ſum *qui diſputem.*

Erant tamen, *quibus videretur.* Clar. Orat. 58.

Qui ita *dicat,* ut a multis probaretur. Ib. 50.

Atque ego præclare intelligo, me in eorum commemoratione verſari, *qui* nec *habiti ſint* oratores, nec *fuerint.* Ib. 49.

In the firſt of theſe, *Quæ* comes from the Indefinite *Quis.* In all the others, *Qui* means a *ſort,* a *claſs,* a *deſcription* of people. In the ſame chapter from which the laſt example is taken, when the writer ſpeaks of *definite perſons,* he uſes the *Indicative Mood.*

De iis autem, *quos* ipſi *vidimus,* neminem fere prætermittimus eorum, *quos* aliquando dicentes *vidimus.* Clar. Orat. 49.

Of the ſecond kind are thoſe ſentences in which *the Predicate is meant to be taken with ſome latitude:* not in its ſtricteſt and moſt definite ſenſe; and when no ſtreſs is laid upon that part of the propoſition; as,

Omnium, *quos* quidem ego *audiverim.* Clar. Orat. 55.

Epiſtolæ . . . . . tum videlicet datæ, cum ego me non belle *haberem.* Cic. Att. 5. 11.

In Cumano cum *eſſem,* venit ad me, quod mihi pergratum fuit, Hortenſius. Cic. Att. 5. 2.

When I was not quite well; During my ſtay in the neighbourhood of Cumæ. Where obſerve, "*quod* mihi pergratum *fuit,*" has the Indicative.

Nos Tarenti quos cum Pompeio dialogos de Republica *habuerimus,* ad te perſcribemus. Cic. Att. 5. 5.

But

mixed cafes. But the ſingle principle juſt laid down will be found to ſimplify the matter greatly, which

But when ſomething more diſtinct is intended by the Predicate, the Indicative Mood is preferred.

Ex quo ego veni ad ea, *quæ fueramus* ego et tu inter nos locuti. Cic. Att. 5. 1.

Me poſteaquam illi arti, *cui ſtuderam*, nihil eſſe loci . . . viderem. Ep. Fam. 4. 3.

Quatenus de religione *dicebat*, *cuique* rei jam obſiſti non *poterat*, Bibulo aſſenſum eſt. Ep. Fam. 1. 2.

Illud *quod eſt*, *qualecumque eſt*, probat. Clar. Orat. 52.

Omnes cauſæ maximæ *quæcumque erant*. Ib. 63.

A remarkable inſtance of this diſtinction of Moods founded in the nature of the Predicate occurs in the ſame paſſage of Livy;

Senatorum omnium, *quique* magiſtratus Capuæ, Atellæ, Cataliæ *geſſiſſent*, bona venire Capuæ juſſerunt: libera corpora *quæ* venundari *placuerat*, Romam mitti, et Romæ venire. Liv. 26. 34. See alſo a paſſage from Cic. Ep. Fam. 1. 5. quoted above in page 48.

It is not always eaſy to diſtinguiſh accurately this caſe from *the third*; that is, where *the whole ſentence* is dependent upon ſome word or ſentence going before, to which therefore it is ſaid to be *ſubjoined*. Nothing however is more frequent than a ſentence with the ſubjunctive mood, in which both the Subject and the Predicate are perfectly defined, becauſe there is a dependency of the whole *predication* on ſomething elſe.

Cui quidem ego, *me cum rogaret*, ut adeſſem in Senatu, eadem omnia . . . . oſtendi me eſſe dicturum. Ep. Fam. 4. 1.

Cum means, "*upon* his aſking me," not ſimply *when*, or "*at the time when*, he aſked me." If the point of time merely is to be noted, the Indicative will ſerve; as

Cum de tuis rebus geſtis *agebatur*, inſerviebam honori tuo. Ep. Fam. 3. 13.

it is hoped may be admitted as ſome excuſe for this long digreſſion. It is however in ſuch points as theſe,

If the preceding clauſe be in the potential mood, all the ſubordinate clauſes, *although merely deſcriptive*, (unleſs intended to introduce ſome independent fact,) muſt be in the Subjunctive: and this is what is commonly meant by conſecutive moods. Thus,

Juſſerunt . . . . *ne* quis eorum, *qui Capuæ fuiſſent, dum portæ clauſæ eſſent*, in urbe . . . . . *maneret*. Liv. 26. 34.

Ne, which governs the principal clauſe, extends its power to all the ſubordinate ones. So, *Ut* ſaltatio quædam *naſceretur, cui ſaltationi Titius nomen eſſet*. Clar. Orat. 62.

But if the preceding clauſe be in the indicative, the ſubordinate deſcriptive clauſe is alſo indicative.

M. Atilius Regulus, *cujus*, ex iis *qui ad Capuam fuerant*, maxima auctoritas *erat* in conſilio, *inquit*, &c. Liv. 26. 33.

In the ſpeeches of Livy indeed, or of any Latin hiſtorian, may be ſeen a very ſtriking illuſtration of the nature of this mood. When the ſpeeches are given in the third perſon, every ſentence proceeds in the Subjunctive mood; becauſe the tenſes depend on *dixit*, or ſome ſuch word preceding. Let any one turn a ſpeech of this kind into the firſt perſon, and he will change all the Subjunctive tenſes into Indicatives; with the exception of thoſe which, according to the firſt and ſecond principle, would ſtill be ſubjunctive.

The ſame holds of meſſages, inſtructions, decrees, &c.

Supplicatio omnibus deis, *quorum* pulvinaria Romæ *eſſent, indicta eſt*. Liv. 24. 10.

If he had been ſimply relating a *fact*, he would have ſaid *erant*; but he is giving the ſubſtance of a decree. And this brings us very near to that character of the Subjunctive, in which it is ſaid to reſemble the future tenſe.

Nuntium miſit, qui diceret.

Ἔπεμψεν ἄγγελον λέξοντα.

Perizonius indeed reaſons againſt this doctrine, and ſays all the

that criticiſm ought to be diffuſe; and the ſtudy of them is worth much time and labour: for they

the *futurity* implied in ſuch ſentences reſides in ſome words underſtood. *Mitto qui dicat*, he would reſolve into *Mitto aliquem qui erit ut dicat*. But I do not know how he would reſolve the ſentence above in this manner, *Miſit qui diceret*. And the Latin phraſe correſponds ſo continually with the Greek future participle, that it bears ſtrong teſtimony to the ſoundneſs of Sanctius's doctrine, that all the tenſes of the Subjunctive Mood [a Grammatical term which he rejects] are but diſguiſed futures. After *ſi* moſt of them evidently have that force.

It muſt however be obſerved, that the force of *qui* in ſuch caſes is often called *cauſal*; and when this force is perceived, every one would expect the Subjunctive to follow it.

Antonium . . . . miſi ad te, *cui* [i. e. ut ei] ſi tibi videretur, cohortes *traderes*. Cic. Ep. Fam. 3. 6.

In Siciliam duo Prætores profecti: P. Cornelius ad exercitum; Otacilius, *qui* maritimæ oræ *præeſſet*. Liv. 24. 12.

In Greek this uſe of the relative is not ſo frequent; becauſe, beſides the future participles, there are a great variety of cauſal particles in that language, ὅπως, ἵνα, ὥστε, ὅτι, as well as the pronoun οἵτινες, all of whoſe places are occaſionally ſupplied in Latin by the inflexions of *qui*.

It would be well therefore, if, when doubting what mood ſhould follow *qui*, we were to conſider whether *qui* be ſimply *relative* or not: for if it be reſolved into any thing more than a mere link uniting the clauſe it governs to ſome antecedent—if it denote *the manner* in which the clauſe ſtands related to that antecedent—if it declare that it ſprings from it, is cauſed by it, or is dependent upon it in any way, the Subjunctive, and not the Indicative, ought to follow.

Mr. Harris ſuppoſes the Latin relative to be merely *que is*: but it frequently has the force of *quia is, quum is, ut is*; in all which caſes it contains an element that calls for the Subjunctive Mood.

Such

are the very joints and ligatures of the language: and to have the right uſe and play of theſe, im-

Such are the remarks which an obſervation, deſultory perhaps, but not ſuperficial, of the beſt Latin writers, has led me to make. They are offered with much diffidence, on a ſubject, where each man almoſt has a right to offer what occurs to himſelf. For the queſtion has never been purſued through all its windings. There is, I doubt not, a clue to this, as to every other mazy dance of human thought, which we trace in the texture of language. When once unravelled, it appears ſimple enough: and the more ſimple it is, the greater is the merit of the diſcovery. And yet in ſuch matters the world are apt to ſhew ingratitude and contempt, when they ought moſt to admire, and to be thankful. Of which injuſtice we have the ſtrongeſt proof in that immortal Stagyrite, who has by a moſt laborious analyſis reſolved all the methods of argumentation into one ſimple principle, only to draw forth this reflection from a modern Philoſopher upon his labours:

O curas hominum! O quantum eſt in rebus inane!

Such injuſtice will not, I truſt, deter a philoſophical critic from attempting to ſolve the intricate phænomena of language which ſtill remain unexplained. To perform the taſk well requires, not only extenſive erudition, a ſtrong memory, an acute and penetrating mind, but an acquaintance alſo, either ſelf-taught or methodically acquired, with that true Logic which enables us to ſort, to diſcriminate, and to abſtract ideas, to know them again under all the changes of dreſs and poſture, and to keep a ſteady eye upon them, as they mingle with the confuſed and ſhifting crowd. This combination of qualities is indeed rare: but there have been men ſo variouſly gifted, though few; and ſome perhaps there ſtill are: One I know there is, who could not render a more acceptable ſervice to the lovers of ancient learning, than by guiding their footſteps through this perplexing labyrinth.

parts

parts more of a native air and grace, is really a more deſirable accompliſhment, than an extenſive acquaintance with the vocabulary, or a knowledge of ſingular and rare ſenſes, in which certain words are uſed.

The critic, whoſe cavils I am examining, ſeems poſſeſſed of no principle to guide him. The examples he gives of an indicative with *quis*, or *quibus*, are wrongly explained. V. g.

" Dic quibus in terris inſcripti nomina regum
" *Naſcantur* flores."

Here if the line be underſtood as a queſtion, the indicative will do; and ſo perhaps it was underſtood by thoſe copyiſts who kept the reading. But the Subjunctive *naſcantur*, with *quibus*, as an Indefinite, is preferable, which in Greek would have been τισὶ, not ἅτις. In the next example,

" Neſcio quis teneros oculus mihi faſcinat agnos,"

Neſcio quis is ſimply parenthetical. " Some one, " I know not who." And again,

" Neſcio quid majus naſcitur Iliade."

" Some poem (I know not exactly what) is coming " forth, which will ſurpaſs the Iliad." Every one knows that this was a compliment paid by Propertius to Virgil, when he was writing the Æneid. But from the reſolution of the line given in the Review, one is led to ſuſpect that the

the writer underſtood it as ſaid in honour of Homer. He ſays, *Neſcio quid* (*ſit quod*) *naſcitur* "*majus Iliade.*" By this mode of reſolving it, the *aſſertion* is loſt, "that *ſomething is really* "coming forth," which is what the poet meant to expreſs. And ſo with the other example, to ſay as the Reviewer does, "*Neſcio quis* [*ſit qui*] "*teneros oculus mihi faſcinat agnos,*" reduces it to this; that Menalcas *does not know* who has bewitched his lambs: whereas he inſiſts that witchcraft is the cauſe of their leanneſs.

His certe neque amor cauſa eſt; vix oſſibus hærent.
Neſcio quis teneros *oculus mihi faſcinat* agnos.

Some *evil eye*, I know not whoſe, is the cauſe. *That* is the propoſition: *Neſcio quis* is merely an adjunct.

It would but ill expreſs the impatience of Horace in that line,

Certe neſcio quid ſecreto velle loqui te
Aiebas mecum. Serm. I. ix. 67.

to tranſlate it,

"*I certainly do not know* what it was you wiſhed to "ſay to me."

Again, how would the Reviewer explain ſuch paſſages as theſe, where the relative is in an oblique caſe?

Neſcio

Neſcio qua præter ſolitum dulcedine læti
Inter ſe foliis ſtrepitant. Georg. i. 412.
Terraque *neſcio quo* non placet ipſa modo.
Ov. iii. Triſt. iii. 8.

Niſi forte me Paconii *neſcio cujus*, hominis ne Græci quidem, at Myſii, aut Phrygis potius, querelis moveri putes. Cic. Ep. ad Quint. Frat. i. 6.

Another deciſive objection to his method of reſolving ſuch paſſages is, that he ſuppoſes an ellipſis of the *relative*; which I believe one may venture to affirm is againſt the idiom both of the Greek and Latin languages. In Engliſh it is common. E. g.

The meſſenger you ſent did not arrive.

But neither in Greek or Latin could this be allowed. We might ſay, οὐκ ἀφίκετο ὃν ἐπέμψας, or, *Quem miſiſti non advenit.* We may leave out the Antecedent, eſpecially when it is a demonſtrative pronoun, but never the Relative. In Engliſh we may leave out the Relative, but never the Antecedent[t]. This contraſt is one of the moſt ſtriking peculiarities which runs through the ancient languages, as compared with our own [u].

[t] In poetry indeed it is ſometimes done: but then the deſign is to *elevate* the expreſſion, by introducing ſomething ξενικὸν, ſomething which is out of the common way, and *is therefore not the idiom.*

[u] Mr. Jones, whoſe philological opinions are always entitled

The phraſe, *eam ſumpſiſſe contigerit*, is perhaps wrong; but it would not be right as the Reviewer mends it, merely by reading *ei* inſtead of *eam*. The fault is in *ſumpſiſſe*, which is ſuperfluous: *ei contigerint* would have been enough. *Contingit* certainly requires a Dative, expreſſed or underſtood; and there is no ſaying why *nobis* might not be underſtood here. It requires a caſe after it, both becauſe *tango* is a tranſitive, and becauſe of the prepoſition *con*. *Accidit* alſo, for the laſt reaſon, requires a caſe after it; and ſo it will be found that the pureſt writers uſe it; although afterwards it took the place of the neutral *cecidit*, which word Plautus, Terence, and Cicero prefer, when the event ſpecified is not related to ſome other event, or to ſome one particularly affected by it.

Of the Latinity of this Preface, let me be per-

to reſpect, does, I ſee, in his Latin Grammar, admit of an ellipſis of the Relative, as in this example;

Urbs antiqua fuit, Tyrii tenuêre coloni:

which he explains by *quam* underſtood, p. 106. Lat. Gram. To me it ſeems better to conſider the latter clauſe as a parentheſis, which is an expedient we muſt at times have recourſe to, or no one rule of ſyntax would be unſhaken. Examples of this kind are extremely rare; and they may, I believe, when they do occur, always be explained moſt ſimply by a pareatheſis. I have much to ſay, but this place will not bear it, upon the peculiarity of the Engliſh in omitting the Relative where the Latin and Greek languages omit the Antecedent. It affects *all the cauſal particles*.

mitted

mitted to obſerve, that, although not faultleſs, it is as good as moſt of what is now written in England, and much better than what uſually comes from Germany. If the Reviewer himſelf ever means to challenge the notice of the public in that way, I would adviſe him to be very cautious: the moſt prudent plan will be, not to let his lucubrations paſs beyond the circle of his private friends, or the ſecret orgies of ſome *Dilettanti* ſociety, where they will be praiſed, no doubt, and admired, and embalmed perhaps among the moſt precious of their curioſities.

Before I notice his general ſtrictures on the value of the notes, it may be as well to diſpatch the remainder of his criticiſms upon Oxonian Latin, which, he ſays, differs moſt eſſentially from the old Roman Latin. But, in doing this, I muſt be forgiven, if a deſire to clear up notions which are often indiſtinct and confuſed, leads me into ſome lengthened diſſertation. His whole paragraph muſt be copied.

"In this *Roman* Latin, the relative conjunction "QUOD uſually governs an indicative, when it anſwers "to the Engliſh conjunction BECAUSE, unleſs the ſen-"tence be potential or oblique; and a ſubjunctive, "when it ſtands for UT, and anſwers to the Engliſh "THAT. But in Oxonian Latin this is completely "reverſed; and we have repeatedly ſuch ſentences as

'*quod* vires *ſint* exiguæ, ſæpe inſidiis circumvenire 'hoſtem tentant;' pag. 210. and 'ſuſpicor *quod Strabo* 'Byzantii latitudinem a Maſſilienſi *ſumpſit*;' pag. 172. "alſo, 'hæc relatu digna cenſui, *quod* Strabo non ſatis 'clarè de hoc bello *ſcripſerit*;' pag. 1088. and '*ſcribit* '*quod cloacæ—ſubiêre tecta*;' pag. 336."[x]

The right uſe of the conjunction QUOD is a knotty point, which has much exereiſed the Grammarians.

In this place it is ſufficient to obſerve, that the conjunction *quod* never ſtands in good writers for *ut*, anſwering to the Engliſh word *that*. It *always* has, more or leſs, the force of *becauſe*[y]; except when it means *as to, as to which. The ſubſtitution of it for* ut, *and for the accuſative caſe with the infinitive mood, is a barbariſm.*

Since then it always refers to ſome cauſe, if that cauſe be fixed and certain, or if the aſſertion be abſolute, the Indicative mood will be joined with it; if vague and uncertain, or if the aſſertion

[x] Rev. p. 435.

[y] *Ut* alſo is *cauſal*, but it denotes the *final cauſe*, or ſomething which *is to follow*. *Quod, becauſe*, denotes the *efficient cauſe*, or ſomething which *has gone before*. This diſtinction is very neceſſary. It is the key to the right uſe of theſe particles in a thouſand caſes: and the neglect of it may account for many anomalies in the uſe of the Engliſh particles, which have much perplexed Grammarians.

be

be not abſolute, the Subjunctive. In the inſtance quoted from the note, it ought to have been "quod vires *ſunt* exiguæ:" but the Reviewer has not given the reaſon why it ought. The whole paſſage is this: *Parvulæ reſpublicæ ſunt bellicoſæ, et quod vires ſint exiguæ, ſæpe inſidiis circumvenire hoſtes tentant.* Here, becauſe he is ſpeaking only of *parvulæ reſpublicæ*, the fact aſſigned as a cauſe is not doubtful, but certain: "vires *ſunt* "exiguæ." But in the ſame note, when the commentator ſays, "*Artes negliguntur quod inutiles* "*ſint*," *ſint* is right, becauſe the aſſertion is not an abſolute acknowledged truth. So Cicero,

Ad te minus multa doleo, *quod* et mœrore *impedior*, et quid expectem magis *habeo*, quam &c. Att. iii. 10.

Hic tu me accuſas, *quod* me *afflictem*. Att. iii. 12.

Suſpicor quod Strabo . . . ſumpſit, is bad Latin, not for the reaſon aſſigned by the Reviewer, but for one which requires even here a little detail. And if I can at all clear up a matter which has puzzled ſo many acute and learned men, my prolixity will, I am ſure, be forgiven. It involves the old diſputed point between Sanctius, who condemns the phraſes *dico quod, credo quod, ſcio quod*, and his commentator Perizonius, who defends them all. The elder Gronovius eſpouſed the doctrine of Sanctius, and upon that ground

altered

altered a line in Plautus, which was almoſt the only palpable authority in their way.

Scio jam filius quod amet meus. Aſin. I. i. 3.

He propoſes to read *quum* or *quam* inſtead of *quod*; and adopts a ſimilar remedy for one paſſage in Livy, where the ſame conſtruction is uſed.

On the ſide of Perizonius are Manutius, Henry Stephens, Voſſius, and Scioppius. Some of theſe parties are very warm in the argument, eſpecially Scioppius, who has betrayed, as people are apt to do, the weakneſs of his cauſe, by diſingenuous attempts to ſupport it. The ſum of their doctrine is this; that *dico quod, credo quod, ſcio quod,* are juſt as good Latin as *miror quod, gaudeo quod, gratulor quod,* &c. and they exclaim, that it is againſt all reaſon to admit the one and reject the other, as Sanctius does.

After a fair ſtatement of the caſe, Geſner, whoſe good ſenſe and candour, as well as his learning, every one muſt admire, points out ſome miſtakes, into which all theſe diſputants had fallen, and gives a perſpicuous diviſion of the ſeveral ſenſes of this particle, which they ſeem to have confounded. What he ſays however of the point more immediately before us is remarkable. He rightly obſerves, if *quod* can be changed into *quia, cum,* or *propterea quod,* it is at our option to expreſs our meaning, either by the Accuſative caſe and the Infinitive mood, or by *quod* and the

the Indicative, or Subjunctive. And he propoſes this as a good practical teſt in all doubtful caſes. Hence, he ſays, after *miror, doleo, queror, indignor, gaudeo, glorior,* and *perhaps* after all verbs denoting *ſimilar* affections of the mind, *quod* may be uſed; but he will not go ſo far as to ſay it may be uſed after verbs denoting *every* affection of the mind; for after *ſpero, confido, vereor,* he thinks it improper; "*ſuch is the* "*tyranny of cuſtom*[z]."

But a little reflection on the reaſon aſſigned for the uſe of *quod* after *miror, doleo,* &c. will teach us that it is not *the tyranny of cuſtom,* but ſound ſenſe and conſiſtent principle, which requires this diſtinction. *Quod* in thoſe caſes, as all Grammarians admit, is *cauſal*; it denotes the *cauſe* of the thing aſſerted: and, as the *cauſe* muſt needs be prior to the effect, it will be proper only in caſes where that priority exiſts. All the affections of *wonder, grief, joy, anger, exultation,* are excited by ſomething which *has* exiſted. *Hope, fear, confidence, ſuſpicion,* relate to ſomething

[z] Geſner's own words are, Itaque poſt *miror, doleo, queror, indignor, gaudeo, glorior,* et ſimilia forte affectuum, quæ vocant, verba (de omnibus non auſim confirmare, neque enim dici poſſe puto, *ſpero, confido quod,* neque dici ignoro, *vereor ut* vel *ne: adeo uſus tyrannus eſt*) dubium non eſt, quin *quod* ſequi poſſit: ſequi tamen et poteſt, et ſolet Accuſativus cum Infinitivo. Theſaur. in voc. QUOD.

proſpective,

proſpective, ſomething that will perhaps exiſt, but which we do not *know* will or does exiſt. If this principle had been kept ſteadily in view, it would have ſolved all the caſes about which theſe acute Grammarians are wrangling. It was the gradual loſs of this principle which led to the confuſion in later writers, who at length employ *quod* equally for things *proſpective*, as retroſpective, and for things which are ſtated merely *to be* or to have *happened*, although they are not alledged as the cauſe of any thing.

It may indeed happen that *quod* ſhould be joined with *timeo* or *metuo*; but it does not then denote the *object* of the fear, but the *cauſe* which has excited it; an omen perhaps, or ſome ſymptom of a coming evil. I cannot recollect at preſent an example in point. And in ſuch words as *quod* Indexes give us no help. But this would be correct Latin: *Quod rex iraſceretur, metuebat ne quid ſibi mali eveniret. Quod lævum intonuiſſet, ſperavit &c.*

A curious illuſtration of the proper uſe of *quod* occurs when it is joined with the word *adde*. Many paſſages are quoted from good writers, beginning with *adde quod*; but in all theſe caſes, the thing introduced may be conſidered as a *cauſe* or *reaſon* for ſomething before alledged. The author has been *reaſoning*, and the new circumſtance is brought in to *ſupport his argument*. E. g.

Adde

Adde quod, ut cupias conſtans in amore manere
Non potes. Ov. Ep. xvii. 199.
Adde quod arcana fieri novus ignis in æde
Dicitur. Faſt. iii. 143.

So again, Faſt. iii. 245. and in many other places. The poet is *arguing* a point, or expoſtulating, and giving *reaſons* for the complaint. Of the ſame kind is this paſſage of Cicero:

Videndumque illud eſt, *quod*, ſi opulentum fortunatumque defenderis, in illo uno, aut forte in liberis ejus, *manet* gratia. Cic. Off. ii. 20.

Videndum quod has juſt the ſame force as *adde quod*, and brings in ſome reaſon for what has been before advanced. But in later writers it often ſerves like the Greek ὅτι, in a ſimple narrative, when the accuſative caſe and infinitive mood ought to have been uſed.

Perizonius, who ſpeaks ſharply of the inconſiſtency of Sanctius, ſays, among other things, "nay, he has himſelf uſed this very phraſe, *Adde* "*quod multi Græce ſcripſerunt.*" I doubt whether Sanctius would have been ready with an anſwer; for he certainly has not taken hold of the thing by the right handle. The proper anſwer is that principle which has been juſt laid down. He has been *arguing* a point, and *adde quod* introduces a new reaſon. The point in queſtion was this: The

word *Quod*, it ſeems, occurs frequently in this barbarous ſenſe in the Pandects; the latinity of which is in general very pure. Sanctius anſwers this objection at length: he ſays, that the book has been much interpolated; that the Lawyers, in whoſe hands it has been, are not the pureſt writers: and *Adde quod multi illorum Græce ſcripſerunt*, *whence*, or *from which cauſe*, it was natural that *quod* ſhould be ſubſtituted by them for the Greek ὅτι. To have ſaid, *multos illorum Græce ſcripſiſſe* would not have anſwered his purpoſe ſo well as *quod* does.

A ſingle difficulty ſtill remains; and that is about the word *ſcio*. *Spero quod*, *credo quod*, *dico quod*, *cupio quod*, *volo quod*, are eaſily exploded: but *ſcio quod* ſeems to have ſome authority, and the paſſages which Gronovius alters in order to reconcile them with his doctrine contain this word. The truth perhaps is, that ſuch authorities are genuine[a]: for *ſcio* is ſomething of an intermediate kind between the retroſpective and the

[a] Upon a cloſer examination of this paſſage in Plautus, I have reaſon to believe it genuine. If the reader thinks it worth while to turn to the original, he will find that Demænetus, wiſhing to ſupply his ſon with money for his amours through the medium of a ſlave, Libanus, ſays, for the ſake of encouraging his confidant,

Aut cur miniter tibi,
Propterea quod me non ſcientem feceris?
Aut cur poſtremo filio ſuccenſeam

Patres

proſpective claſs. It may partake of the nature of each. The thing muſt *have happened*, in order to be *known* in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word: as in that line of Martial quoted by Sanctius;

Hoc ſcio, quod ſcribat nulla puella. ii. 65.

But it is common to ſay, we *know* many things that *will happen*; and in ſuch caſes *quod* would be undoubtedly wrong. In the example from

Patres ut faciunt cæteri? Lib. Quid iſtuc novi eſt?
De. Equidem ſcio jam, filius quod amet meus
Iſthanc meretricem e proxumo Philenium. Aſin. I. i. 33.

The words of Libanus are evidently meant to be ſaid *aſide*. *Equidem ſcio jam*, may be conſidered as parenthetical, referring to *non ſcientem feceris*, and in that caſe *filius quod amet meus*, will relate to *ſuccenſeam*, which is a legitimate conſtruction. I am confident indeed that this is the true conſtruction. *Cur miniter* has *quod non feceris* after it: and *cur ſuccenſeam* would naturally require a ſimilar clauſe ſubjoined explanatory of *ſuccenſeam*, as *non ſcientem feceris* is explanatory of *miniter*. But the courſe of the ſentence is interrupted by *Quid iſtuc novi eſt? Equidem jam ſcio:* and then, as is very common after a parentheſis, the word which preceded it is repeated after it; as here, *filio* is repeated in *filius*. A long parentheſis indeed is often the cauſe of a little grammatical incongruity in the oldeſt writers: it is a kind of *diſturbing force*, which affects the courſe of the ſentence, although it does not extinguiſh its original character: ſuch a ſentence therefore is not a good authority for any unuſual conſtruction.

The line, *Equidem jam ſcio*, &c. is repeated v. 70. where Gronovius juſtly condemns it as ſpurious. The doctrine which I have maintained about *quod* is a further reaſon for condemning it: for in that place *quod amet* muſt depend upon *ſcio:* there is no ſuch word as *ſuccenſeam* going before, with which it can unite.

Martial, Sanctius underſtands *quod* as if it were *propter quod*, or *cur*. Very likely ſome *équivoque* was intended; in which caſe the uſe of words is apt to be a little ſtrained. And indeed the paſſages are ſo few in which *ſcio quod* is found, compared with the thouſands of occaſions in which that idea occurs, that we may well conſider it offenſive to the genius of the language.

Hence it will be ſeen that *ſuſpicor quod* Strabo . . . *ſumpſit*, is barbarous, not becauſe *quod* is uſed with *ſumpſit*, but becauſe it is uſed with *ſuſpicor*. So *ſcribit*[b] *quod*, is wrong: *quod . . . ſubiére* is not wrong. *Hæc relatu digna cenſui, quod Strabo non ſatis clare de hoc bello ſcripſerit*, is defenſible, becauſe the aſſertion implies ſome diffidence; it is not quite abſolute: ſo in Plautus;

Cur miniter tibi,
Propterea quod me non ſcientem *feceris*?
Aſin. I. i. 34.

and in a hundred other places.

The two firſt examples of the wrong uſe of *ut* are correctly quoted; although in the latter the meaning of *ut* probably is, *as, according as*; in which caſe there is no fault. Of the other I can only ſay, that in the eye of every candid

[b] After *ſcribo* ſhould be the Accuſative caſe and Infinitive mood. Thus Livy, xxiv. 31. *Scriptum erat* recte eum feciſſe . . . quod nulli peperciſſet; not *ſcriptum erat quod recte feciſſet.*

reader

reader it *muſt* be deemed an overſight, and not a mark of ignorance. It is impoſſible that ſuch a miſtake could have been deliberately made. The Reviewer indeed ſays, "this kind of error is "ſyſtematic[c]." He does not however refer to a ſingle example of the kind beſides, although he has evidently peruſed the notes *ſolely* with a view to detect the falſe Latin; and from what I have read of them, I do not believe he could produce another. That the error is *ſyſtematic*, is an aſſertion which will ſhine conſpicuous in that galaxy of falſehood which has nearly dazzled us already. The paſſage p. 220, where *ut* is ſaid to be omitted, he does not underſtand. To place *ut* where he propoſes, would make nonſenſe. The meaning of *videatur* is, *may ſeem*. "*To the eye* "*it may ſeem* at firſt not to riſe: but, in reality, "by degrees it ſwells into the mountains of Mo-"lina," &c.[d]

"Of the Oxonian uſe of the indicative with the "*relative* pronoun ſubordinate to another verb we have "already treated in our obſervations on the Preface[e]."

We alſo have treated of this matter pretty largely, and have ſhewn how the Indefinite

[c] Page 436, l. 13.

[d] Paullò infra Caunum ex Idubeda emiſſus Oroſpeda mollibus initio juris vix aſſurgere videatur; ſenſim tamen ſeſe efferens Molinæ primum montes erigit, &c. p. 220.

[e] Rev. p. 436.

is often confounded with the Relative. But we do not often expect to find ſuch a confuſion as the Reviewer is here guilty of. For example; of this fault he gives three ſpecimens, ſelected from the whole body of notes. In the firſt and third, what he calls the Relative is in fact the Indefinite. In the ſecond, "cum ſentirent "quantum optimates a divitiis potuerunt," he calls *quantum* a Relative. In the next example there is ſomething worſe than blundering about a Relative. In order to make room for a pitiful joke, he wilfully perverts the meaning of the paſſage;

'Obſervandum eſt, quo violentior eſt Solis ardor, eo 'citius fieri pluvias.' "*Citius*, ſays he, we preſume "ſtands for *crebrius*; for though 'it rains faſter' be "a common vulgariſm in Engliſh, we do not believe "that it had even that humble ſtation in any idiom of "the Latin, that exiſted prior to the Oxonian."

Who could have believed that in this paſſage *citius* merely means *ſooner?* The rainy ſeaſon ſets in SOONER, the hotter the climate is. Even ſuppoſing the Editor had meant *faſter*, *crebrius*, which the Reviewer recommends, is the laſt word he ſhould have uſed. It conveys an idea totally different, *more frequently: vehementius*, *effuſius*, *gravius*, would have been the proper words for *faſter*[f].

[f] This criticiſm is very ably refuted in the Gent. Mag. for

The next complaint is of the Oxonian uſe of tenſes. Of this fault he produces eight ſpecimens. One of theſe runs thus;

"Neque hoc memoriæ lapſu Strabo ſcripſit; ſed "cum de Cyri rebus geſtis vix aliquid certe conſtat, "eam famam ſequitur, &c."

He ſeems to mean, that the change of tenſe from *ſcripſit* to *conſtat* and *ſequitur*, is utterly barbarous. He therefore brings in a Roman, altering *conſtat* into *conſtaret*, and *ſequitur* into *ſequebatur*. The Roman muſt have been more nice than many of his countrymen to think this neceſſary: ſuch changes of tenſe in the ſame ſentence are not unuſual in the beſt writers.

Primo anteſignani Pœnorum, deinde ſigna perturbata, poſtremo tota impulſa acies; inde haud dubie terga *data, ruuntque* fugientes in caſtra; adeo pavidi trepidique .... ut ne .... quiſquam *reſtiterit*, ac prope .... *ediderint*. Liv. xxiv. 16.

for Oct. 1809. by Mr. Falconer, the writer of the Preface. His paſſage from Servius proves that *citius* will bear the meaning of *ſooner*; but the poſitive authority of Horace and Virgil, both of whom uſe it in that ſenſe, is ſtill better. The Poets however are not the beſt guides. Cicero would have ſaid *maturius*.

The whole of Mr. Falconer's letter is well worth reading. I am obliged to touch upon the ſame points, ſome of which I ſhall treat more fully than he has done.

Itaque

Itaque Nolam ad Collegam *mittit* .... opus eſſe, qui *opponatur:* vel ipſe relicto Nolæ præſidio modico *veniret*: vel ſi eum Nola *teneret*, et res *eſſent*, &c. Liv. xxiv. 19.

Conſules, Marcellus retro, Nolam *redit;* Fabius in Samnium .... *proceſſit*. Liv. xxiv. 20.

Ad me *adire* quoſdam memini qui *dicerent*. Cic. Div. iii. 10. 19.

Pronuntiat Gracchus eſſe nihil quod de libertate *ſperarent*, niſi eo die fuſi fugatique hoſtes eſſent. Liv. xxiv. 15.

Quoad primus ille ſermo *haberetur*, *adeſt* in diſputando ſenex. Cic. Att. iv. 16.

Antiochus Magnus, ut tributa Romanis *ſolveret*, nocte templum Elymæi Jovis *aggreſſus eſt*, qua re prodita, concurſu incolarum cum exercitu toto *interficitur*. Juſtin. lib. xxxii. c. 2.

It is needleſs to multiply examples, for theſe are enough to ſhew that a fault of this kind in a modern, eſpecially in one whoſe mind was wholly intent on his matter, and quite regardleſs of his ſtyle, is not very diſgraceful. The alteration of *ſupponeret* into *ſuppoſuerit*, has no reaſon for it, and to my ears makes the ſentence leſs Roman than it was before. Either *ſupponeret* is uſed for *ſupponat*, or *habet* for *haberet*. In Plautus ſuch inaccuracies are very common. If the Reviewer means to ſay that the expreſſion "*cum* "de Cyri rebus vix aliquid certe *conſtat*" is faulty,

and

and that it ought to be *conſtet*, he takes more upon himſelf than he has any right to do. The beſt writers have uſed *cum* in this ſenſe with the Indicative mood.

Tibi maximas gratias ago, *cum* tantum meæ literæ *potuerunt*. Cic. Fam. xiii. 24.

Cum medio *exceſſit*, unde hæc ſuſcepta eſt tibi.

Ter. Phorm. V. vii. 77.

Gratulor tibi, *cum* tantum *vales* apud Dolabellam, quantum &c. Cic. Att. 226. b. ap. Nizol. voc. Cum. et Cic. de Orat. 122. b. ibid.

Cum iſthæc res male *evenit* tibi, Gripe, gratulor.

Plaut. Rud. IV. iv. 134.

Tu *cum* eo tempore mecum eſſe non *potuiſti*, quo operam defideravi tuam, cave feſtines &c.

Cic. Fam. xvi. 12. Facciol.

Quam quidem, *cum* difficillimo reip. tempore ſecuti *ſunt*, eos nunquam oportebit &c. Cic. Phil. xiv. 11.

The Subjunctive is certainly moſt frequent with *cum*, when uſed for *quandoquidem* or *quoniam*; and writers of Latin ſhould be cautioned againſt this practice: but as it has the ſanction of Cicero, however ſparingly, it is to be treated with reſpect. It cannot be a downright barbariſm.

The next critical laſh falls upon the following ſentence.

"Strabo duodecim civitates in Etruria principes "antea dixit: ſed harum tantum octo memoravit, ſcili- "cet Tarquinii, Cara, Volaterra, Arretium, Perufia, "Volſinii, Falerii, Clufium. p. 322."

Upon this the Reviewer obſerves, that "al-
"though in *Homeric Greek* there is a figure of
"ſpeech ſomewhat like this," yet "it was unknown
"to *every period of Latinity*—prior to the Ox-
"onian, which it has thus ſo happily enriched."

Why in Homeric Greek only? Did he ever read this paſſage in Xenophon? Ἐφ' οἷς γε μὴν ἔργοις κεῖται θάνατος ἡ ζημία, ἱεροσυλίαι, τοιχωρυχίαι, ἀνδραποδίσις, πόλεως προδοσία, ἃ δ' αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀντίδικοι τούτων πρᾶξαί τι κατ' ἐμοῦ φασίν. Apol. Soc. §. 25.

The ſame conſtruction occurs often in Herodotus and Thucydides; and I perceive an inſtance in Strabo, p. 299. l. 25. And as to the facetious remark about Latinity, it may be edifying to quote the following paſſage from the Edinburgh Review, when examining an edition of a *Latin claſſic*.

"There is no form of conſtruction more common,
"than this reſuming the Nominative caſe after the
"ſentence appears to be proceeding to ſomething elſe.
"Nay, there are many inſtances, in which an object is
"firſt introduced, in ſome of the oblique caſes, in the
"courſe of conſtruction; and then the Nominative is
"reſumed, without regard to that conſtruction, for the
"purpoſe of ſtating or expounding ſome circumſtance
"attending it. Thus in the tenth book of the Æneid we
"have

—"rapiens immania pondera baltei,
Impreſſumque nefas"

"all

" all in the accuſative; but the farther deſcription of " the *neſas* is given, without any interval, in the " Nominative.

—una ſub nocte jugali
Cæſa manus juvenum fœde, *thalamique crienti.*"

Edinb. Rev. No. V. p. 63.

I will not go ſo far with this ingenious critic, as to ſay, " *nothing is more common than this con-* " *ſtruction*;" but I may at leaſt conſign over to him the controverſy with his brother critic, who ſays, " *it is unknown to every period of Latinity.*"

The paſſage however in the note is manifeſtly an overſight: it never could have ariſen from ignorance, and it never could miſlead or embarraſs any reader.

The Reviewer proceeds;

" Upon the ſame principle, the baldneſs and poverty " of the ancient Roman tongue have been embelliſhed " in this new modification of it with the *exquiſite and* RE- " CONDITE *phraſes of ſtretching out a ſentence or opinion* " geographically by the mile, from one gate of a great " city to another,—' Donati tamen *ſententiam* intelligo " eſſe a porta Eſquilina verſus Labicanam'—*and ex-* " *hibiting Faith or Belief* in a tangible or viſible form, " aſcertained *by cubical or ſuperficial meaſure*,—' *Ma-* ' *jor* auctori noſtro ac Juſtino adhibenda *fides* eſt."

This is meant (ſi Dîs placet) for wit and pleaſantry! O! ſi ſic omnia dixiſſet! little ſhould I dread the miſchievous effects of this northern

libeller. Or if I could believe this to be the tone of ſarcaſm we are likely to hear from that journal in future; inſtead of complaining and refuting, I ſhould ſing in a note of triumph,

Audivere, Lyce, Dî mea vota; Dî
Audivere, Lyce. *Fis anus, et tamen*
Vis formoſa videri:
Ludiſque, et bibis impudens.

There is indeed a tottering and toothleſs decrepitude in this paſſage, which almoſt diſarms criticiſm, and, as it affects to be friſky, provokes only laughter. The egregious ſillineſs of miſtaking a *gate* for a *road*, and of tranſlating "*verſus* Labicanam," "*to* the Labican," as if *verſus* denoted the *limit* inſtead of the *direction* of any movement, has been ſo well expoſed by Mr. Falconer[5], that it would be uſeleſs for me to ſay more on that ſubject. "*Major* fides" is objected to, as "exhibiting faith in a tangible or viſible "form, aſcertained by cubical or ſuperficial "meaſure." Cicero is guilty of the ſame error, with the words *ſpes, virtus, indoles, vox, alacritas, admiratio, auctoritas*, all of which he abſurdly joins with the epithet *major*, for want of this learned Reviewer's advice: and as to this very word *fides*, his ignorance of his own language is inexcuſable;

[5] Gent. Magazine, Oct. 1809.

"Si

" Si *honor* is fuit, *majorem* tibi habere non potui: si " *fides, majorem* pene habui, quam mihi ipsi.

Ep. Fam. v. 20.

In the same strain of superannuated tittering he proceeds,

" which [sc. fidem] this learned body is so generous " as to *give gratuitously* (for they cannot mean it in the " Roman sense, of either rendering credible or pledging) " to an old Jewish historian, who has been dead seventeen " centuries—'*Josepho fidem damus*,'—and make a faith- " less usurper give to history, what he never had to give " to any one—'*Augustus fidem historiæ dedit.*"

Rev. p. 437.

The wisdom of all this is just as small as the wit. Does he mean to say, that the Roman sense of " *Josepho fidem damus*, is " *we render Josephus* " *credible?*" If so, he is quite in the dark. *Dare fidem*, after a *thing*, a *circumstance*, an *argument*, may mean *to add weight and credit* to any statement. Thus,

Nunc quoque dant verbo *plurima signa* fidem.

Ov. Fast. ii. 20.

Commemoratio antiquitatis . . . et auctoritatem orationi affert et fidem. Cic. Orat. 34.

But after *a person*, " dare fidem" means to *promise*, to *certify, to give one's word.* There is a marked distinction in its use according as it follows *a person*, or *a thing*. *Homo dat fidem*, he promises: *Homo habet fidem*, he believes: *Res dat*

dat fidem, it adds credit: *Res habet fidem*, it is credible. How abſurd therefore is his remark about Auguſtus! We may ſay of a *faithleſs* man, as well as of an *upright* man, "*dedit* fidem." It is not in *giving* their word, but in *keeping* it, that they differ.

But we have not done with this unlucky *fidem* yet. He goes on to ſay,

"The Engliſh phraſe, indeed, may ſuggeſt another "meaning, and make us Britons ſuſpect, that, in this "new dialect, '*fidem dare*' ſignifies what '*fidem habere*' "did in the old: but no ſuch ſuſpicion will ariſe on "the Continent, *where no ſuch indigenous expreſſion* "*exiſts.*" Rev. p. 437.

"O! I had loſt a ſheep, an' he had not "bleated."

Why will a man force us to expoſe his vanity and ignorance? The thing, to be ſure, is in itſelf quite indifferent; but it may ſerve to ſhew what ſtuff this Reviewer is made of, who would fain have us to think he underſtands German.

But let us hear the words of Noltenius.

Sed quæ eſt occaſio, quod *Germani mei* locutione *fidem dare* etiam tunc utuntur, quum utendum eſſet locutione *fidem habere*, aut verbo ſingulo, *credere* vel *accredere*? Hæc nimirum, quod in vernaculâ linguâ habemus locutionem *Glauben geben*, *beymeſſen*, *zuſtellen*, putamuſque, quomodo Latinum *dare* noſtro *Geben* alias

alias reſpondet, ita reſpondere eidem et heic poſſe, dicique adeo *fidem dare*. Nolten. Antibarb. Wichmanni, p. 1421.

Few of my readers will be diſpoſed to heſitate between this authority and that of the Reviewer. Many of them alſo may have heard the French phraſe *ajouter foi* not uſed as the Roman *adjungere fidem*, but in the ſenſe of *credere*. From a Spaniſh Dictionary by Gattel, I learn that *Dar fé* means *croire*; from a Caſtilian Dictionary, that *Dar credito, dar fé*, is the ſame as *alicui fidem habere*; and from Baretti's Italian Dictionary, that the Engliſh of *Dare fede* is *to believe*. And yet *no ſuch indigenous phraſe exiſts on the Continent!* Well did Cicero obſerve;

Qui ſemel verecundiæ fines tranſierit, eum bene et naviter oportet eſſe impudentem.

Let it be remembered too, (for indeed it is a thing never to be loſt ſight of,) that theſe miſtakes of the Reviewer are not picked and culled out of two folio volumes; but he is himſelf acting the rigid cenſor, challenging public notice, and of courſe is upon his guard, and does his beſt; and yet he ſcarcely utters a ſentence in Latin without committing ſome palpable blunder againſt the idiom of the language.

Some other little matters of this ſort muſt now be

be diſpatched, and then we ſhall come to the *flos et medulla*, the pink and cream of criticiſm, the DEUS LUNUS.

He is pleaſed to ſay, "there are ſome of theſe "Oxonianiſms ſo profound or ſo refined, that "our northern underſtandings, condenſed as they "are with Mathematics and Metaphyſics, can "ſcarcely comprehend them at all." The reader, I hope, will take notice in future that what is *condenſed* cannot *comprehend* what is *profound*. The Reviewer indeed adviſes the Univerſity of Oxford to ſhake off the "*benumbing influence of Port* "*wine*;" (pag. 441.) whereas his own faculties have been *condenſed* by more ſubtle diet. It is to be hoped he does not always treat his genius as he does his readers; and, on thoſe rare occaſions, the liquor he condemns may at leaſt vie with a certain northern beverage, for which he perhaps imagines the encomium of Horace to be intended.

Tu lene tormentum ingenio admoves
Plerumque duro:

It certainly cannot be a *benumbing* port, which the Poet means by

Narratur et priſci Catonis
Sæpe *mero caluiſſe* virtus.

With all its faults there is ſomething generous about it; and if the old Latin proverb ſays right,

right, it is at leaſt no enemy to *truth*. If he has himſelf hitherto abſtained from its uſe, under the hope of ſubduing prejudice, invigorating his faculties, or quickening his perceptions, never was an experiment attended with a more unfortunate reſult.

The ſcurrility and meanneſs of this abuſe muſt be allowed to ſcreen it from a grave and formal anſwer; neither will any ſuch reply be wanted by thoſe who are accuſtomed to the enjoyment of good ſociety, and who know how eaſily the moſt innocent and the moſt indifferent habits of life may be made the object of vulgar and malignant ſatire. Let us return then to his Latin criticiſms.

"Tigranes poſt reges ſubditos rex regum appellatur." Strabo, p. 772.

Upon this he exclaims,

"Is it poſſible that the writer could mean '*Tigranes, 'poſtquam reges ſupradictos imperio ſubjecerat, rex re-'gum appellatus eſt?*'

Here he ſuppoſes the conſtruction *poſt reges ſubditos* to be wrong: whereas it is much more correct and elegant than his own. E. g.

Paucis annis poſt reges exactos. Clar. Orat. xiv.

And again:

Sexennio poſt Veios captos. Cic. Div. i. 44.

Such modes of conſtruction abound in Livy. *Subditos*, though not the right word, has a ſort of authority even in Ovid. The Reviewer's own word, *ſupradictos*, never ſaw the light till long after the Auguſtan age. *Supradictis*, which occurs two or three times in Quintilian, ought to be divided, as it is in Horace; *Adde ſupra dictis*, Serm. II. vii. 78. In theſe places it always means *the things which have been before ſaid.* As an adjective prefixed to a ſubſtantive, like the ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ of Polybius, it was never employed till a much later age. There is no need of ſaying *appellatus eſt*, becauſe of the paſt time *ſubditos*: nothing is more common than this irregularity in the narrative ſtyle. Indeed *appellatur* is the right tenſe, if a *practice* or *habit* is meant to be expreſſed.

The next paragraph of the Review contains a groſs fabrication. A paſſage from the notes is produced to this effect.

"Platæenſes noſter author affirmat eſſe olim prope "paludem ſitos; remotis tamen incolis ad meliorem "locum a palude diſtantem, urbs nova nomen priſcum "ſervavit, quod nomen non eorum ſitui ab aquis re-"moto proprie competeret." To which, ſays the Reviewer, *the writer adds with ſelf-complacent confidence*, "nihil abſurdi in his, ut mihi videtur, apparet. p. 590." And, to prove that *there is abſurdity*, he proceeds to correct *the Editor's Latin.*

By

By this method of quoting, an author may be made to ſay any thing. The truth is this. Palmerius had objected to the etymology of Platæa given by Strabo. He cannot reconcile it with the *inland* ſituation of that city, that its name ſhould be derived from a word ſignifying an *oar*; he ſays, "*Quid abſurdius hoc etymo?*" The object of Falconer's note is to account for this paradox; which having done, he vindicates Strabo from the reproach of Palmerius, alledging "*nihil abſurdi* in his, ut mihi videtur, apparet."

Now for the Latinity, which this Reviewer, forſooth, thinks proper to correct. I hope the reader will have patience to examine it carefully, and he will find that, for one fault he mends, he makes two. The Editor of Strabo he ſomewhere compares to a Chineſe tailor. But there is a homely Engliſh proverb, according to which, it ſeems, he would not rank very high himſelf in the ſcale of handicraft employments. Thus then he would correct the note.

"Platæenſes ad paludem olim habitâſſe, noſter affir-
"mat: in locum autem meliorem tranſlatos novæ urbi
"nomen priſcum continuâſſe, *ſitui* licet, ab aquis re-
"moto, *haud diutius competiſſet.*"

Will he tell us where he ever met with the word *ſitui*, and from what author he borrowed the phraſe *haud diutius? Haud diutius! no longer.*

Is this the critic who has no mercy for bald Latin? and who thinks it not beneath the buſineſs of a ſcholar to hunt for miſtakes in the poſthumous works of one long ſince dead? of one who never aſpired to the credit of a pure writer, and whoſe habit it was to pour forth the various information, with which his mind was ſtored, in the language that firſt preſented itſelf to his pen. Oh miſerable miſuſe of time, even when learning is ſo employed! The concluding part of the Editor's note might have been better expreſſed thus; *Urbem novam priſcum nomen ſervaſſe, quanquam ei, ſitu ab aquis remoto, jam id non competeret.* *Competeret* is right, not *competiſſet:* the idea requires continued time, or the imperfect tenſe, not the preterperfect, much leſs the preterpluperfect. *Conveniret* would be better ſtill.

One ſtep more, and then we are out of the mire. The following he propoſes as a piece of faultleſs Latin, not without his accuſtomed ſneer at Oxonian Latin.

"Nonne vult Pauſanias Melanthum Andropompi filium e Nelei progenie *primum* fuiſſe, *qui* in Attica ſedem *habuiſſet*; atque ideo *eundem qui* Xanthum *occidiſſet*." Rev. p. 488.

In this ſentence there are no leſs than four faults; two of them rank barbariſms—*primum qui*—

qui—eundem qui. The two other faults are, *habuiſſet—occidiſſet.*

Firſt then of *primum qui.* Any reader of Cicero, one would think, muſt have obſerved that he invariably avoids this phraſe, although he has a hundred occaſions for uſing it, if it were Latin. In the treatiſe de Claris Oratoribus, this idea occurs continually; and the phraſe employed is either *primus* alone, or *qui primus*, or the adverb *primo*. E. g.

Cum cætera melius, quam ſuperiores, tum *primus intellexit.* c. viii.

Hic *primus inflexit* orationem, et eam mollem, teneramque reddidit. c. ix.

Sed tum fere Pericles .... *primus* adhibuit doctrinam. c. xi.

Et eum *primum* ob eam ipſam cauſam Maximum eſſe appellatum. c. xiv.

Æſculapius, *qui primus* vulnus obligaviſſe dicitur. Cic. De Nat. 71. a. Nizol. voc. Primus.

Peripatetici *primi* ex omnibus philoſophis docuerunt. Cic. Fin. 110. a. Nizol. voc. Primus.

So Horace;

Illi robur et æs triplex
Circa pectus erat, *qui* fragilem truci
Commiſit pelago ratem
Primus, Od. i. 3.

Such a phraſe as *primus fuit qui habuit*, would have

have grated in the ears of any Roman. The reaſon is manifeſt. *Qui* being a relative refers properly to a *perſon* or *thing*, or a *quality in the abſtract*, not (if one may be allowed to uſe a logical term) to a quality *in concreto*. Now *primus* is an adjective in the ſuperlative degree: but who would think of ſaying, *pulcherrimus qui venit ad Trojam*, for *pulcherrimus eorum qui venerunt?* The Relative might refer to *pulchritudo* in the abſtract, but not to *pulchritudo* implied in *pulcherrimus*. The ſame principle holds in Greek. There we ſay, ὃς πρῶτος, ὃς κάλλιστος, not πρῶτος ὅς, κάλλιστος ὅς.

The other barbariſm is *eundem qui*; which will require a little more diſcuſſion, becauſe it appears to derive more countenance from the practice of good writers, and neither Voſſius nor Turſellinus ſeem aware of the true principle. Is it however credible, that if this mode of ſpeaking were correct, it ſhould not be met with ten times in all the pureſt writers? The idea is ſo common, and enters inadvertently into ſo many ſentences, that we muſt purſue a very different rule of criticiſm, when examining this, from what is uſually adopted when the genuineneſs of a ſingle word is ſuſpected. In the preſent caſe I ſhould not admit three or four inſtances, out of the whole body of Latin authors, to juſtify the uſe of it: but the fact, I believe, is, that in the way here employed

it

it does not occur *once*. Cicero's ordinary way of ſpeaking is, *eum qui, is qui*, when he wiſhes to identify a perſon with ſome fact or ſtory. Vid. Clar. Orat. c. xix. and twice c. xxi. c. xlvii.

A thouſand other paſſages of the ſame ſort might be produced from him and Livy, in which a modern would ſay *the ſame who*. Vid. Liv. xxi. 40.

On looking over the examples in Geſner and Facciolati, I do not find one which ſupports the Reviewer's phraſe. There are none where *qui* is uſed after *idem*, when *idem* means a *perſon*, or *ſubſtance*.

The reaſon for this may be, that *is qui* identifies an individual as well as *idem qui*. If it be *he* at all, it muſt be *the ſame he*: for *ſubſtance* does not admit of *more* and *leſs*[h]. But when *idem qui* is uſed with reference to a *quality*, it denotes the *ſame degree*, and *idem* may generally be converted into *par*.

And not only does *quality* vary in degree in the *ſame thing*, but the *ſame quality* may be in *different things*. And again, one thing may have the *ſame relation* to many others. Hence, both in denoting *quality* and *relation*, *idem qui* is a common mode of ſpeaking.

[h] Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον . . . οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔσται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἄνθρωπος, ἔτε αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ, ἔτε ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ. Ariſtot. Categor. περὶ Οὐσίας. Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὰ ποιά. Ibid. περὶ Ποιότητος.

The

The examples in Voſſius and Turſellinus of *idem qui*, ſo far from oppoſing, really ſupport the principle I am maintaining.

Verres *idem* eſt, *qui* fuit ſemper. Cic. Verr. i. ap. Turſell.

Here *idem* means *character*, not *perſon*. The ſame may be ſaid of theſe:

Eſt *idem qui* ſemper in republica fuit. Cic. Att. ix. 11. Geſn.

Nihil commutantur animo, et *iidem* abeunt, *qui* venerant. Cic. Fin. iv. 3.

Peripateticis veſtris, qui quondam *iidem* erant, *qui* Academici. Cic. Off. iii. 4.

If the phraſe is never uſed, as I believe it never is, of *perſons* but in this figurative way, when by perſon is meant *character* or *quality*, there cannot be a ſtronger proof that it is improper in any other. For it ſhould be obſerved, that *abſolute ſameneſs* or *identity* is then predicated: which *ſameneſs* is the proper antecedent to *qui*.

In the New Teſtament, what is tranſlated *the ſame who*, is ſeldom, if ever, ὁ αὐτὸς ὅς. In Luk. vi. 38. τῷ αὐτῷ means *quality*. In 1 Cor. xii. 6. ὁ αὐτὸς ſignifies ONE; and in other places, *relation*. When a reference is made to ὁ αὐτὸς, it is generally by a word denoting *quality*: as,

TON

TON ATTON ἀγῶνα ἔχοντες OION εἴδετε ἐν ἐμοί. Phil. i. 30. 'Having *the ſame* conflict *which* ye ſaw in me.'

When the *relative* is uſed in Greek, the antecedent is not ὁ αὐτὸς, but ὅτος.

Another fault in the Reviewer's phraſe *eundem qui* is, that the relative is not in the *ſame caſe* with the antecedent, which it ought to be, as, I hope, the following analyſis will prove. The argument requires a little ſteady attention; and it ſeems to me deſerving of it.

When *idem* is in the *nominative* caſe with *qui* following it, mere *identity* is predicated. *Idem eſt qui fecit*, as we have already ſhewn, is barbarous: *idem eſt qui fuit* is Latin. The rules of grammar may indeed require an *accuſative* caſe, but *identity* is the idea that is expreſſed: nothing is predicated of the thing mentioned but that it is *the ſame*. Thus,

Apud bonos *iidem* ſumus *quos* reliquiſti. Cic. Att. i. 13. Turſellin.

Here *quos reliquiſti* means no more than '*qui* '*fuimus* cum nos reliquiſti.' So,

Eoſdem eſſe oratorios numeros, *qui* ſunt poetici. Cic. in Orat. c. lvi.

The variation of *caſe* does not affect the meaning of the propoſition: *identity* is all that is predicated.

But when *idem* in any of its *oblique cases* is followed by *qui*, the meaning of the paſſage is, not that the thing which *idem* denoted *is the ſame* with any thing elſe, but that it *bears the ſame relation* to two other things. Now the inflexions or *caſes* of nouns are expreſſive of *relation*. The caſe of *idem* denotes the relation it bears to one of the two things, and the caſe of *qui* denotes the relation it bears to the other. Hence the caſe of *idem* and the caſe of *qui* ought to be the ſame, otherwiſe they do not mark the *ſame relation*. And thus, I believe, it will be found, that the beſt writers invariably uſe the words. *Eadem ratione qua, eodem pacto quo, eandem poteſtatem quam, eodem loco quo*, are among the moſt ordinary phraſes. The laſt phraſe is from Livy, xlii. 37. where *loco* means *rank, eſtimation*, which is a *quality* or *abſtract idea:* if it had meant ſimply *place, ipſo* probably, and not *eodem*, would have been the word: as in this paſſage of Cicero;

Caſtra paucos dies habuimus, *ea ipſa, quæ* contra Dasium habuerat apud Iſſum Alexander. Ep. Att. v. 20.

There are various ways indeed of expreſſing the *ſame relation*, and ſometimes this happens with *idem qui*. As, "Vovit *in eadem* verba Conſul, *quibus* antea quinquennalia vota ſuſcepi "ſolita erant." Liv. xxxi. 9. Where the change of expreſſion is eaſily accounted for, by the uſe

of

of *ſuſcipi* inſtead of repeating the *verb* voveo: but the *relation* is not changed: and the rule, that ſameneſs of *relation* is marked by ſameneſs of *caſe*, is liable only to thoſe exceptions which we muſt expect to meet with under every grammatical rule.

A remarkable inſtance of the obſervance of it juſt occurs to me in Livy, xxvi. 33.

Cæterorum omnium Campanorum *eundem* erga nos animum, *quem* Carthaginienſibus, fuiſſe—not 'qui Car-'thaginienſibus.'

And thus too we may uſe all words denoting *relation*, although they include a *perſon* under them. *Eodem rege quo, eodem duce quo*, &c. But to ſay *eodem duce, qui*, or, as this writer ſays, *eundem eſſe qui occidiſſet*, is againſt the genius of the language, and argues an ignorance of the principle which governs this phraſeology.

But to return from this digreſſion to the Reviewer's Latin. Both the tenſes *habuiſſet* and *occidiſſet* are wrong. *Haberet* might do, as relating to continued time: but *habuerit* is the more uſual form. Inſtead of *occidiſſet*, he ſhould have ſaid *occiderit*: for *occiderit* has nothing ſubordinate to it, or connected with it, whoſe time cannot begin till the time of *occiderit* is paſt; *which is the proper teſt for the uſe of the preterpluperfect ſubjunctive.*

I will produce an exact parallel, in point of tenſes, from Cicero.

Publium etiam Scipionem Naſicam .... habitum eloquentem aiunt, illius qui ſacra acceperit, filium. Clar. Orat. c. xx,

Which this Reviewer might have expreſſed thus,

Publium etiam Scipionem Naſicam fuiſſe aiunt qui eloquens habitus fuiſſet, ejuſque patrem eundem eſſe, qui ſacra accepiſſet.

Such is the advantage of not having one's Latin ſtyle ſpoilt at Oxford. His own ſentence I ſhall beg leave to caſt quite in a new mould.

Nonne vult Pauſanias, primum ex Nelei nepotibus Melanthum in Attica ſedem habuiſſe, ac proinde eum eſſe qui Xanthum occiderit?

When preparing to introduce the DEUS LUNUS, he clothes the Editor's remark in a new Roman dreſs, which he fancies is perfectly *in coſtume*. "Romanis enim Græciſque juxta ignorantibus "quiſnam deorum eſſet iſte Menes, pro alio quam "Luna, *ſub deæ perſona*[1] ab iis culta, *Straboni* "vix haberi *potuerit*." *Straboni* vix *haberi*, is one of thoſe faults which may grace the fourth form at Eton, but ſeldom, I imagine, riſes higher in the ſchool. What *potuerit* has to do here

[1] *Sub deæ perſona*—This is as bald a phraſe as he could have uſed: and I doubt its purity. He might have ſaid, *tanquam Dea, tanquam fœmina, fœminea forma*—any thing better than '*ſub* deæ perſona.' For the ſtrict meaning of the phraſe is, *under the aſſumed appearance, or character, of a Goddeſs.*

I will

I will not attempt to explain. We will however ſuppoſe it to be *potuit*. And what then? "*Is* it "poſſible, he exclaims, that even the preſſmen at "Oxford ſhould be ignorant that there was at "Rome a *Deus Lunus*, as well as a *Dea Luna*?"

This is one of thoſe ſcraps of nauſeous pedantry which bring a reproach upon the ſtudy of ancient learning—exalting an inſignificant trifle into an affair of importance—a ſolitary and obſcure fact, of which every one may well be ignorant, into a *criterion* of ſound erudition. This too I ſhould ſay, if his mythology were correct. But the ignorance is as palpable as the affectation is diſguſting. In order to expoſe it, it is impoſſible to avoid a longer detail than the God and all his worſhippers together are worth. But ſo it is with puny cavils: they generally take more trouble and more time in refuting, than ſtrong objections.

The firſt thing then that ſtrikes us is, the uniform ſilence on the ſubject of this deity in all popular compendiums of Roman antiquities. Cicero, Ovid, Livy, and other writers about that time, from whom we collect incidentally moſt of what we know reſpecting the Roman religion, never mention him. And in fact the earlieſt writer, who ſpeaks of him as connected with that religion, is Tertullian. In his *Apologeticus*, written in the third century, he boldly attacks the pagan ſuperſti-

ſuperſtitions and follies. Having ſpoken of the diſgraceful ſtories which the beſt poets relate of their own deities, he proceeds to notice low and vulgar farces, in which they are expoſed to the deriſion of the populace. "Mœchum Anubim, et maſculum "Lunam, et Dianam flagellatam, et Jovis mortui "teſtamentum recitatum, et tres Hercules fameli-"cos irriſos." c. 15. The epithets to the other deities are *mœchum*, *flagellatam*, *mortui*, *famelicos*, all denoting ſomething abſurd or ludicrous; from whence we muſt in reaſon infer that the epithet *maſculus* was of the ſame kind. If ſo, could it even at that time be a part of the religion of Rome, when Tertullian himſelf produces it as a burleſque of their religion?

There is no arguing from the capricious manner in which the poets and artiſts diverſified the form, the ſex, and the office of their deities. At this rate, we ſhall have a *Female Bacchus*, a *Venus Maſculus*, a *Fortuna Barbata*, and every other prepoſterous abſurdity. Even Jupiter would hardly know himſelf in the Orphic verſe,

Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἔπλετο ΝΥΜΦΗ.

And as, according to Spon, there were many who held all the deities to be of both ſexes, ſo the philoſophers held them to be of none. Vid. Spon in Polen. Supplem. vol. iv. p. 678.

A little before the time of Tertullian indeed we are told by Spartianus, that Caracalla, when in the Eaſt,

Eaſt, viſited Carræ in Meſopotamia for the ſake of the God Lunus, *Luni Dei gratia.* Vit. Caracall. p. 87. fol, ed. And immediately he tells of a fooliſh ſuperſtition prevalent among the Greeks and Egyptians reſpecting this deity, in a way that ſhews he thought him unknown to the Romans.

The following are the words of Spon upon the ſubject. "Deus iſte Lunus, ſeu Luna, habitu "virili ſæpe in nummis *Græcorum* exprimitur." Polen. Supplem. vol. iv. p. 678. But in all theſe coins he is repreſented with the Phrygian tiara.

The diſguſting ſtory of Elagabalus, who aſſumed that name from the Syrian deity of the Sun, and introduced his worſhip into Rome, is well known; but even this ſtory affords no foundation for a *Deus Lunus at Rome.*

As far as it goes, it makes againſt it. The new deity brought in by him, to match with the Syrian Elagabalus, was a female called Οὐρανία, from Carthage, the ſame with the Phœnician Aſtarte or Luna; and, as the fooliſh ſtory goes, it was the *feminine character of this deity* which directed his choice; for he took it into his head that his Syrian God was not pleaſed with the bride he had before given him, Pallas, becauſe of *her warlike character.* All this traſh may be ſeen in Herodian, lib. v. c. 15. Now the votive tablet at Palmyra exhibits the Lunar Deity as *a*

male

male in armour; and if any inference is to be drawn from theſe data, it is that *he* never found his way to Rome. The Syrian worſhip even of the Sun was, we know, expelled from Rome, after the death of the monſter who introduced it. And it is worth remarking, that Sperlingius, in one of his letters publiſhed by Polenus, ſays, "all the "Northern and Eaſtern nations worſhipped the "Moon as a male—the Greeks and Romans only "(with thoſe nations who wiſhed to imitate "them) eſteemed that deity a female." Polen. Supplem. vol. iv. p. 294.

Now Strabo, as Caſaubon well obſerves[k], when giving this Aſiatic deity a Greek name, inſtead of coining a new word, Σελήνος, prefers Μῆν, which is maſculine, and is properly expreſſive of his character: and, as far as appears, even the *Latin name* LUNUS was not coined till long after Strabo's time.

But ſuch inquiries, inſtead of indicating a claſſical taſte and ardour, are pretty ſure teſts of a depraved appetite, which is incapable of reliſhing wholeſome native flavours, and ſeeks its gratification in every thing that is fetid and diſagreeable to an uncorrupted palate. Never can I believe this writer to have imbibed the generous love of ancient learning. His delight is not to launch

[k] Ad Spartiani Caracall. p. 88. Ed. Par. 1620.

his

his veſſel on the broad current, and ſpread his ſails to the wind; but to dabble in ſome muddy back-water, and fiſh up with ignoble pains a few filthy ſhreds and remnants, which might well have been allowed to periſh where they ſunk, in the dark ſilent pool of oblivion.

"The ſeventeen maps, with which the ſeventeen "books are illuſtrated and adorned, are ſaid, in the "preface, *to have been formed on the beſt authorities*, "and carefully adapted to the geography of Strabo. "We have examined only that of the central ſtates of "Greece; and in that we find neither Erythræ in "Bœotia, nor Ægæ, Hiſtiæa, or Orabiæ in Eubœa— "though they are all deſcribed as cities of importance "in the text of the author—are duly placed in the map "of M. D'Anville—and the three firſt, moreover, diſ- "tinguiſhed as independent ſtates by their coins ſtill "extant." Rev. p. 440.

In this ſingle paragraph there are three falſe propoſitions, one miſrepreſentation, and one blunder. The blunder is Orabiæ for Orobiæ. The miſrepreſentation is, that *Hiſtiæa is not in the map. Oreus*, which in Strabo's time was the name of Hiſtiæa, *is in the map*; and it is difficult to conceive that he did not know it, becauſe in D'Anville's map it is called *Oreus, prius Iſtiæa*. As for the three falſe propoſitions[1]: Erythræ in Bœotia

[1] For the two firſt of theſe points I have again to acknow-

 ledge

had no coinage of its own: *Ægæ* in Eubœa *had none* of its own: and the maps are *not said* in the Preface to have been formed on the beſt authorities. All that is ſaid of them is, that *care was taken to adapt the laſt fourteen to the text of Strabo as cloſely as the three firſt.* The adoption of the name *Oreus* inſtead of *Hiſtiæa* is one proof of this.

Having now nearly diſpoſed of the long ſtring of *falſe aſſertions, miſrepreſentations*, and *blunders*, which go to the compoſition of this article, it only remains to ſay a few words concerning the Edition itſelf of Strabo, which has been made the vehicle of ſo much coarſe invective. In the account given of it, the public are as much wronged as we are abuſed: for no view whatever is laid before them of its nature or its merits. Neither can I afford much room for that purpoſe; it being my deſign not to vindicate the book, but to vindicate the Univerſity from falſe aſperſions.

It contains, however, collations of almoſt all the known manuſcripts. It has every thing that was valuable in Caſaubon's edition: of which edition numberleſs typographical errors are corrected. The excellence of Tyrwhitt's conjectural emendations

ledge the aſſiſtance of Mr. Falconer's letter, [Gent. Mag. Oct. 1809.] as well as in what relates to Philip King of Macedon.

is

is acknowledged by the Reviewer, although he is ſtudious to deprive Oxford of all ſhare of the credit. Even here his evil genius of ignorance haunts him every ſtep he takes. He aſks, why they were not publiſhed in one ſmall ſupplementary volume. The anſwer is, they have been printed in a ſmall volume, as every pretender to exact Greek criticiſm ought to know, twice already: once at London in 1783, which edition is quoted by Schweighæuſer in his notes to Polybius, and once by Harles in 1788, from which the French tranſlators have taken his conjectures, as far as they have gone, and in general adopted them with acknowledgments of their ingenuity.

The Reviewer praiſes theſe emendations highly, and, out of near two hundred, ſelects ſix, as being particularly ingenious, and as *having been confirmed by manuſcripts* collated ſince his death. The firſt and the laſt of theſe ſix *have had no confirmation whatever* from manuſcripts; the firſt is not ſo much *a conjecture*, as an adoption of the ſenſe given in the old Latin tranſlation: the third is only *partially confirmed:* and the ſecond and fourth have no pretenſions to ſuperior ſagacity, as I will leave it to any one converſant in theſe matters to determine. How unaccountable all this! when, in the imperfect reading which I have myſelf given to the notes, I have found

above twelve very ingenious ones poſitively confirmed, *as many* partially confirmed, and at leaſt *twenty*, far exceeding thoſe ſelected by him in acuteneſs and ingenuity, not yet confirmed, but bearing the ſtrongeſt marks of probability [m].

He goes on to ſay,

"Almoſt the whole of the Editor's own notes are "*hiſtorical* and *geographical* commentaries; which may "be of uſe to the reader, in ſaving him the trouble of "reference."

And yet all this is called *alloy*, p. 449. l. 32. Beſides, what is meant by *ſaving him the trouble of reference?* Many of them, nay, moſt of them, will *give* him the trouble of reference, if he has an inquiſitive turn: for they point out the paſſages in ancient and modern books, which tend to throw any light upon the text, or which contain matter intimately connected with it. In many of them diſputed points of chronology and geo-

[m] It may not be unacceptable to thoſe who take an intereſt in this department of criticiſm, if I ſpecify ſome of theſe out of a much longer liſt of each kind. The firſt number denotes the page, the ſecond the line. 166, 4. 235, 37. 330, 20. 357, 5. 401, 19. 682, 21. 696, 32. 700, 10. 874, 19. 1054, 17. 1179, 22. entirely confirmed. 287, 10. 353, 31. 384, 15. 408, 22. 430, 33. 677, 43. 686, 1. 690, 31. 799, 35. partially confirmed. 166, 34. 290, 20. 308, 22. 354, 29. 378, 25. 425, 6 459, 6. 493, 14. 602, 8. 732, 7. 733, 10. with a multitude beſides, ingenious, although not confirmed.

graphy

graphy are diſcuſſed, and frequently explained by diagrams—incidental elucidations of other authors are given—the ancient and modern names are appropriated, often beyond what D'Anville and other geographers have done—the etymology of many is traced to Oriental words—a conciſe hiſtory of remarkable towns is given—the productions, natural hiſtory, trade, population &c. are compared with the accounts of the beſt modern travellers —a vaſt variety of curious information is ſcattered through them, of a rambling and miſcellaneous kind, but always connected with the text—and, notwithſtanding the faulty Latin, ſound ſenſe and conſiderable force of reaſoning are always perceptible.

The Reviewer indeed ſays, that,

"In *Hiſtory* and *Geography* the Editor diſplays the "ſame ſort of accuracy as in *Grammar*:" and he ſupports his charge by ONE ſpecimen. "Philip the ſon of "Demetrius, and father of Perſeus, is called *repeatedly* "Philip the Second, though he was the fourth regularly acknowledged King of Macedonia of that "name." Rev. p. 441.

This calumny has been completely refuted by Mr. Falconer. There is but *one* place in which the word *ſecundus* is applied to the ſon of Demetrius: and in that place it poſſibly meant not the *ſecond Philip*, but the *next* perſon who de-

deſtroyed the cities Sciathus and Peparethus, after the war between Philip and the Athenians. I am myſelf inclined to think it a miſtake of the Editor's: nor do I fear that this conceſſion will raiſe any other feeling but that of contempt or indignation againſt the critic, who founds a ſweeping charge of hiſtorical inaccuracy in the whole two folio volumes upon this ſingle miſtake.

Of him then it is time that we now take a long farewell. Degraded as he muſt be in the opinion of every candid and liberal mind, it is impoſſible he can again find vent for his malice through any reſpectable channel. There is a blot in his eſcutcheon, which muſt for ever exclude him from the liſts of honourable combat: and he muſt be ſent, like ſome uncourteous and *recreant* knight, bereft of his habiliments, to atone for his offence by a life of auſtere and ſolitary penance.

Victus abit, longeque ignotis exulat oris,
Multa gemens ignominiam plagaſque—

I cannot proceed with the paſſage, for it is impoſſible that any glory can be gained againſt ſuch a combatant, or any pride felt at ſuch a victory. If indeed he would qualify himſelf for a renewal of the fight, he muſt practiſe *many a hardy adventure in a foreign land*—he muſt, in the language of that Firſt of Critics, ſeek for diſtinc-

tion

tion "by harder ſtudy and a humbler mind," and then perhaps, after a due probation, he may be reckoned worthy of engaging in claſſical warfare with an Engliſh Univerſity.

After all the experience we have had of the ſtrength of his prejudices, I ſtill was ſurpriſed that the Editor ſhould permit this article to diſgrace his pages. The *ſcurrility* of the attack muſt ſurely have made him heſitate. Its *unfairneſs*, I fear, was no obſtacle; and its *virulence* the chief recommendation. But I do believe, that if he had been aware of its containing half the *ignorance*, or one tenth part of the *falſehood* which has been pointed out, he would have rejected it with diſdain. In his own writings (if I can truſt to rumour, and to that feature, no unſeemly one, which runs through them all) I diſcover a tone of mind far ſuperior to ſuch baſeneſs—a vigour of intellect indeed, which ſhould make him cautious how he meaſures others by his own ſtandard—and a correctneſs and dignity of moral ſentiment, which I reſpect even in an enemy.

CHAP. III.

CLASSICAL EDUCATION—*Remarks on an Article in the Edinburgh Review, upon Edgeworth's Profeſſional Education.*

MUCH has been ſaid, and well ſaid, on this ſubject: but I have not yet ſeen the queſtion argued exactly on its right grounds. Neither do I propoſe in the preſent treatiſe to ſupply all the deficiencies which I ſpeak of in its advocates, but rather to point out two or three leading principles, which have not been made ſufficiently prominent in theſe diſcuſſions, if they have been noticed at all.

Some, who diſpute the utility of Claſſical learning, have placed the queſtion on this ground: What remuneration does a boy receive for the time and money expended in this purſuit? For what employment does it fit him? or how does it enable him to improve his fortunes?

To this I anſwer, that the object of Claſſical education is not to fit him for any *ſpecific* employment, or to increaſe his fortune. Such, I admit, is the object of moſt parents when educating their

their children; but it is an object not only different from that of true philoſophy or enlightened policy, but even frequently at variance with it. The peculiar intereſt of the individual is not always the ſame, is ſeldom preciſely the ſame, with the intereſt of the public. And he who ſerves the one moſt faithfully, always forgets, and often injures, the other. The true principles of educating a gentleman cannot be better ſketched than they are by Locke, although his language already ſounds rather quaintly.

"The great work of a Governor is to faſhion "the carriage and form the mind; to ſettle in "his pupil good habits, and the principles of "virtue and wiſdom; to give him, by little and "little, a view of mankind; and work him into "a love and imitation of what is excellent and "praiſe-worthy; and, in the proſecution of it, "to give him vigour, activity, and induſtry. The "ſtudies which he ſets him upon are but, as it "were, the exerciſe of his faculties, and employment of his time, to keep him from ſauntering "and idleneſs, to teach him application, and accuſtom him to take pains, and to give him "ſome little taſte of what his own induſtry muſt "perfect. For who expects that, under a tutor, "a young gentleman ſhould be an accompliſhed "critic, orator, or logician; go to the bottom of

"metaphyſics, natural philoſophy, or mathema-
"tics; or be a maſter in hiſtory or chronology?
"Though ſomething of each of theſe is to be
"taught him: but it is only to open the door,
"that he may look in, and, as it were, begin an
"acquaintance, but not to dwell there." Vol. iii.
p. 39.

It is remarkable, however, that Locke, like moſt other writers on education, occaſionally confounds two things which ought to be kept perfectly diſtinct, viz. that mode of education which would be moſt beneficial, as a ſyſtem, to ſociety at large, with that which would contribute moſt to the advantage and proſperity of an individual. Theſe things are often at variance with each other. The former is that alone which deſerves the attention of a philoſopher; the latter is narrow, ſelfiſh, and mercenary. It is this laſt indeed, on which the world are moſt eager to inform themſelves: but the perſons who inſtruct them, however they may deſerve the thanks and eſteem of thoſe whom they benefit, do no ſervice to mankind. There are but ſo many good places in the theatre of life; and he who puts us in the way of procuring one of them, does to *us* indeed a great favour, but none to the whole aſſembly.

It is again ſometimes aſked, with an air of triumph, what is the *utility* of theſe ſtudies? and

utility

utility is vauntingly pronounced to be the ſole ſtandard, by which all ſyſtems of education muſt be tried.

If in our turn we were to aſk what *utility* is, we ſhould, I believe, have many anſwers not quite conſiſtent with each other. And the beſt of them perhaps would only give us other words equally looſe and indefinite; ſuch as *wiſer*, *better*, *happier*; none of which can ſerve to untie a knotty queſtion, and all of which lead us into a wider field of doubt and enquiry, than the ſubject which originally produced them. Before I attempt to ſhew what the utility of Claſſical learning is, in my own ſenſe of the word, let it be permitted me to explain what it is not; and to take up the enquiry a little farther back than writers on this ſubject commonly go.

It is an undiſputed maxim in political economy, that the ſeparation of profeſſions, and the diviſion of labour, tend to the perfection of every art—to the wealth of nations—to the general comfort and well-being of the community. This principle of diviſion is in ſome inſtances purſued ſo far, as to excite the wonder of people, to whoſe notice it is for the firſt time pointed out. There is no ſaying to what extent it may not be carried; and the more the powers of each individual are concentrated in one employment, the greater ſkill and quickneſs will be naturally diſ-

play in performing it. But while he thus contributes more effectually to the accumulation of national wealth, he becomes himſelf more and more degraded as a rational being. In proportion as his ſphere of action is narrowed, his mental powers and habits become contracted; and he reſembles a ſubordinate part of ſome powerful machinery, uſeful in its place, but inſignificant and worthleſs out of it.

So ſenſible is the great and enlightened Adam Smith of the force of this objection, that he endeavours to meet it by ſuggeſting, that the means of intellectual improvement multiply rapidly with the increaſing wealth of ſociety; that the facility therefore of acquiring theſe means may increaſe in the ſame ratio with the injurious tendency of that ſyſtem we have been juſt conſidering; and thus counteract or compenſate all its evil. An anſwer, which affords a much ſtronger proof of the candour of the philoſopher, than it is a ſatisfactory defence of his ſyſtem againſt the ſuppoſed objection. The evil of that ſyſtem is certain, and almoſt demonſtrable; the remedy ſuggeſted is doubtful, and even conjectural. It would have been better to alter the ſhape of the whole queſtion, and to remove at once the ground-work of the objection, by guarding his theory againſt that extreme in which it takes its riſe.

If indeed national wealth were the ſole object

of

of national inſtitutions, there can be no doubt but that the method demonſtrated by Dr. Smith, being the ſureſt means of attaining that end, would be the great leading principle of political philoſophy. In his own work *it is* the great and ſole end of his enquiry: and no one can blame him for confining himſelf to that ſingle conſideration. His undertaking required no more, and he has performed his part well. But, in truth, national wealth is not the ultimate ſcope of human ſociety; and although we muſt forbear entering on the boundleſs enquiry, *what is the chief good*, yet all reflecting minds will admit that it is not wealth. If it be neceſſary, as it is beyond all queſtion neceſſary, that ſociety ſhould be ſplit into diviſions and ſubdiviſions, in order that its ſeveral duties may be well performed, yet we muſt be careful not to yield up ourſelves wholly and excluſively to the guidance of this ſyſtem: we muſt obſerve what its evils are, and we ſhould modify and reſtrain it, by bringing into action other principles, which may ſerve as a check and counterpoiſe to the main force.

One of the greateſt faults in all moral and political reaſoning is an exceſſive and immoderate application of one principle, to the excluſion of others, with which it ought in reaſon to be combined; and whoſe relative force ſhould always vary with the circumſtances of the caſe.

There

There can be no doubt that every art is improved by confining the profeſſor of it to that ſingle ſtudy. There are emergencies, which call for his *whole mind and faculties* to be abſorbed in it, which require him to forget every other relation of life, however ſacred or natural, except that artificial one in which he is then placed. Times will occur when a Surgeon or a General muſt diſmiſs the common feelings of human nature, and, in order to do his taſk well, muſt look upon himſelf as engaged in working out one problem, and upon all around him as inſtruments ſubſervient merely to the acquiſition of ſome one diſtinct purpoſe, without regard to their bearings on any thing beſides.

But although the Art itſelf is advanced, by this concentration of mind in its ſervice, the individual who is confined to it goes back. The advantage of the community is nearly in an inverſe ratio with his own. Reaſon and common ſenſe require that neither object ſhould be excluſively regarded. And if in ſome caſes, as in thoſe above mentioned, an *entire* ſacrifice of the individual is demanded, in all other caſes that ſacrifice can be required only in proportion as they approximate to this extreme. And thus a wide ſpace is left to the diſcretion of the individual, where the claims of the community are either not preſſing, or are wholly ſilent.

Of

Of courſe it will be underſtood, that in this ſtatement I conſider the intellectual enjoyment of the individual merely, when ſpeaking of his *advantage*, and that I do not loſe ſight of that enjoyment, which even the moſt confined exerciſe of the intellect imparts: I conſider it as abridged only in proportion to the contracted ſphere of action in which he is doomed to move.

Indeed, when the emergency is paſt, ſociety itſelf requires ſome other contribution from each individual, beſides the particular duties of his profeſſion. And if no ſuch liberal intercourſe be eſtabliſhed, it is the common failing of human nature, to be engroſſed with petty views and intereſts, to under-rate the importance of all in which we are not concerned, to carry our partial notions into caſes where they are inapplicable, to act, in ſhort, as ſo many unconnected units, diſplacing and repelling one another.

In the cultivation of literature is found that common link, which, among the higher and middle departments of life, unites the jarring ſects and ſubdiviſions in one intereſt, which ſupplies common topics, and kindles common feelings, unmixed with thoſe narrow prejudices with which all profeſſions are more or leſs infected. The knowledge too, which is thus acquired, expands and enlarges the mind, excites its faculties, and calls

calls thoſe limbs and muſcles into freer exerciſe, which, by too conſtant uſe in one direction, not only acquire an illiberal air, but are apt alſo to loſe ſomewhat of their native play and energy. And thus, without directly qualifying a man for any of the employments of life, it enriches and ennobles all. Without teaching him the peculiar buſineſs of any one office or calling, it enables him to act his part in each of them with better grace and more elevated carriage; and, if happily planned and conducted, is a main ingredient in that complete and generous education, which fits a man "to perform juſtly, ſkilfully, and magna-"nimouſly, all the offices, both private and pub-"lic, of peace and war."

Thus far then we have conſidered the utility of thoſe liberal purſuits, which in a refined ſtate of ſociety engage the attention of the higher orders, and which, by common conſent, impart a dignity to the ſeveral profeſſions of life, and to mercantile adventure.

It ſtill remains to prove, that what is called *Claſſical literature* anſwers this purpoſe moſt effectually.

And here, if the queſtion is to be compendiouſly treated, it muſt be allowed me to take for granted many points, which a captious adverſary might diſpute, but which the authority of the

the greateſt names, and the general experience of educated men concur in eſtabliſhing. That the relics of Grecian and Roman literature contain ſome of the choiceſt fruits of human genius; that the poets, the hiſtorians, the orators, and the philoſophers, of Greece eſpecially, have each in their ſeveral lines brought home, and laid at our feet, the richeſt treaſures of invention; that the hiſtory of thoſe early times preſents us with a view of things "nobly done and worthily ſpoken;" that the mind and ſpirit which breathed then, lives ſtill, and will for ever live in the writings which remain to us; that, according as taſte, and genius, and learning, have been valued among men, thoſe precious remains have been held ſtill dearer and more ſacred; are all poſitions which it is better to aſſume as indiſputable, than to embarraſs the preſent argument with any new attempt to prove them.

Neither is it neceſſary to ſay much in order to ſilence the feeble and querulous cry, that all the good which thoſe works contain may be had through the medium of *tranſlation*. To demonſtrate, indeed, how, from the very nature of language, tranſlation cannot adequately perform this office, would require an extended argument. I would rather appeal to the reflection and experience of every man who is acquainted with more than one language, whether he has not

often felt a tranſlated thought, even when beſt executed, to be rather a cold inanimate buſt, than a living counterpart of the original: whether he has not been affected by ſentiments or deſcriptions in one language, in a degree which no power or ſkill can equal in another. Even the rudeſt languages have in ſome words and phraſes, or in ſome peculiarity of conſtruction, their characteriſtic advantage; and the more copious and perfect a language is, the more muſt theſe advantages be multiplied. A bare chronicle of facts indeed, or a rigid demonſtration in ſcience, may perhaps be transferred from one to the other without loſs or injury. For where the ideas are few, ſimple, and determinate, they readily find in all languages an adequate expreſſion. But how ſhall the inſpirations of genius and fancy be packed up, lettered, and conſigned over, from hand to hand, in this literary traffic? How ſhall even the ordinary phraſeology of moral reaſoning, of ſentiment, of opinion, preſerve its native colouring, and exact features? How ſhall the language of varied paſſion, of tender feeling, of glowing deſcription, find, in the diſtant region to which it is tranſported, the preciſe meaſure of its value? How, after this change of place and manners, where all is ſo new and ſo different, how ſhall it ſuit itſelf with the commodities adapted to its former wants and habits? Mere ſubſiſtence, it is

true,

true, the bread of life may be obtained every where. The great truths of religion, the bare theorems of ſcience, whatever is addreſſed to the underſtanding ſtrictly, may perhaps paſs unimpaired. But all that conſtitutes the grace, the beauty, the charm, the dignity of compoſition, all that tends to awaken the fancy, or to affect the heart, like the finer and more volatile parts of ſubſtances, is loſt during the experiment; or if theſe qualities be partially retained, they are in a manner the invention of the tranſlator; and ſerve rather to tell us, that the original was excellent, than to preſent us with a view of that excellence itſelf.

The writer of an Article in the Edinburgh Review, on "Edgeworth's Profeſſional Edu-"cation," whoſe petulant ſarcaſms alternately provoke our ſpleen and our laughter, endeavours to convince the world, that, notwithſtanding the advantage of Claſſical learning, the aſcendancy it has acquired in Engliſh Education is prepoſterous, and the mode of teaching it in Engliſh Schools and Univerſities, utterly abſurd. I confeſs it was the reading of that article, which drew forth the preſent remarks, and I had deſigned a formal diſcuſſion of the falſe opinions and accuſations contained in it. The bulk of this work, however, ſwelling imperceptibly far beyond my firſt intention, induces me to contract the plan; and the truly meagre and flimſy texture of the article

itſelf is hardly deſerving of any ſolid criticiſm. There is a ſprightlineſs, however, and vivacity, which takes with the world at firſt reading, and raiſes a tranſient admiration, which perhaps was the ſole ambition of the writer: for, upon comparing one page with another, he ſeems wholly regardleſs of the dull virtue of conſiſtency, and, like ſome popular divines, thinks only how he may keep up the requiſite ſmartneſs for his fifteen minutes to amuſe his audience.

He may think it injuſtice to compreſs his airy ſatire; but there is really not time for quoting him always in his own words. I could wiſh the reader of this chapter firſt to give an attentive peruſal to the Reviewer, while I endeavour to exhibit his impeachment in diſtinct charges.

1ſt. That Claſſical learning forms the *ſole* buſineſs of Engliſh Education.

2dly. That hence the taſte and imagination only of the ſtudent are cultivated.

3dly. That the inſtruction of public ſchools and univerſities, even in Claſſical literature, is of a limited and miſtaken kind.

4thly. That in Oxford particularly, every manly exerciſe of the reaſoning powers is diſcouraged.

The firſt charge, beſides being ſpun and twiſted into the materials of every page, is alſo diſtinctly laid before us in the following terms.

"A young

"A young Engliſhman goes to ſchool at ſix or ſeven "years old: and he remains in a courſe of education "till twenty-three or twenty-four years of age. In all "that time, his ſole and excluſive occupation is learning "Latin and Greek." No. 29. p. 45.

From the manner in which the phraſe *learning Latin and Greek* is uſed, one might be led to ſuppoſe that the Grammar and the Lexicon were the ſole companions of the Student; that Latin and Greek were a ſort of *black art*, ſomething wholly unconnected with the ſyſtem of nature and of human affairs; that the languages were learnt for the ſake of the ſound or form of the letters, not for the ſtores of taſte and knowledge which they contain. What elſe is the Reviewer's notion of learning Greek? Can we be ſaid to learn Greek, without making ourſelves acquainted with the authors who wrote in Greek? A modern language may perhaps be learned without much of its literature: but how is it poſſible to ſeparate the ſtudy of an ancient language from the ſtudy of thoſe works in which it has been preſerved? Of all known languages, the Greek perhaps is the moſt copious and extenſive; and no one can pretend to call himſelf a maſter of it, who has not ſtudied the ſeveral claſſes of authors in which its compaſs and variety is diſplayed. The language of Ariſtotle is as different from that of Homer,

Sophocles,

Sophocles, or Pindar, as theſe again are from Thucydides, Xenophon, or Demoſthenes. It would be uſeleſs to purſue the topic through all its branches. Thoſe who are acquainted with the ſubject will admit the ſtatement as ſoon as it is made: and thoſe who are not, will hardly, I preſume, apply to the Edinburgh Review for information about the Claſſics.

How idle then, how perfectly ſenſeleſs, all this declamation about Latin and Greek! unleſs the ſtudy of Bacon, of Locke, of Milton, of Addiſon, and all our greateſt moraliſts, hiſtorians, and poets, be rightly called *learning Engliſh*. What is to hinder the ſtudent from deriving all the benefit which the reading of valuable authors is ſuppoſed to impart? or rather, if theſe works are ſtudied, how can he avoid deriving it?

Yet even Mr. Edgeworth, the author of the book which gives occaſion to the Review, (although a writer not of the ſame empty claſs with the Reviewer, but one who to great ingenuity and vivacity adds much good ſenſe, and gives many proofs of a good heart,) even he is weak enough to ſay, "that young men intended for "Clergymen ſhould not go to any Univerſity, "till they are *thoroughly maſters of the learned* "*languages, particularly of Greek.*" p. 95. I am at a loſs to conceive what ſo intelligent a writer could mean by this paſſage. The abſurdity

ſurdity of teaching Greek, without teaching the beſt authors who have written in that language, appears to me ſo ſtriking, that no words can make it more evident; and to ſuppoſe that theſe authors can be *thoroughly ſtudied* before a young man goes to the Univerſity, or even during the whole time he ſtays there, is equally againſt reaſon and common ſenſe.

The firſt charge then of this Reviewer, as far as it implies a ſtudy of language merely, is already anſwered. For a contradiction of the aſſertion itſelf, which I hope will be found ſatisfactory, the reader is referred to the Chapter on The Courſe of Studies purſued at Oxford.

The ſecond charge alſo requires no ſeparate notice. If the Poets alone were ſelected by us out of the great maſs of ancient learning, ſome ground might appear to exiſt for this complaint. But the fact is far otherwiſe: and facts are ſtubborn things.

The third charge is worked up with all the ſmirking pleaſantry and pert playfulneſs peculiar to a certain ſchool, whether conſiſting of Divines, or Lecturers, or Letter-writers, or Reviewers, whoſe main object ſeems to be, to have their laugh out, whatever truth or juſtice or decency or right reaſon may ſay to the contrary. And perhaps the wiſeſt way is to let them have their laugh out. It is a miſerable ambition, and its

ſucceſs

ſucceſs need not be envied; provided the world are diſpoſed to liſten afterwards to plain ſenſe and unvarniſhed truth. The whole ſyſtem is ridiculed, by which the Claſſics are uſually taught. It is not merely inſinuated, but aſſerted, that the knowledge of minute points of Grammar and the mechaniſm of Latin verſe are deemed the higheſt accompliſhments of a Scholar—and that "his ob-"ject is not to reaſon, *to imagine*, and to invent; "but to conjugate, decline, and derive."

"The great ſyſtem of facts with which he is moſt "perfectly acquainted, are the intrigues of the Heathen "Gods: with whom Pan ſlept?—with whom Jupiter?— "whom Apollo raviſhed? Theſe facts the Engliſh youth "get by heart the moment they quit the nurſery; and "are moſt ſedulouſly and induſtriouſly inſtructed in "them till the beſt and moſt active part of life is paſſed "away." Rev. p. 45.

I have copied the very words of this filthy ribaldry, in order that the reader may judge of the pure virtuous indignation which glowed in the breaſt of the ſatiriſt who wrote it. The deſcription is applied to the whole courſe of Engliſh Education, even to the advanced period of twenty-four. Now it is difficult to ſay how ſuch an adverſary is to be treated. To contradict him flatly, might be thought unmannerly; and yet that is the only treatment he properly deſerves, who

who with wanton levity perverts the truth. If the paſſage had occurred in a farce, or burleſque comedy, we ſhould forgive the falſehood for the ſake of the humour; and becauſe the writer himſelf does not expect to be believed. But this we are told by a perſon who affects in other paſſages the grave cenſor and indignant moraliſt, and who with a magiſterial air, forſooth, after his play is over, vouchſafes his ſerious advice on the ſubject of Education. As to the childiſh prattle which follows, about "the Æolic Reduplication," "Syl-"burgius his method of arranging defectives "in ω and μι," "the reſtoration of a dative caſe, "which Cranzius had paſſed over," which he ſays are the higheſt feats of glory in the eſtimation of a young Engliſhman, the whole is a tiſſue of ignorance and nonſenſe, of which a man of liberal education ſhould be aſhamed.

The entire paſſage is given at the bottom of the page[a]; it is hardly deſerving even of that

[a] "The diſtinguiſhing abſtract term, the epithet of Scholar, "is reſerved for him who writes on the Æolic reduplication, "and is familiar with Sylburgius his method of arranging "defectives in ω and μι. The picture which a young Engliſh-"man, addicted to the purſuit of knowledge, draws—his *beau* "*idéal* of human nature—his top and conſummation of man's "powers—is a knowledge of the Greek language. His object "is not to reaſon, to imagine, or to invent; but to conjugate, "decline, and derive. The *ſituations* of imaginary glory which "he draws for himſelf, are the *detection* of an Anapæſt in the

notice: but it may be as well to clear the ground of theſe light buſh-fighters, before we advance into the heart of the enemy's country, and beat up his cloſe quarters.

Firſt then of "him who writes on the *Æolic* "Reduplication." No man ever wrote on it; for this plain reaſon, that there is no ſuch thing. The *Dorians* are ſaid to have been fond of forming verbs in μι out of verbs in ω, which proceſs was uſually completed by prefixing the reduplication: as θέω, θήμι, τίθημι; and this mutation of verbs, but not the reduplication conſequent upon it, may be diſtinguiſhed by the name of their Dialect; which dialect is ſometimes confounded with the Æolic; and indeed by Maittaire they are treated as one. But there is no peculiar *Æolic* or *Doric* reduplication[b].

"wrong place, or the reſtoration of a dative caſe, which "Cranzius had paſſed over, and the never dying Erneſti failed "to obſerve." Edin. Rev. No. 29. p. 46.

[b] I cannot avoid ſubjoining a note upon this Æolic Reduplication, which may contain ſome matter intereſting to a few of my readers, and which will prove to all of them the ignorance of this Reviewer upon a ſubject, with which he affects to be quite familiar.

So far from practiſing reduplication, it was common with the Æolians as well as the Ionians even *to reject the augment*. "Nam Æoles, ab eo quod eſt χαίνειν, non apponunt in-"crementa præteritis, ſed dicunt χανόν." Scal. de Cauſ. Ling. Lat. c. 52. It is generally ſaid that the Latin language is deſcended from the Æolic Greek. I am inclined to think with Heyné, after Foſter and Burgeſs, [Excurſ. II. ad Il. 19.] that

There is an *Ionic* reduplication, by ε inſtead of ι, which was perhaps what the Reviewer meant, if he meant any thing. [Vid. Euſtath. ad Odyſſ. x. p. 1654. 29. et ibid. 32.] There was alſo an *Attic* reduplication, much practiſed by the Poets, as ἐρήρικα from ἐρίζω, and in the preſent tenſe, as ἀλάλημι from ἄλημι; and the Poets were apt to extend the reduplication of the preterperfect to other tenſes. [Vid. Clenard. ed. Sylb. 144. 10. et 103. 43.] Clenardus mentions alſo a *Bœotic* re-

that the diſtinction of dialects did not then ſubſiſt: and that in later times, when learned men were led to inveſtigate theſe matters, they found a greater affinity between the Latin and Æolic than between the Latin and any other dialect, only becauſe the Æolians retained moſt of the ancient language.

It is remarkable, ſays Heyné, that the only documents from whence Grammarians deduce their canons of Æoliſm, are the fragments of Lyric poets, and he ſeems to approve of Maittaire's method, who merges that dialect in the Doric.

There is a paſſage in a ſcarce book, *Hortus Adonidis*, p. 49; from which we learn that *the Sicilians* were fond of forming new verbs out of the preterperfect tenſe, as πεποιήκω from πεποίηκα, κεκλήγω from κέκληγα. Now the Sicilian was a ſubdiviſion of the Doric. It was a *ſpecies* prevailing in the Peloponneſian colonies, which went chiefly weſtward, as the Æolian did in the earlier colonies of Aſia. They have many points *in common*, but that which is *peculiar* to the Sicilian is *oppoſite* to the Æolian.

After all, I believe the origin of the Reviewer's blunder is to be found in page 66. of the *Winchester* Grammar; where *Æoles* occurs in the ſame paragraph with an example of *Bœotic reduplication*.

duplication, p. 103. 20. but no ſuch phraſe occurs as *Æolic* reduplication, except once (and, I am pretty confident, only once) by Sylburgius in his notes on that Greek Grammar, p. 456. where it is probably put by miſtake for *Attic*.

Now 2dly. of the memorable exploits of Sylburgius. Sylburgius never arranged any defectives in ω and μι. He leaves Clenardus's arrangement as it was; and corrects only ſome occaſional blunders, into which he and his commentator Anteſignanus had fallen.

3dly. What the Reviewer could mean by "a "dative caſe, which Cranzius had paſſed over," I cannot even gueſs. Perhaps there is ſome miſtake in the name: for there is no Commentator or Critic ſo called. At leaſt he was not known to Fabricius or Saxius; and the ſmall treatiſe on Grammar which Cranzius the Theologian and Juriſt publiſhed in 1506, is not mentioned by them in the liſt of his works, ſo inſignificant and uſeleſs was it become, after the labours of other ſcholars.

Laſtly, Erneſti is introduced as a champion of verbal criticiſm, when the facetious Reviewer would play off his pleaſantry on the abuſe of that ſpecies of learning. Moſt unfortunate of men! What ill ſtar could have led him to venture thus on the mention of particulars? *Dolus latet in univerſalibus* is indeed a ſound maxim. If he had

had kept to general buffoonery, he might have concealed his ignorance. But by ſpecifying facts and names he has ſpoilt all, and only expoſed himſelf. Every ſtudent knows that among all the foreign Editors Erneſti ſtands conſpicuous for his *practical* editions—that his notes are few and ſhort—and that he deſpiſed curious philological diſſertations which had no direct tendency to elucidate the author, or to aſſiſt the reader.

Let us now proceed to more important matters.

Upon the ſubject of ſchool exerciſes ſcarcely any thing can be ſaid, which has not been ſaid long ago by writers of great authority. The opinions of this writer are of no value. In fact, it may be ſaid of him, as of ſome late publiſhers of Sermons, that he has no opinions. One while he tells us, that the "imagination is too much "cultivated," p. 48; at another, that the ſtudent's great object is not to *imagine*, but to learn the technical rules of grammar. In one page he objects to the ſtudy of ancient Metaphyſics, Morals, and Politics, '*that the Greek alone is ſtudy enough* '*without them*;' and in the next, that '*all the* '*ſolid and maſculine parts of the underſtanding* '*are left wholly without cultivation.*'

It may be curious however to ſee the real opinions of two illuſtrious writers on this point of ſchool compoſitions. Milton rejects the practice

tice altogether, and calls it "forcing the empty "wits of children to compoſe themes, verſes, and "orations, which are the acts of ripeſt judgment, "and the final work of a head filled, by long "reading and obſerving, with elegant maxims "and copious inventions. Theſe are not matters, "he continues, to be wrung from poor ſtriplings, "like blood out of the noſe, or the plucking of "untimely fruit[c]." He makes no difference between compoſitions, in Latin and Engliſh, in verſe and proſe: he equally proſcribes them all.

Locke is juſt as adverſe to the practice, and much more diffuſe in his reaſoning againſt it. "By all means, ſays he, obtain, if you can, that "your ſon be not employed in making Latin "themes and declamations, and, leaſt of all, "verſes of any kind[d]." He then proceeds to inveigh againſt all ſuch exerciſes, eſpecially in Latin; and condemns verſes of every kind, chiefly for this reaſon. "If he has no genius to poetry, it is the "moſt unreaſonable thing in the world to tor-"ment a child, and waſte his time about that "which can never ſucceed; and if he have a "poetic vein, it is to me the ſtrangeſt thing in "the world, that the father ſhould deſire or "ſuffer it to be cheriſhed or improved;" adding, in ſubſtance, "that it is not likely to promote his

[c] Tractate of Education, vol. i. p. 275. 8vo.

[d] Vol. iii. p. 76. fol. ed.

"fortunes,

"fortunes, but rather to make him poor and "idle."

The ſketch of "a complete and generous edu-"cation," drawn by the firſt of theſe great maſters, is magnificent indeed and impoſing, but has never been thought reducible to practice even by his fondeſt admirers. It is read, and will continue to be read, for its bold and large conceptions, and the majeſtic eloquence of its ſtyle—for that heavenly fancy, and that mighty ſoul which breathes through all his works, and which makes even his prejudices and his errors awful.

For the memory of the other I alſo feel ſincere reverence, although his own opinions would have been entitled to greater reſpect, if he had himſelf treated with more deference the opinions of others who had gone before him, and the practice of ſenſible men of his own time, whoſe judgment was worth more, in proportion as it was confirmed by experience. The light freedom indeed, and the confidence with which this philoſopher attacks all eſtabliſhed notions, is one of the principal blemiſhes in his character. Intrepid and ſagacious he certainly is; but theſe are not the only qualities requiſite in a diſcoverer of truth; eſpecially if the enquiry be of ſuch a nature as to draw after it important practical conſequences. Caution and reſpect for the opinions of others, in all caſes, but more particularly in matters

matters incapable of demonſtration, are virtues not of the loweſt order.

To theſe authorities, as in a matter of judgment and experience, we may ſurely oppoſe that of Cicero and Quintilian. Locke pronounces, that writing does not help towards good ſpeaking, p. 77. Cicero ſays, it is the beſt and moſt efficient preparation for it. De Orat. i. 33. Quintilian recommends it as a main part of the education of an Orator; and deſcribes, with his uſual candour and good ſenſe, his own method in examining the compoſitions of his pupils. Inſt. ii. 4. So much for authority in this matter. The thing itſelf ſtrikes every one at firſt ſight as reaſonable: and the experience of moſt perſons concerned in education bears teſtimony to its uſe. Without ſome exerciſe in compoſition, the ſtudent, who has read even the beſt authors, feels a difficulty and embarraſſment in arranging his thoughts on any given ſubject, in connecting, illuſtrating, and adorning them. Juſt as in the conduct of life, if he has never been accuſtomed to think or act for himſelf, although he may have lived among the pureſt examples, yet when called upon to act or reaſon, he is apt to be diſconcerted, diffident, and confuſed. In fact, the utility, and almoſt neceſſity, of *practice* is ſo received a maxim, that we may fairly demand the ſtrongeſt proof againſt it, before we give way. Milton's reaſon does not meet

meet the queſtion. It is not for the value *to us* of what the boy writes, that we impoſe the taſk, but for the benefit of the exerciſe to himſelf.

To write well is, as he juſtly calls it, "the act "of ripeſt judgment;" it is the laſt beſt fruit, the τελευταῖον ἐπιγέννημα of an educated mind: but without previous effort and training, it is idle to expect that theſe manly virtues will ever arrive at maturity. That finiſhed offspring of genius ſtarts not, like Minerva from the head of Jupiter, perfect at once in ſtature, and clad in complete armour: but is the produce of ſlow birth, and often of a hard delivery; the tender nurſling of many an infant year—the pupil of a ſevere ſchool, formed and chaſtened by a perſevering diſcipline.

The ſame reply may be made to the objection againſt verſes. It is not that we ſeek to ſtock the world with new poems, but to give play in the moſt effectual manner to the *poetic faculty*, which exiſts to a certain degree in all minds, and which, like every other faculty, ought to lie wholly uncultivated in none. At leaſt it is an irreparable injury to young minds, if it be entirely neglected. They may ſtill be uſeful members in the mechaniſm of ſociety, if the powers of reaſoning and calculation only be encouraged: but they loſe that intellectual charm, from which life borrows its loveliеſt graces; they loſe, in a re-

 fined

fined age, the means of recommending Virtue herſelf, if taſte and elegance be not found in her train. The reaſoning of Locke on this ſubject does, I confeſs, appear to me ſordid and illiberal. He ſays, indeed, in a phraſe not very intelligible, that we muſt be careful how we "make anything "a boy's buſineſs but downright virtue." p. 76. But the improvement of the faculties which God has implanted in us, is ſurely itſelf a virtue. Our attention may be given in undue meaſure to one, and may violate that juſt harmony, without which nothing is virtuous, nothing lovely. But the faculty itſelf, which he condemns, was one of the kindeſt gifts of heaven. And why then ſhould man be niggardly where Providence has been bountiful? Why ſhould he think ſcorn of that pleaſant land, and undervalue thoſe fair poſſeſſions, which were not thought beneath the care even of the Almighty? In the garden of Eden, we read, was made to grow, not only what was good for food, but every tree alſo that was pleaſant to the ſight: and in that garden man was placed, to keep it, and to dreſs it.

That in ſome ſchools too much ſtreſs is laid upon this accompliſhment, I will not take upon me to deny. Let the exceſs, where it is an exceſs, be blamed and corrected. The reproach of the Reviewer, however, extends equally to the Univerſities:

Univerſities: and here I can undertake to affirm, the charge is falſe. If any thing, the fault lies on the other ſide. Verſes, eſpecially Latin verſes, are looked upon as a boyiſh exerciſe; and although it is the practice not to call for this exerciſe, except from thoſe who are known to excel in it, yet even this limited demand is ſeldom ſatisfied. So prevalent is the conviction, that the higheſt excellence alone can give it dignity; and that other roads to diſtinction are open, in which every degree of merit will command reſpect. Its utility, however, even in the lower department of elegiac verſe, is not generally underſtood. It imparts a habit of compreſſion without obſcurity; a habit of ſelecting the fitteſt materials, and of ſetting them in the niceſt order; and a command of pure, terſe, and poliſhed diction, which cannot long be practiſed without imparting a ſalutary tincture to all other kinds of compoſition. Still, I admit, it is not a principal, but a ſubordinate feature, in every ſound plan of education; and the farther we advance in life, the more urgently do other claims preſs upon us.

It is time however to notice the fourth charge of the Reviewer, the ſubſtance of which is, "that "in Oxford particularly, every manly exerciſe of "the reaſoning powers is diſcouraged."

The beſt anſwer to this will be given in the

account of our ſtudies; and ſomething, I truſt, has been already ſaid in refutation of it, when the falſe eſtimate made of the nature of Claſſical learning was expoſed. The ſtudent undergoes a cloſe examination in the *ſubject matter* of all he reads, and ſome of the works moſt read are no light exerciſe of the underſtanding. Strict Logic, Divinity, and Mathematical theorems, whether pure or mixed, cannot fail to diſcipline the reaſoning powers; and theſe form a part of the ſtudies in every College. There are lectures read in Experimental Philoſophy, in Aſtronomy, in Chemiſtry, in Mineralogy, and in Botany: how far theſe purſuits *exerciſe* the ſtudent's mind, can only be collected from the general tendency of ſuch ſtudies. They do not enter (except the two firſt, and theſe at the option of the candidate) into the examination for degrees; and as they are taught not by Tutors, but by public Profeſſors, it cannot well be aſcertained what impreſſion they make on each individual.

In reply however to the frivolous impertinence about checking the progreſs of ſcience, and keeping us back to the meaſure of the ancients, let it ſuffice to ſtate, that a rank fallacy runs through the whole argument. The writer confounds the *cultivation of literature* with the *acquiſition of ſcience*. In the former, unleſs our models be defective, which is not attempted to be ſhewn, the

the ſtudy of thoſe models muſt be as beneficial now as ever. In the latter, the ancients are not made our guides. We ſtudy them for the facts, the reaſonings, the deſcriptions, the characters and the ſentiments, for the principles and the examples of pure taſte, which they contain. Theſe muſt ever be what they once were, and their relative importance muſt ever remain the ſame. It is not the diſcovery of neutral ſalts, or the decompoſition of alkalis, that can alter the value of ancient literature—that can make eloquence leſs powerful, poetry leſs charming, hiſtorical example leſs forcible, or moral and political reflections leſs inſtructive. Where then is the wiſdom of bringing into compariſon things which have no common points of relation; which are in fact heterogeneous, and incommenſurate with each other? Whatever may be the advancement later ages have made in the knowledge of the properties of bodies, the temper and conſtitution of the human mind cannot have changed; and the writers beſt adapted to make impreſſion there, if we turn not ſtupidly and ſullenly away, will perform their office now as heretofore.

Never let us believe that the improvement of chemical arts, however much it may tend to the augmentation of national riches, can ſuperſede the uſe of that intellectual laboratory, where the ſages of Greece explored the hidden elements of which

which man conſiſts, and faithfully recorded all their diſcoveries. Never let us permit the volumes which incloſe theſe early records, which preſent us with a diſtinct view, not only of the reſults, but of each varied proceſs in all its ſtages; never let us permit them to moulder and periſh as they lie, inſenſible of that kind Providence which preſerved them through their long and dark voyage, and of thoſe heroic efforts which baffled all the fury of ignorance, and enabled them to ride out the ſtorm in ſafety. Some indeed have unhappily foundered in their courſe; but even of theſe, the ſcattered wreck has been waſhed in by the waves, and proves to us, while we gather along the ſhore its glittering fragments, how precious the lading was which has been caſt away.

If, in the ſearch for theſe diſmembered parts, ſomething more than ſober reaſon would dictate has been felt, ſome devotional paſſion, as for "the "torn body of a martyred ſaint," why ſhould we ſcoff at the honeſt toil, and not rather admire and applaud the zeal which ſuſtains it? As the feigned wandering of that Egyptian Queen for her loſt Oſiris, or, as the nobler fable tells, though born in later days [e], of the Virgin Truth, whoſe lovely form, once ſo perfect and glorious to look upon, was by a race of wicked deceivers hewn into a

[e] See Milton's "Speech for the Liberty of unlicenſed Print-"ing," p. 317. 8vo.

thouſand

thouſand pieces, and ſcattered to the four winds; ſo has it been with the body of ancient learning, mangled and diſperſed as it was throughout the world. And it is only by long ſearch and painful diligence, that limb after limb has been found, and reſtored in ſome meaſure to that form of perfect beauty which it once had. The ſervice ſurely is entitled to our thanks and praiſe: and that enthuſiaſm, which magnifies the value even of the minuteſt relic, will meet with reſpect and forgiveneſs among liberal minds. Mockery we know will always be the engine of vulgar malice, to undermine that which overtops itſelf; and envy will affect to deſpiſe what it does not and cannot poſſeſs. But from the more enlightened claſs, eſpecially from thoſe who hold up the torch of criticiſm, and pour its uſeful beams to the remote corners of our iſland, it is not too much to expect that the peaceful and inoffenſive purſuits of learning may be ſhielded from ſcorn and calumny—that they will not at leaſt themſelves wantonly attack them with rude clamour or inſulting ſarcaſm, and leaſt of all *fabricate* abuſes for the ſake of venting their ſpleen, or diſplaying the vain talent of wit and raillery.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Courſe of Studies purſued at Oxford.

NOTHING ſeems leſs underſtood, or more induſtriouſly miſrepreſented, than the courſe of ſtudies, which this Univerſity reformed and ſettled ſome years ago, and which is now purſued even more vigorouſly than at the time of its firſt inſtitution. In the preſent chapter I propoſe to explain very minutely its ſeveral parts; and to throw in occaſionally ſuch remarks as ſeem neceſſary to meet the objections, which are now and then alledged by haſty and ſuperficial obſervers. A plan of ſtudies ſketched on paper is, I am aware, often very fallacious: and nothing is more eaſy than to miſlead the public by a plauſible ſtatement of this kind. I have myſelf ſeen outlines drawn, divided into ſtudies of the firſt year, of the ſecond year, and ſo on, which appeared to comprehend almoſt all one could deſire to learn either in literature or ſcience: but the perſons who execute this plan muſt be more fortunate than common, if the materials on which they operate are capable of bearing it. In a Univerſity

ſity, one fourth part of which changes every year, the new comers differ ſo widely in age, in capacity, in diſpoſition and turn of thought, in previous knowledge and attainments, that it ſeems inconceivable how they can be claſſified in this manner, without a ſacrifice, not of extreme caſes, (for that muſt happen in all comprehenſive plans) but of ſomething worth preſerving and improving in all. The books and the portions of ſcience allotted to the firſt year are ſuch as many, by the moſt diligent ſtudy during four years, can never go beyond; while others come ſo ripe and forward as to be quite fit to begin where the former end. The facility, again, of learning, the rate of advancement varies in ſuch wide proportions, that no fair claſſification can be founded on this baſis. It is idle to think that any ſyſtem of education can equalize the powers of different minds. The nominal rank and precedence of the ſtudent, like rank in all the liberal profeſſions, muſt be determined chiefly, not by his merit, but by his ſtanding: the habits of ſociety, the mixed and entangled intereſts of life require it: but in obtaining this rank, it may be contrived (and it is the great ſecret of liberal education ſo to contrive it) that emulation ſhall be an active, ſteady, and commanding principle. Compulſion in ſuch caſes is ridiculous. It ſcarcely ſucceeds even in a

nurſery; and, as we advance in years, is leſs to be wiſhed for, and is in fact leſs practicable. Conſtant admonition, the conſciouſneſs of an overſeeing eye, the fear of reproof, and the hope of praiſe, are indeed of ſervice, are even neceſſary to overcome the deſultory habits of youth, to check its wanderings, to fix its reſolutions, and keep it to its purpoſe. Theſe however are ſecondary and incidental powers: they ſerve to refit and keep the machinery in order; but the great ſpring, which moves and invigorates the whole, is emulation.

According to the laſt regulations, the Univerſity Honours are obtained in the following manner.

When the ſtudent is about two years ſtanding, he is ſubject to a public examination, which admits him, not to the Degree of Batchelor of Arts, but to that intermediate ſtep, which ſtill retains its old title of *Sophiſta Generalis*. The old exerciſe was a logical diſputation in the public Schools on three philoſophical queſtions, which had long dwindled into an inſignificant form, before the preſent exerciſe was ſubſtituted in its room. At this previous examination he is expected to conſtrue accurately ſome one Greek and one Latin book at leaſt: the moſt difficult works are not required

required or encouraged, as there is no competition between the candidates, and an accurate grammatical acquaintance with the ſtructure of the two languages is the point chiefly inquired into. Xenophon, Homer, Herodotus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Demoſthenes among the Greeks, and Virgil, Horace, Salluſt, Livy, and Cicero, among the Latins, are the moſt uſual books. Beſides this, he is examined in ſome compendium of Logic, (generally Aldrich's,) and in Euclid's Elements of Geometry. It is not thought reputable for a candidate to have omitted either of theſe branches, but one of them is abſolutely required; and in all caſes he is made to tranſlate a paſſage from ſome Engliſh author into Latin. All this is done in public. Eight candidates may be examined in one day, who are all preſent during the whole time; and there is commonly a numerous attendance of Junior Students. Indeed there muſt of neceſſity be an audience, becauſe every candidate is bound to attend one examination before he is examined himſelf. The number however far exceeds what the Statute requires, and the School is often quite full. The Examiners are three in number, annually appointed by the Univerſity, and ſworn to the faithful performance of their duty.

If the ſtudent fails on this occaſion, it paſſes *ſub ſilentio*. He does not receive his certificate

at the cloſe of the day; and he may preſent himſelf again the next term.

After having paſſed this examination, his ſtudies are directed more ſteadily to the other, where the honour he acquires will depend entirely on his own exertions. He cannot preſent himſelf till after the third year is completed, and it is common to defer it till the end of the fourth year. He is then examined firſt in the rudiments of Religion: a paſſage in the Greek Teſtament is given him to conſtrue, and he is tried, by queſtions ariſing out of it, whether he has a proper view of the Chriſtian ſcheme, and of the outline of ſacred hiſtory. He is expected to give ſome account of the evidences of Chriſtianity, and to ſhew by his anſwers that he is acquainted with the thirty-nine Articles, and has read attentively ſome commentary upon them. He is examined again in Logic, the object being chiefly to ſee that he has juſt and firm conceptions of its leading principles; and, on this occaſion, ſelections from the Organon are often introduced.

The Examination then proceeds to Rhetoric and Ethics. Upon theſe ſubjects the celebrated treatiſes of Ariſtotle are chiefly uſed: and whoever is maſter of them knows what an exerciſe of the mind it is to acquire a thorough inſight into the argument, and what a ſerious diſcipline the ſtudent muſt have undergone, who has accompliſhed

compliſhed this point. The accurate method obſerved in each treatiſe renders it not a perplexing, but merely an arduous taſk: the preciſion of the language, the cloſe connection of the reaſoning, the enlarged philoſophical views, and the immenſe ſtore of principles and maxims which they contain, point them out as the beſt calculated perhaps of any ſingle works for bringing into play all the energies of the intellect, and for trying, not merely the diligence of the ſcholar, but the habit of diſcrimination which he has formed, the general accuracy of his thoughts, and the force and vigour of his mind. If it be at all of uſe to divide, to diſtinguiſh, and to define, to ſtudy clear arrangement and order, to diſcern connection, and to comprehend a plan compoſed of many widely-ſeparated parts, hardly any works can be named, ſo well adapted to all theſe purpoſes. To theſe is often added, at the option of the ſtudent, the treatiſe on Politics, which is in fact a continuation and completion of the Ethical Syſtem.

Beſides theſe treatiſes of Ariſtotle, Quintilian as belonging to Rhetoric, and the philoſophical works of Cicero, eſpecially that De Officiis, as belonging to Ethics, are admitted. And theſe laſt, as being of eaſier attainment, are of courſe the choice of many candidates. But neither of them are ſtrictly indiſpenſable.

In examining *viva voce* almoſt two hundred candi-

candidates every year, nearly in the ſame departments, much ſkill and care is requiſite, leſt a certain routine of queſtions be introduced, which a ſtudent may learn, and give to them ſome plauſible anſwers, without having drawn his knowledge from the original ſource. Nothing but practice and conſtant vigilance, joined to a familiar acquaintance with the ſeveral books, can effectually guard againſt this abuſe. And hence to a by-ſtander the Examination may often ſeem vague and deſultory, when the deſign only is, to probe the candidate here and there, and to aſcertain that his reading has been ſerious, not looſe or ſuperficial, or, as might ſometimes happen, none at all.

At this Examination the ſtudent preſents what number of Claſſical Authors he pleaſes, provided they be not leſs than three, and thoſe of the higher order, including both languages. It is not unuſual for thoſe who aim at the higheſt honours to mention Homer, Pindar, one, two, or three of the Greek Tragedians, and Ariſtophanes. Thucydides is ſeldom omitted. The other hiſtorians, and the orators, are alſo included, according as the ſtudent's line of reading has been. Of Latin Authors, beſides the poets of the Auguſtan age, Livy, Tacitus, Cicero, Juvenal, and Lucretius, are the moſt uſual. In the books that he names, he is expected to be well and accurately verſed. And although great encouragement is given to an

enlarged

enlarged range, yet a haſty and unſcholarlike manner of reading, however extenſive it may be, will not obtain reward, and is in fact much diſcountenanced.

Beſides the queſtions propoſed *viva voce*, many others in the different branches of the Examination are put, and anſwered on paper, while other things are going on. And in this manner alſo the candidate's knowledge of Latinity is tried.

The Mathematical Examination is quite a diſtinct buſineſs. It is conducted indeed at the ſame time, but is chiefly done on paper, if the ſtudent has advanced far in thoſe ſtudies; although for every candidate who preſents himſelf in Mathematics there is an oral examination, in which, with a table of diagrams before him, he is called upon, not to give full and long demonſtrations, but, as the Examiner turns over a correſponding table, to anſwer queſtions relating to the properties of figures, and the mode of proving certain theorems. The ſoundneſs of his ſcientific ſtudies is thus made known; and he has problems, which require time and cloſe attention, to ſolve at his leiſure on paper, while the examination paſſes on to others.

It muſt be well known to every one who has had experience in life, that, notwithſtanding this formidable array of books and ſciences, great numbers of candidates muſt be allowed to paſs, whoſe

whoſe attainments in both are, from various cauſes, very inconſiderable. Still if the ſyſtem be ſo conducted as to encourage exertion, it would be abſurd to reject thoſe of the moſt moderate pretenſions, who have paſſed through their period of reſidence with good conduct, and a tolerably regular attention to the preſcribed ſtudies. Nothing but extreme incapacity, extraordinary want of ſchool education, or groſs idleneſs at the Univerſity, will abſolutely exclude a ſtudent from his degree at the regular time. Of this deſcription ſome few are found every year. But even theſe are not finally rejected; they may appear at the following Examination, and, unleſs the ſame inſufficiency is again obſerved, generally paſs. 'Only ſix candidates can be examined in one 'day: and every candidate muſt produce a cer-'tificate of having attended two entire days of 'ſome former EXAMINATION before he can be ad-'mitted.'

Of thoſe who are thought worthy of Honours, there are two claſſes in the branch of Literature, and two in that of Mathematical Sciences; and nothing hinders a candidate from being diſtinguiſhed in each branch: indeed this double Honour is very frequent. The ſecond Claſs of each department is divided into two parts, an upper and a lower; ſo that in fact there are three claſſes of Honours in Literature, and three in Mathe-

Mathematics. The individuals of each claſs are arranged among themſelves, not according to merit, but in alphabetical order. It has uſually happened, that above one third of the whole number of candidates have been placed in the liſt of honour: but of theſe by far the greater part are in the lower diviſion of the ſecond claſs. All theſe names are printed: the names of thoſe who ſimply paſs, and obtain no honour, are not printed. If any candidate is rejected, it paſſes *ſub ſilentio*. His certificate is not delivered to him.

The Examiners are ſworn officers, appointed for two years; they are four in number, and muſt all be preſent, unleſs prevented by ſickneſs or ſome very urgent cauſe. The School is in general much crowded during the Examination-weeks, eſpecially when a candidate, who enjoys any previous reputation, is to appear. In ſuch caſes a ſtrong intereſt is excited among all orders, and great attention is paid.

It will be evident, from the ſtatement here given, that the ſtudents are prepared to paſs this examination, not by ſolemn public lectures, delivered to a numerous claſs from a Profeſſor's chair, but by private ſtudy in their reſpective Colleges. This method of ſtudy is the next thing which requires to be explained; for upon this point alſo the world are greatly, and in ſome inſtances purpoſely, miſinformed.

The mode of inſtruction by College Lectures, which prevails at both the Engliſh Univerſities, is an innovation upon the original plan, which formerly obtained among them, and which is ſtill practiſed in foreign univerſities, and I believe in thoſe of Scotland. Some peculiar advantages there are attending each method, and the beſt method perhaps would be that which ſhould unite both more completely than is the caſe with any modern univerſity. If, however, they are compared one againſt the other, as means of inſtruction, the preference ſeems ſtrongly due to that of College Lectures.

Under this ſyſtem the pupils of one tutor are eaſily claſſed according to their capacities, and the ſtock of learning and ſcience they bring with them. When formed into theſe ſubdiviſions, the choice of the lecture may be adapted to their peculiar wants, and the lecturer can perceive, individually as he goes along, how his inſtruction is received. The heavineſs of ſolitary reading is relieved by the number which compoſe a claſs: this number varies from three or four to ten or twelve: a ſort of emulation is awakened in the pupil, and a degree of animation in the inſtructor, which cannot take place with a ſingle pupil, and which approaches to the vivacity of a public ſpeaker addreſſing an audience. At the ſame time he can addreſs himſelf to individuals, ſatisfy their

ſcruples,

ſcruples, correct their errors, and in ſo doing, the ſubject being thoroughly ſifted and handled is ſeen in a variety of lights, and faſtens more durably on the mind of thoſe who are liſteners merely. Indeed, the impreſſion thus made by theorems of ſcience, and by proceſſes of reaſoning on every ſubject, is ſo much more vivid, and the means are at hand of aſcertaining ſo ſatisfactorily how each pupil receives what he hears, that the buſineſs of teaching is made leſs irkſome and fatiguing to both parties; and in a few weeks the tutor is enabled to form a juſter eſtimate of the abilities, and quickneſs, and mental habits, of his pupil, than any other ſyſtem could explain to him in as many years.

In reading the principal Claſſic Authors alſo, which forms a great part of Oxford Education, the advantages of this method are not leſs conſpicuous. A habit of accuracy, the laſt habit which a young man acquires by himſelf, is thus created. A thouſand points are remarked as he goes along, which would have eſcaped a ſolitary ſtudent. Bad ſchool-practices are corrected. Principles of taſte and criticiſm are conveyed in the moſt ſtriking manner, becauſe they ariſe out of the occaſion, and are taught with the example before him. Opinions of men and books, and whatever elſe is connected with the topics as they occur, are eaſily communicated. The ſcheme of literature

is gradually unfolded to his mind, according as he is able to bear it, and to profit by it. In fact, there is no work of the claſs here alluded to, which may not ſerve as a text-book; with which information of every ſort may, as the occaſion requires, be interwoven; and the mode of imparting it may be adapted to the individual who is addreſſed. It is thus that the ſtores of one mind may moſt effectually be transfuſed into another, whether concerning matters of literature, or philoſophy, or religion, or the conduct of life. It is in theſe readings that the full merit of thoſe ancient models is made prominent, and brought home to the feelings and apprehenſion of every one. They ſerve as ſpecimens and exemplars, according to which private ſtudy may be formed and moulded; for in private ſtudy, after all, the great field of literature muſt be traverſed. And hence is eſtabliſhed that intercourſe of mind, which, imperceptibly, gives a tincture even to the moſt thoughtleſs, and marks a laſting ſtamp on others, who are hardly conſcious of the ſucceſſive impulſes, by which the impreſſion is continually worn in.

In the more ambitious diſplay of a public Lecture, there are, beyond a doubt, advantages which private inſtruction cannot have. The effort of the Lecturer is naturally greater, his matter more carefully prepared, his tone and diction

more

more elevated and impreſſive. There are emotions which eloquence can raiſe, and which lead to loftier thoughts and nobler aſpirings than commonly ſpring up in the private intercourſe of men: when the latent flame of genius has been kindled by ſome tranſient ray, ſhot perhaps at random, and aimed leaſt where it took the greateſt effect, but which has ſet all the kindred ſparks that lay there, in ſuch a heat and ſtir, as that no torpid indolence, or low earthy-rooted cares, ſhall ever again ſmother or keep them down. From this high lineage may ſpring a never-failing race; few indeed, but more illuſtrious becauſe they are few, through whom the royal blood of philoſophy ſhall deſcend in its pureſt channels, but will hardly be brought down to mingle with the baſer alloy of the unſchooled multitude. It is not, it cannot be, the moſt effectual means by which inſtruction is to be conveyed to the minds of the great majority of ſtudents; and to do this, ſurely, is the prime object in any ſyſtem of national education. The ſucceſſion of illuſtrious names brought into notice by the other mode, is apt to caſt a deluſive ſplendour over the prominent maſſes which it illumines, and to withdraw our attention from the thouſand inferior objects which are crowded in the back ground, leſs captivating, it is true, to the imagination, but equally entitled to the care of true philanthropy. I would not undervalue

dervalue theſe higher doings; but we muſt be cautious how they lead us out of the track of plain and ſober induſtry. A thirſt for diſtinction may interfere with homely duties more really important to mankind. Our huſbandry is truly on a large ſcale; but let us beware how we ſacrifice, after the example of vain oſtentatious breeders, the food of ſome twenty or thirty, for the ſake of making a proud ſhew of one. Such produce is not the true or certain teſt of ſkilful management. If we ſend out into the world an annual ſupply of men, whoſe minds are imbued with literature according to their ſeveral meaſures of capacity, impreſſed with what we hold to be the ſoundeſt principles of policy and religion, grounded in the elements of ſcience, and taught how they may beſt direct their efforts to farther attainments in that line; if, with this common ſtock, of which they all partake, they be encouraged afterwards to ſtrike off into the ſeveral profeſſions and employments of life, to engage in the public ſervice of the ſtate, or to watch over and manage the leſſer circle of affairs, which the independent gentlemen of this country, and of this country only, conduct in their reſpective neighbourhoods; I think we do a greater and more ſolid good to the nation, than if we ſought to extend over Europe the fame of a few exalted individuals, or to acquire renown by exploring untrodden regions, and by holding

up

up to the world, ever ready to admire what is new, the fruits of our diſcovery.

Let not this be conſtrued into an admiſſion that ſpeculation is diſcouraged. The fact is not ſo. But it is not, and it ought not to be the buſineſs of a body. It is for us to execute an eſtabliſhed ſyſtem; to teach and to recommend what is thoroughly approved. Individuals may engage in the taſk of diſcovery; and they are better fitted for that taſk, if they be well informed in what is already known. In caſe they ſhould be rewarded for their honourable ſearch, "if truth "ſhall have ſpoken to them before other men," let them in the name of truth not withhold the ſecret; it will be eagerly liſtened to here as elſewhere; and if, after due probation, it be found to be indeed the voice of truth which ſpake it, our ſyſtem will thankfully receive the wholeſome aliment. But to expect that every crude opinion or untried theory ſhall enter as ſoon as it demands admiſſion, and take its place amongſt us, while we riſe up and make room to receive it, is againſt all reaſon and the analogy of things. Let the experiments be tried, and repeatedly tried, in ſome inſignificant ſpot, ſome corner of the farm: but let us not riſk the whole harveſt of the year upon a doubtful project.

There is one province of education indeed, in which we are ſlow in believing that any diſcoveries

can

can be made. The ſcheme of Revelation we think is cloſed, and we expect no new light on earth to break in upon us. The ſacred volume we know has been abuſed, (as what gift of the Almighty has not been abuſed?) for the worſt and wickedeſt ends. It has been hidden from the world, it has been corrupted, miſinterpreted, and perverted, ſo as to become an engine of fraud and error, and blind fanaticiſm. Theſe arts and theſe acts of violence we hold it our eſpecial duty to remedy and to guard againſt; to keep ſtrict watch round that ſacred citadel, to deliver out in due meaſure and ſeaſon the ſtores it contains, to make our countrymen look to it as a tower of ſtrength, and to defend it againſt open and ſecret enemies. It ſtands conſpicuous in all our ſtreets: it catches the eye in every direction, and at every turning: and we ſhould think all our views incomplete without it.

But I have, while purſuing theſe topics as they preſſed upon my attention, left two or three points omitted, which belong to the detail of our proceedings.

Notwithſtanding the high authorities quoted againſt the practice of compoſition, it forms part of the buſineſs of education in each College. Theſe exerciſes however are all in proſe, with the few exceptions before alluded to, and they are alternately Engliſh and Latin. In ſome Colleges a

ſelection

ſelection of the beſt is made every week, and read publicly before the College by the authors. In others they are collected at the end of each term, ſome judgment is pronounced upon them, and thoſe who have written the beſt are thanked and commended.

It is alſo the practice of moſt Colleges (certainly of all the larger Colleges) to examine every ſtudent at the end of each term in the ſtudies of the term. On this occaſion he preſents written notes and abridgments which he has formed, and gives an account of any other things he has read, connected with the main courſe of his ſtudies.

There have alſo been for about forty years Prize Exerciſes, propoſed by the Chancellor, in Latin Verſe, and Engliſh Proſe; to which our preſent Chancellor has added one, at his own ſuggeſtion, in Latin Proſe. Theſe are open to the whole Univerſity; and the ſucceſsful compoſitions are recited in the Theatre in the moſt public manner at the annual Commemoration. The number of exerciſes uſually given in is fifty or ſixty: and occaſionally a Prize in Engliſh Verſe is added, which has brought forth poems of no common merit.

Such is the outline of the ſtudies of this place: an outline, which I do not ſay is incapable of being improved and enlarged, but which does ſeem to comprehend all the leading objects of

liberal education. In particular, it might, without danger of interfering too much with the more efficient ſtudies of private colleges, admit of more frequent public lecturing than is at preſent practiſed. But to ſuppoſe that there is no ſuch lecturing, is a great miſtake. Beſides a courſe, and ſometimes two courſes, in divinity, I have already mentioned that lectures in this way are read by the ſeveral Profeſſors in Natural Philoſophy, Aſtronomy, Chemiſtry, Mineralogy, Botany, Anatomy, to claſſes drawn from different Colleges, at the option of the individuals, or under the advice of their tutors. Public lectures, which are rather detached diſſertations, are alſo read, one in each term, to the whole Univerſity by the Profeſſor of Poetry, and the Profeſſor of Modern Hiſtory. There is likewiſe a Courſe in Modern Hiſtory often read to a ſelect claſs, in which the doctrines of Political Economy have by the preſent Profeſſor been much introduced and diſcuſſed.

That Political Economy therefore is unknown or diſcountenanced as a ſcience, is equally wrong with many other imputations againſt us. The beſt works in that branch, as well as in the elements of Law and Politics, are in the hands of many ſtudents, with the full approbation of thoſe who regulate their ſtudies; although it is never forgotten that to lay a foundation of liberal literature,

literature, ancient and modern, before any particular purſuit abſorbs the mind, is our main buſineſs. Any ſtudent alſo may obtain aſſiſtance from the Profeſſors of Saxon and Oriental learning. But it is ſeldom that claſſes are formed in theſe branches. A few individuals, enough to keep up the ſucceſſion unbroken, have always made them their favourite ſtudy. But no account is taken of theſe matters at the Examinations for Degrees.

CHAP. V.

Of PLANS OF EDUCATION *in general, and particularly of Engliſh Education.—Abuſe of the term* UTILITY.—*Remarks on the Study of Political Economy and Moral Philoſophy—Of ſome vulgar errors reſpecting Oxford—Concluſion.*

PLANS of Education can never create great men. It is a weak and miſtaken opinion one now and then meets with in the world; and all the teſtimony of hiſtory and experience will never wholly explode it. Native vigour and perſevering exertion are the rare qualities, which lead to excellence of every kind. Theſe qualities, it is true, may be aided, encouraged, and directed by method. Still it cannot happen that the method beſt adapted for the generality of caſes will exactly ſuit each. The charge of education is a weighty one, and many intereſts are involved in it: it muſt be conducted with a view to the general benefit; and rules not always liked, not always profitable to individuals, muſt be inforced. Some perhaps will be impatient, and overſhoot the

the convoy, in hopes of making a better market. But it is at their own peril; and as the advantage is precarious, ſo is the failure unpitied, and without remedy.

There are again many who ſpeak, there are ſome even who have written upon education, as if in its beſt form it were one continued ſyſtem of reſtraint, of artificial guidance, and over-ruling inſpection. The mind, they tell us, may be moulded like wax; and wax-work truly is all theſe plans will make of it. Such was the old Platonic reverie: ſuch was the Jeſuit ſcheme, the moſt perfect drill-training, perhaps, from the Centinel to the General, that ever was deviſed. Such in a great meaſure is the method of the modern Quakers. Heaven, and the guardian genius of Engliſh liberty, preſerve us from this degrading proceſs. We want not men who are clipped and eſpaliered into any form, which the whim of the gardener may dictate, or the narrow limits of his parterre require. Let our ſaplings take their full ſpread, and ſend forth their vigorous ſhoots in all the boldneſs and variety of nature. Their luxuriance muſt be pruned; their diſtortions rectified; the ruſt and canker and caterpillar of vice carefully kept from them: we muſt dig round them, and water them, and repleniſh the exhauſtion of the ſoil by continual dreſſing. The

ſunbeams

ſunbeams of heaven, and the elements of nature, will do the reſt.

In the firſt ſtages indeed of infancy and boyhood, reſtraint muſt be continually practiſed, and liberty of action abridged. But, in proportion as reaſon is ſtrengthened, freedom ſhould be extended. At ſome of our public ſchools, it is ſaid, this freedom is indulged to a dangerous extent. The charge may be juſt; and if ſo, the evil calls aloud for correction. But when a ſtudent is ſent to the Univerſity, he ought to underſtand that he muſt think, in a great meaſure, and act, for himſelf. He is not to be for ever watched, and checked, and controlled, till he fancies that every thing is right which is not forbidden: as if there were no conſcience within him, and no God above him, to whom he is accountable. Obedience is indeed a virtue even in man; but it is obedience founded in right reaſon, not in fear. Unleſs joined with this principle, virtue itſelf hardly deſerves the name. Unleſs ſome choice be left it, ſome voluntary action to try its ſteadineſs, how ſhall it approve itſelf to be virtue?

On this principle I rejoice to ſee a manly and generous diſcipline eſtabliſhed among us—a diſcipline which enjoins nothing, which prohibits nothing, which puniſhes nothing, but what reaſon and common ſenſe declare deſerving of that treatment.

ment. There are decencies and formalities, indifferent perhaps in their own nature, which all well-ordered communities, eſpecially if numerous, find it expedient to inforce by rules; and which none but a depraved taſte would diſreliſh or habitually violate. But in all the great buſineſs of education, the ſtudent feels that what he does is his own doing; the free working of his own will; aſſiſted certainly by counſel, by reproof, and by encouragement; but ſpringing principally from his own ſenſe of what is fitting, virtuous, and honourable.

In the favourite ſtudies of the place, they meet with nothing but what tends to breed and foſter theſe noble ſentiments; to make them feel what they owe to their country in a land of freedom, and what their country expects from them. In the hiſtories of Thucydides and Xenophon they ſee reflected all the great cauſes and motives, which can ever agitate and diſtract their own nation. They read, unmixed with the prejudiced and perverſe clamours of party, the fatal conſequences of miſrule and anarchy, of wild democracy, of unlimited or unjuſt power. In theſe works, more eſpecially in the former, is ſpread out before their eyes a crowded but not a confuſed picture of human affairs, exhibiting all the paſſions, both in their ſecret workings and in their fulleſt energy—all the difficulties and duties of a true patriot—all the virtues, the vices, the intrigues,

intrigues, the reciprocal intereſts, and the diverſified fortunes of free ſtates; and with the fulleſt and minuteſt detail of facts are interwoven ſuch reflections and reaſonings, as muſt for ever fix on that hiſtory the ſeal of political wiſdom, and make it to be, what its author nobly and boldly foretold it would be, a ſtanding monument of inſtruction to all times.

In the latter of theſe writers they perceive how active patriotiſm and ſkill in affairs may be combined with the cultivation of letters and ſound philoſophy: while in his luminous narrative there occurs to them ſuch a lively and juſt account of things, ſuch ſtrong portraits, ſtarting, as it were, from the page in their native mien and features, as to carry almoſt all the diſtinctneſs, and more than all the authority, of living examples. And from no ſtudy can an Engliſhman acquire a better inſight into the mechaniſm and temper of civil government: from none can he draw more inſtructive leſſons, both of the danger of turbulent faction, and of corrupt oligarchy: from none can he better learn how to play ſkilfully upon, and how to keep in order, that finely-toned inſtrument, a free people.

To think that any ſtudent can peruſe and underſtand theſe works without catching ſome portion of the generous ſpirit that breathes in them, is to argue an ignorance of the frame and conſtitution

ſtitution of man's nature; and many, we truſt, there are, who, in the lofty language of Milton, "are led by them and drawn in willing obedience, "enflamed with the ſtudy of learning, and the "admiration of virtue; ſtirred up with high hopes "of living to be brave men, and worthy patriots, "dear to God, and famous to all ages."

So live they yet
Unchang'd by time, and hold their empire ſtill
With noble minds: ſtill lingering on the banks
Of Iſis' ſilver ſtream, the Muſe of Greece,
As by Iliſſus once, her awful truths
Unfolds, and draws from many a record proud
The great example, not in vain addreſs'd
To Britain's youth, that teaches how to prize
Their country's worth, and how to guard its weal
With virtue or with arms. Lo! where ſhe points
To Marathon's dread plain, and the rough ſhore
Of ſea-beat Salamis, and bids them mark
How Heaven itſelf will arm, to aid the cauſe
Of virtuous freedom. From the myſtic ſhrines
Of old Eleuſis, and her dark abodes,
Went forth "The Mighty Mother," and in clouds
Hovering aloft o'er Perſia's baffled hoſt
Pour'd wild diſmay, and on the Colian rock
Scatter'd the frequent wreck. Then while the flame
Glows in their youthful breaſts, pauſing awhile
The ſweet inſtructreſs bids them mark again
How Athens roſe to empire; firm, and wiſe,

Reſting her ſway on lovely virtue roſe;
Till wealth and power prevail'd at length to taint
Her ſimple faith, and warp'd her from the line
Of equal rule: and the vile demagogue
Unfix'd the people's mind: and looſening firſt
The fence of law, that held him from his prey,
Chang'd them from what they were, from juſt and mild
To fierce and cruel. Ponder th' eventful tale,
Ye riſing hopes of Britain, for it ſpeaks
With no light warning.

Such was the impreſſion made by theſe ſtudies on one, who had himſelf drank largely at the fountain of modern ſcience as well as of ancient learning; who lately ſhone a bright example among us, as the warm friend to merit of every kind; who never ceaſed to encourage, to direct, and to aſſiſt thoſe around him in every honourable purſuit; and who is now wiſely gone to enjoy the evening of life in repoſe, ſweetened by the remembrance of having ſpent the day in uſeful and ſtrenuous exertion.

It is not without reaſon then that we may think ourſelves injured and inſulted, when the world are told that we confine our inſtruction to the grammatical niceties of a dead language—that we repreſs all attempts at reaſoning upon moral and political queſtions—that, "by our miſerable "jealouſy and littleneſs, an infinite quantity of "talent

" talent is deſtroyed,"—that all the great topics, in which the mind of a public man ſhould be well informed, are not only neglected, but diſcouraged or deſpiſed. The world in general cannot know, what the writer of this calumny moſt probably knew, that the charge is falſe. They will naturally be impreſſed by the daring look and menacing tone with which theſe poſitions are advanced: and, unleſs they read with ſufficient attention to detect the ignorance and inconſiſtency of the writer, they will conclude, that, if not anſwered, they cannot be denied. In ſuch a caſe indeed, where the charge is totally unſupported by proof, and by the authority of any name, a bare denial is in ſtrict juſtice enough. No man can fairly be put on his defence, and expected to clear himſelf from looſe accuſations, without being even confronted with his accuſer. But what could not in ſtrict juſtice be demanded of us, it may ſtill be wiſe and prudent to concede. A decent reſpect for public opinion, which every man and every ſociety of men ought to entertain, makes it impoſſible to hear oneſelf openly and induſtriouſly defamed without ſome uneaſineſs, and without feeling ſome anxiety to give truth its fair chance againſt malice and defamation.

The words of this acrimonious invective I have not thought it always neceſſary to tranſcribe; but the ſubſtance of it will not be found, I truſt,

unfairly ſtated, if compared with the extracts below[a]; which contain ſome of the noxious infuſions in their moſt rectified and concentrated

[a] 'The Engliſh Clergy, in whoſe hands education entirely 'reſts, bring up the firſt young men of the country, as if they 'were all to keep grammar ſchools in little country towns; 'and a nobleman, upon whoſe knowledge and liberality the 'honour and welfare of his country may depend, is diligently 'worried, for half his life, with the ſmall pedantry of longs 'and ſhorts. .... A genuine Oxford tutor would ſhudder 'to hear his young men diſputing upon moral and political 'truth .... He would augur nothing from it, but impiety 'to God, and treaſon to Kings. And yet, who vilifies both 'more than the holy poltroon, who carefully averts from them 'the ſearching eye of reaſon, and who knows no better method 'of teaching the higheſt duties, than by extirpating the fineſt 'qualities and habits of the mind? If our religion be a fable, 'the ſooner it is exploded the better. If our government is 'bad, it ſhould be amended.' Edin. Rev. No. 29. p. 50.

'When an Univerſity has been doing *uſeleſs things* for a 'long time, it appears at firſt degrading to them to be uſeful. 'A ſet of lectures upon political economy would be diſcouraged 'in Oxford, probably deſpiſed, probably not permitted. ... 'The Parr or the Bentley of his day would be ſcandalized in 'an Univerſity, to be put on a level with the diſcoverer of a 'neutral ſalt; and yet, *what other meaſure is there of dignity in 'intellectual labour, but uſefulneſs?* .... Nothing would ſo 'much tend to bring claſſical literature within proper bounds, 'as a ſteady and invariable *appeal to utility* in our appreciation 'of all human knowledge. The puffed-up pedant would 'collapſe into his proper ſize, and the maker of verſes, and the 'rememberer of words, would ſoon aſſume that ſtation which 'is the lot of thoſe who go up unbidden to the upper places of 'the feaſt.' Ibid. p. 51.

form.

form. There is however one ingredient carefully thrown in, with a view to render the reſt more palatable—a plauſible affectation of zeal for what is termed *Utility*.

Upon this ſubject I have already treated at ſome length in the third Chapter. But the fallacy is of ſuch perpetual recurrence, that I muſt requeſt a little farther attention while the ſolidity of this pretenſion is accurately examined. *Utility*, if it means any thing, means that which is conducive to ſome good end. Thus a thing may be uſeful which is not good in itſelf, provided it lead to what is good. It is the value of the end, which muſt determine the value of the means. And if a queſtion ariſe concerning the comparative utility of two things, it can only be determined by conſidering the nature of the ends to which they reſpectively lead.

Now all thoſe arts and ſtudies which relate to the improvement of manufactures, and to the raiſing or multiplying the means of ſubſiſtence, terminate merely in the bodily enjoyments of man. Our houſes are better furniſhed, our tables better ſupplied, our travelling more commodious; and all theſe are very deſirable ends. But will any man who aſpires to the name of philoſopher maintain, that theſe are the principal ends of human life—that a rational being is moſt nobly occupied in ſupplying his bodily wants—in miniſtering

niſtering to the caprices of faſhion in dreſs, in building, in equipage, or in diet? There ſurely is ſome object paramount to all theſe, for which his faculties are fitted, and towards which they receive from nature ſome ſecret impulſe and bias; an impulſe which he is enabled to obey, in proportion as the preſſure of thoſe other motives is leſſened, which are inferior in dignity, although prior in neceſſity. To make *neceſſity* the ſtandard of what is praiſeworthy or honourable, is againſt the uniform judgment of mankind. If that poſition were admitted, the loweſt employments of life are unjuſtly depreſſed: for what ſervices are more neceſſary than thoſe which provide us with food and raiment? If the other wants and pleaſures of life could not be conſulted, without a ſacrifice of theſe, no man could heſitate to which to give the preference. It is only on the preſumption that theſe can be ſupplied by ordinary hands, and that there is time and labour enough at the diſpoſal of ſociety for other purpoſes, that we can at all juſtify thoſe leſs neceſſary purſuits, which engage the attention of the higher departments in civilized life. This univerſal teſtimony of mankind, uncalled for and undeſigned, appears to me the ſtrongeſt evidence for the reaſonableneſs of that diſtinction which every where prevails, and which admits only of ſuch variations as local and accidental peculiarities naturally cauſe. The main

prin-

principle is not only obſervable, but is prominent under all theſe variations, and has been ſo in all ages of the world.

Still we are continually reminded, that ſolid and uſeful attainments are preferable to thoſe which are leſs neceſſary, and which adorn rather than ſupport life. I readily grant that they are ſo: but only when brought into *competition* with each other. It is only when we are called upon to *make a choice between two*—when we cannot *have both*. We muſt build our houſe before we furniſh it: but he who ſupplies the library and the pictures may ſurely be allowed to rank above the artificer that raiſed the walls and framed the roof.

Neither can any diſtinction be juſtly made between the eaſe of *manual* and *intellectual* labour. They cannot indeed be altogether ſeparated, even in the loweſt occupations. And where the labour is purely intellectual, I do not ſee how its dignity can be meaſured by the tendency it has to ſatisfy the bodily wants of men. It is not, at leaſt, a ſelf-evident propoſition; which this Reviewer preſumes it to be. And if it be true, much more reaſon does there ſeem for meaſuring the mechanical and corporeal employments of life by that ſtandard. But it is *not true*, and never will be *eſtabliſhed* in the opinions of men. It may be brought forward upon occaſion, like many other plauſible

plauſible deceptions, to ſerve a tempory purpoſe, to excite odium againſt one party, or to acquire popular favour for another; and the miſchief may be great for a time, although the deluſion cannot be laſting.

There muſt be ſurely a cultivation of mind, which is itſelf a good: a good of the higheſt order; without any immediate reference to bodily appetites, or wants of any kind. Of this cultivation I ſhould ſay, as of many profeſſions and trades, that it muſt not be allowed to *interfere* with duties of a plainer kind. If they cannot *both* be allowed in the ſame ſociety, that which is leaſt neceſſary muſt give way. But in the preſent caſe, ſuch is not the queſtion. No pretence is ſet up, that an undue proportion is withdrawn from the general population, and employed in theſe ſtudies; but that the *ſtudies themſelves* are frivolous, becauſe they do not immediately tend to what is called *practical* good.

There are, it is true, emergencies of ſo imperious a nature, that they ſeem, while they laſt, to exalt the merit of him who relieves them, above that of every other ſervice. An emergency of this kind is war. But no one ſurely can deſire war on its own account. No ſincere Chriſtian, or friend to mankind, can wiſh the profeſſion of arms to be extended beyond the neceſſity of the caſe. The neceſſity may be lamented, but, after

the

the unvarying experience the world has had, it is the weak and viſionary theoriſt only that can expect to ſee it altogether removed. And having this experience before us, any ſyſtem of national education would be *wrong*, which unfitted men for that ſtate of things—any ſyſtem would be *imperfect*, which had not ſome tendency, direct or indirect, to fit them for it. And if Claſſical education be regarded in this light, there is none in which it will be found more faultleſs. A high ſenſe of honour, a diſdain of death in a good cauſe, a paſſionate devotion to the welfare of one's country, a love of enterprize, and a love of glory, are among the firſt ſentiments, which thoſe ſtudies communicate to the mind. And as their efficacy is undoubted in correcting the narrow habits and prejudices to which the ſeparation of the profeſſions gives birth; ſo in the rough ſchool of war is it more eſpecially exemplified, in mitigating the tone of that ſevere inſtructor, and in ſoftening ſome of his harſheſt features.

But I will not return, however attractive the theme, to a conſideration of the merits of the beſt Claſſic writers. The praiſes we beſtow upon them will be regarded by our adverſaries, not as *proofs*, but as *encomiums*; and if what has been ſaid is not ſufficient, there is nothing, I believe, that can be ſaid, to convince a heſitating and candid enquirer, how naturally they tend to inſpire

juſt and elevated thoughts; thoughts not merely adapted to ſolitude and contemplation, but to the intercourſe of ſocial life, and to the diſcharge of its moſt active duties.

Let me be permitted however, before I quit the ſubject, to tranſcribe a paſſage from the ſame Review: written at a time when candour and liberal ſentiment towards Engliſh Univerſities were not unknown to it.

'It is the reſpect which men of rank in England 'uſually pay to a Claſſical education, that drew from 'our Author the following compliment, in which we 'heartily join, in favour of our ſouthern neighbours, 'and which is valuable as coming from a man little 'accuſtomed to the complimentary ſtyle.'

"We ought to judge in matters of education, rather "from experience than from mere reaſoning. We ſhould "enquire what nation has produced the moſt active, "and the greateſt men; not indeed the greateſt number "of compilers and of book makers, but of the moſt in- "trepid, the moſt acute, accompliſhed, and magnani- "mous characters? This is very probably the Engliſh "nation." Edinburgh Review, Number vi. p. 352. On Lichtenberg's Miſcellaneous Works.

If ſuch be the advantages of a ſyſtem founded in the ſtudy of ancient literature, it cannot be an object of indifference with the nation, to ſee it firmly eſtabliſhed and well endowed. To preſerve and

and uphold with due care this venerable edifice, a large appropriation both of the men and of the property of the country may well be made. Many there certainly ought to be, whoſe peculiar office ſhould lead them to examine diligently all its parts, to bring together ſuch materials as are neceſſary to counteract decay, to maintain its ſolidity, to cleanſe, to improve and embelliſh it. But it is the *free communication of its uſe to the public*, which is their leading purpoſe; and, according as that duty is well or ill performed, the judgment of the public ſhould be pronounced.

That ſome of its apartments might not be arranged more commodiouſly, or furniſhed better, is more than I would preſume to ſay. But on the ſubject of Political Economy, of which we now hear ſo much, I will venture a few obſervations in our defence.

This is, beyond a doubt, of all ſciences relating to human intereſts, that in which the greateſt progreſs has been made in modern times; and much honour is due to thoſe writers who have let in light upon this hitherto obſcure and unfrequented track. But the effect of novelty and diſcovery is to attract for a ſeaſon an undue proportion of public favour. Such appears to me to have been the miſtake with regard to Political Economy: and, in many inſtances, it has been a dangerous, if not a miſchievous miſtake: for

the attainment of this ſcience ſeems almoſt to have ſupplanted all the other branches of knowledge requiſite for a ſtateſman; to have often narrowed his views, and to have made him regard every public meaſure ſimply in the relation it bears to national wealth. But this object, as I have already contended, and ever will contend, againſt the clamorous ſcioliſts of the day, is not the prime buſineſs of true policy. However important and even neceſſary it may be, it is a ſubordinate and not a predominant concern in public affairs—not leſs than the management and improvement of an eſtate in private life is an inferior duty to the education of children, the maintenance of character, and the guidance of a houſe.

Still it cannot be diſputed, that the ſcience, if rightly ſtudied, has a tendency to enlarge the mind, and that it will enable a man to perform many of the relative duties of life, both public and private, more correctly. On this account the introduction of it into the Lectures on Modern Hiſtory has always appeared to me a great improvement; and the ſtill farther extenſion of the ſame enquiry would, I am perſuaded, be much approved.

Its great leading principles however are ſoon acquired: the ordinary reading of the day ſupplies them. And with the majority of ſtudents, the more accurate ſtudy and inveſtigation of its theorems

orems may well be reſerved for thoſe ſituations and occaſions, in which many of them will be placed at ſome future ſeaſon, and which afford ample time for the completion of ſuch enquiries. When combined with practical exertions, and called forth by particular occaſions, theſe ſtudies gain a firmer hold, and are purſued with more eager intereſt. The mind ſhould indeed be early diſciplined and fitted for that work: but the work itſelf may be done when the time comes.

It is a folly to think that every thing which a man is to know muſt be taught him while young; as if he were to ſpring at once from College, and be intruſted with the immediate management of the world: as if life had no intervals for extending knowledge: as if intellectual exerciſe and the act of learning were unbecoming the ſtate of manhood.

With regard to this ſcience in particular, there are many points in it, which make me think it a fitter employment for the mind in an advanced period of life, than when the affections are young and growing, and liable to be cramped and ſtunted by the views of human nature which it continually preſents. There is perhaps ſomething in all theoretical views of ſociety, which tends to harden the feelings, and to repreſent man as a blind part of a blind machine. The frame-work of that great ſtructure muſt, we know, be put together upon ſuch principles. And the more enlarged

our

our ſphere of action is, the more correct and luminous ought our notions to be of their relative power and importance. But by far the greater part of thoſe who are educated for active profeſſions have leſs occaſion for contemplating theſe abſtract notions, than for adapting themſelves promptly to the limited relations of life in which they are placed; and in which the remedy of evils cauſed by the friction of the machine and by external accident, requires not that comprehenſive view of its whole conſtruction to be for ever preſent to the mind. It is not then that I would keep theſe truths out of ſight; it is not that I would deny the utility of them in every ſphere and condition: but where a choice is left us among many purſuits, all of which are in their ſeveral degrees beneficial, I would be very cautious how that was ſingled out and made predominant, which is ſo prone to uſurp over the reſt, and the abuſe of which is not a laughable, but a ſerious evil.

Much we are told from day to day of the folly of pedantry. The folly is indeed ridiculous, and it is ſeldom ſpared. But the pedant in chemiſtry, or in phyſics, is at leaſt as diſagreeable an animal as the pedant in claſſical learning; and the pedant in political economy is not diſagreeable only, but dangerous. And if a proſpect were open to a young man of a period of leiſure after his term of college-ſtudy ſhould be expired, it ſeems more adviſable

adviſable to lay the foundation for this ſcience by exerciſing his mind in ſound Logic and in Mathematical reaſoning, upon which any other ſyſtem of cloſe and ſevere reaſoning may ſoon be built, than to run the riſk of ſacrificing that more generous diſcipline, which, if not imparted at an early period of life, is ſeldom acquired afterwards.

Never, while the world laſts, will it be wholly diſabuſed of that ſpecious error, that the more there is crammed into a young man's mind, whether it ſtays there or not, whether it is digeſted or not, ſtill the wiſer he is. And writings ſuch as that which I have been examining, ſmart, witty, and confident, tend to confirm this diſeaſed habit of thinking, and to ſpread the contagion. A half educated father hears that lectures are read in Chemiſtry, Botany, Mineralogy, &c. &c. at one place, and his ſon is learning nothing of this ſort at ſchool. Incapable of judging how mental powers are improved by continual exerciſe, and how the moral character is in a great meaſure formed by the ſtudy of good authors, he fancies that when the grammar of a language is learnt, all farther attention to that language is loſt time—that there is nothing new gained, becauſe there is no new name. If the boy is captivated by the novelty and variety of the ſtudies which are preſented to him, he ſeldom returns with any reliſh to philological purſuits. He may become a ſkilful agriculturiſt,

an

an improver of manufactures, an uſeful inſpector of roads, mines, and canals: but all that diſtinguiſhing grace, which a liberal education imparts, he foregoes for ever. It cannot be acquired in a later period of life, if the morning of his days have been occupied with other cares, and the intellectual habits already ſettled in different forms and poſtures. If, as too often happens, theſe matters are received into the ears, but take no poſſeſſion of the mind, there is not only a moral blank, but an intellectual barrenneſs—a poverty of fancy and invention, a dearth of hiſtorical and poetical illuſtration, a want of all thoſe ideas which decorate and enliven truth, which enable us to live over again the times that are paſt, to combine the produce of widely diſtant ages, and to multiply into one another the component parts of each. The experiment is a cruel one. I have ſeen it tried; and have witneſſed the melancholy and irreparable reſult.

On the contrary, if this liberal inſtruction be firſt provided, and if the intellect be duly prepared by correct Logic, and pure Mathematical ſcience, there is no analyſis, which the buſineſs of life may afterwards call upon him to inveſtigate, beyond the reach of a moderate underſtanding. The habit of diſcrimination; the power of ſtating a queſtion diſtinctly, and of arguing with perſpicuity, are of much greater importance than the haſty acquiſition of miſcellaneous knowledge. Not that I would

would be underſtood to exclude the ſtudy of thoſe matters from an Univerſity. They are taught, and eſteemed and encouraged here: but we do not deny that they are the ſubordinate, and not the leading, buſineſs of education: and (what I think ſhould never be forgotten) they are much more eaſily attained by a well diſciplined mind, after he enters into life, than the other ſtudies upon which we lay the greateſt ſtreſs.

If it be ſeriouſly complained of as a defect, that ſcepticiſm either in philoſophy or religion is diſcountenanced, I can only pity the folly of the writer who could advance ſo untenable a poſition. If indeed the object of education be to diſtract the mind of the ſtudent, to make his opinions looſe, wavering, and confuſed, inſtead of guiding his choice, aſſiſting his judgment, and concentrating his powers, then we muſt admit that we are altogether under a miſtake. If he was ſent here, not to be fed with what we believed to be the moſt wholeſome diet, but to be turned adrift amongſt a medley of all ſorts of food and all ſorts of poiſon, and left to chooſe for himſelf, then indeed have we ſtill to learn our duty, and to begin at that point where we have hitherto fancied education ought to end. But the wretched abſurdity of this doctrine is too manifeſt to bear a queſtion. It muſt ſeem like trifling to attempt its refutation. I will therefore proceed to notice

one topic more, on which I have heard the complaints of friends as well as enemies.

Much wonder has been ſometimes expreſſed, that, in ſo important a ſcience as Moral Philoſophy, no more diſtinct proviſion ſhould have been made in the Engliſh Univerſities, and that ſo much reſpect ſhould ſtill continue to be paid, more eſpecially in Oxford, to the ancient heathen ſyſtems of Ethics, after ſo many corrections and improvements, with the light and authority of the Goſpel to guide us.

To this objection the firſt anſwer which occurs is, that, in a Chriſtian community, Ethics is much more included within the province of Religion than that of Philoſophy. Without the ſanction of Religion, the pureſt ſyſtem of Ethics would be comparatively lifeleſs and unfruitful: and without ethical inſtruction, Religion itſelf is vapid, and even dangerous. They may be conſidered as inſeparable ingredients of one compound; and the care of teaching both in the moſt effectual manner may well be intruſted to the ſame hands. It is then to the pulpit that we are to look for the fulleſt performance of this branch of education; and it is in this ſervice that we ſee called forth amongſt us the greateſt efforts of moral and metaphyſical reaſoning.

The name of Sermon has with ſome people become ſynonymous with a trite ſuperficial ſtatement

ment of truths which no one combats. A volume of Sermons is too often regarded by the world in that light: and it is well known to be a moſt unpromiſing title to a work. Call the ſame compoſition, Lectures in Moral Philoſophy, Diſſertations on certain theorems in Ethics or Metaphyſics, and it is immediately ſuppoſed to contain ſomething profound—ſome diſplay of acute and original reaſoning—ſome new illuſtration or powerful vindication of eſtabliſhed truths. And the ſame injuſtice is equally obſervable with regard to the unpubliſhed arguments which are continually framed, and delivered from the pulpit. The inſtruction, however, thus conveyed is, for all practical purpoſes, and in a great degree alſo for intellectual exerciſe and improvement, the moſt ſolid and impreſſive.

Religion adapts itſelf to all conditions, to all occupations, whether of mind or body; and that form, in which its truths are beſt repreſented to a congregation of ſtudents and of educated men, is one which calls for a power of abſtract reaſoning, and for a knowledge of the beſt Ethical works, the matter of which, according to its worth, may be incorporated with religious diſcourſe. Hardly any man but the Euthuſiaſt contends that the Goſpel was deſigned to ſuperſede moral reaſoning. It adds a ſanction to Ethics, which the ſublimeſt philoſophy could never give: it corrects ſome

errors, into which the pureſt philoſophy, without that guide, had fallen. But it diſplays no entire and ſyſtematic code, which renders the employment of our natural faculties in ſuch an enquiry leſs needful: on the contrary, it affords a ſtrong additional ſtimulus to exert them in this ſervice. If therefore the whole of what we learnt in Morals were to be derived from one work, no Chriſtian could heſitate between the ſyſtem of Ariſtotle and the ſyſtem of Paley. The latter work is well known here, and never mentioned without reſpect. But whether as an exerciſe of the reaſoning faculty, or as exhibiting moral theorems in a more captivating and convincing ſhape, I cannot think it entitled to a decided preference. It may lead to a notion alſo, that it contains *all* we think well eſtabliſhed in Chriſtian Ethics: whereas the Greek Philoſophy is always ſtudied with a reſerve in favour of Chriſtianity, and an habitual reference is made to a more unerring ſtandard, by which its ſoundneſs is to be tried. When we conſider too how frequently, from the very nature of the caſe, a popular modern work in Engliſh will be read without much peculiar encouragement, while a foreign ſtimulus is almoſt always wanted to make an ancient treatiſe of any depth generally ſtudied, the prudence of fixing on the latter, ſuppoſing them nearly equal in value, as the object of reward and honour, cannot be queſtioned.

queſtioned. My own conviction, after much conſideration of the matter, decidedly ſettled in that way: but I admit it to be a point, on which different opinions may well be entertained, even by people acquainted with the works of both claſſes.

In the view which has thus been given, and the defence which has been attempted, of Oxford Education, although I have not been able, nor indeed have I been willing, to ſuppreſs the ſtrong affection which I feel for the place and for its peculiar ſtudies; yet nothing has been farther from my mind than to act the part of a profeſſed advocate—to hide its defects—to exaggerate its merits—and to give a falſe complexion to the whole caſe. It is one of the marks either of extreme weakneſs or of artful malignity, to draw an ideal picture of what a ſeminary of learning might be, or ought to be. A kind of intellectual paradiſe is delineated, from which human paſſions, prejudices, and intereſts are altogether excluded. Nothing is to occupy the mind but a never-failing and laborious attention to peculiar duties. No allowance is to be made for difference of bodily or mental conſtitution—none for occaſional languor, or fluctuation of ſpirits—none for the avocations of buſineſs—for multiplied and entangled connections—for purſuits of private intereſt

tereſt and advancement; purſuits which are thought not only allowable, but laudable in every other department of life. And when this viſionary ſcene has been exhibited to the fancy, what wonder if the reality ſhall be found homely and diſappointing! Where human beings are, human follies and intereſts will ever be found. The compariſon ought not in candour to be made with a perfect ſtandard; but with that which ſeems fairly attainable, and reaſonably to be expected in the preſent ſtate of things. If there be any inſtitution ſo pure, any body of individuals ſo devoted to the public good, that no other motive finds place in their minds, and no other view or inclination, from day to day, is harboured there, but the ſervice of God and man, let *them*, (with ſolemn reverence and ſincerity of heart I ſpeak it,) let them caſt the firſt ſtone at us. But theſe are not the men, from whom the language of inſult and invective is heard. It is that many-tongued ſpirit of jealous diſcontent or political diſcord, which utters theſe jarring ſounds; which ever and anon flits acroſs our path, and, occupying ſome ſheltered nook or over-hanging eminence, derides us with fiendlike mockery, and points with a reproachful hand at each faultering ſtep or accidental failure: while nothing ſeems to delight it more than to ſee its elfiſh tricks imitated by an idle throng of ſpectators, or to hear an echo

of

of laughter raiſed at the expence of ſilent and unpretending worth.

There are, moreover, ſome points in the conſtitution of this place, which are carefully kept out of ſight by our revilers, but which ought to be known and well conſidered, before any compariſon is made between what we are, and what we ought to be. *The Univerſity of Oxford is not a national foundation.* It is a congeries of foundations, originating ſome in royal munificence, but more in private piety and bounty. They are moulded indeed into one corporation; but each one of our twenty Colleges is a corporation by itſelf, and has its own peculiar ſtatutes, not only regulating its internal affairs, but confining its benefits by a great variety of limitations. In this particular, I believe, we are much more reſtrained than the foundations in Cambridge, although in many caſes the limitations bear a cloſe reſemblance. In moſt Colleges the fellowſhips are appropriated to certain Schools, Dioceſes, Counties, and in ſome caſes even to Pariſhes, with a preference given to the Founder's kindred for ever. Many qualifications, quite foreign to intellectual talents and learning, are thus enjoined by the founders; and in very few inſtances is a free choice of candidates allowed to the Fellows of a College, upon any vacancy in their number. Merit therefore has not ſuch proviſion made as the extent

tent of the endowments might ſeem to promiſe. Now it is certain, that each of theſe various conſtitutions cannot be the beſt. The beſt of them perhaps are thoſe where an unreſtrained choice is left among all candidates who have taken one degree. The worſt are thoſe which are appropriated to ſchools, from which boys of ſixteen or ſeventeen are forwarded to a fixed ſtation and emolument, which nothing can forfeit but flagrant miſconduct, and which no exertion can render more valuable.

But what can be ſaid to all this? Are the wills of private benefactors to be ſet aſide, not becauſe they contain proviſions *injurious* to the public, (for in that caſe no one could queſtion the propriety of interference in the Legiſlature,) but ſimply becauſe theſe proviſions are *not the beſt that might have been?* If the country were about to allot anew any portion of its wealth for the purpoſe of education, of courſe the plan would be uniform, and the regulations ſuch as might ſeem beſt adapted, in every reſpect, to promote the deſired end. But an Engliſh Legiſlature has always evinced, and I truſt ever will evince, a tender regard for the authority of Wills, and the ſacredneſs of private property. Whatever innovations may be made, no one can apprehend from ſuch a Legiſlature, that any perſonal loſs ſhould be ſuſtained by the preſent individuals. And whether even the

maintenance

maintenance of a ſacred principle be not a greater good than the mere *amelioration* of a ſyſtem, ought to be, and would be, I am confident, well conſidered, before any change is made [b].

[b] Mr. Cockburn, Chriſtian Advocate at Cambridge, has propoſed a plan for limiting the duration of all fellowſhips to ten or twelve years, ſecuring of courſe the preſent poſſeſſors from any loſs or injury. Although I admire and applaud the zeal of this writer, and have no doubt of the purity and rectitude of his intentions, yet I cannot think his plan deſirable, on ſeveral accounts. The hardſhip, which many individuals would *certainly* ſuffer, outweighs in my mind the value of any *incidental good* which might ariſe from this ſyſtem. Beſides, the great object propoſed is, to ſend Fellows of Colleges into active employment. Now this purpoſe is already effected by the permiſſion, univerſally granted, of non-reſidence. Not more than one ſixth part, I believe, of the Fellows of Colleges in Oxford are reſident; very few more than are engaged in the buſineſs of education. The reſt are employed in the world in different ways. The ſyſtem of non-reſidence is carried ſo far, as to have affected materially the aſpect of the place, perhaps farther than in prudence it ought to be. Very few are there who are poſſeſſed of leiſure to carry on learned works. And the conſequence is, that the buſineſs of Authorſhip is often aſſumed by moſt incompetent hands; while abler men are occupied in the more uſeful but leſs ſhewy taſk of tuition. On this ſubject I believe the public are much miſinformed. The life of a College is far from being the life of a Cloyſter. The character of a Fellow of a College, ſo often made the theme of ſatirical humour, like that of the Squire in country life, has nearly diſappeared. The evil, if any, is now reverſed. So far from a College being a drain upon the world, the world drains Colleges of their moſt efficient members; and, although the Univerſity thus becomes a more effectual engine of education, it loſes much of that characteriſtic feature

In the mean time I never wiſh to ſee the Univerſity placed above reſponſibility to public opinion. I never wiſh to ſee her ſhielded from the fear of public cenſure, repoſing ſecurely on her endowments, and diſregarding the clamours of the world around her. It is the terror of the public voice which keeps in awe our very Government, and all our public inſtitutions: and when once that ſalutary check is removed, we know how ſoon every ill weed ſprings up and ripens in every quarter of the eſtate, and how indolent all its ſtewards and labourers become. To the voice of the public we ought always to anſwer with reſpect, and to render an account, if called upon, of our proceedings. And when that account is fairly given in, I do not fear that a judgment will be paſſed, upon the vain and ungenerous expectation of perfect virtue. If indeed the great purpoſe of national education were defeated or lightly regarded by us, if the life-blood of England, inſtead

it once had, as a reſidence of learned leiſure, and an emporium of literature.

Having mentioned this pamphlet of Mr. Cockburn's, I cannot avoid repeating, that I admire the ſincerity and benevolence of the Author, and that I enter warmly into his views of the danger to which the Church is expoſed, not from the attempts to effect Catholic Emancipation, as it is abſurdly called, but from the ſubtle activity of its adverſaries, and the ſupineneſs and indifference of thoſe who ought to be its moſt energetic defenders.

of

of being invigorated by healthy food, and quickened by pure patriotiſm, were ſent back tainted and diſeaſed, to circulate through her veins diſloyalty, irreligion, or fanaticiſm, then indeed might we hang down our heads in ſhame, and ſhrink from that ſtorm of obloquy which is gathering ſo thick around us. But if no ſuch deadly miſchief is ſuffered to lurk here; if, with the allowances candour will ever make for human frailty, we be found upon the whole to diſcharge our duty with diſcretion and fidelity; we need never ſcruple to meet our accuſers with a clear and unabaſhed countenance; confident, as we well may be, that we ſhall continue to enjoy the protection of the government we live under, and the favour of that nation, whoſe beſt intereſts we ſerve.

THE END.

BR

DEC 1 0 1996